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BROOKS, JOSEPH R., Ed.D. The Legal Aspects of Equal Employment 
Opportunities in the Public Schools. (1984) 
Directed by Dr. Joseph E. Bryson. 186 pp. 
This study reviews federal laws, state laws, and case laws, de­
cisions of regulatory agencies, Executive Orders, and Equal Employment 
Opportunity Guidelines where equal employment opportunity has been the 
major issue. The study focused on applicability of these legislative and 
judicial decisions on employment in public schools. 
The following questions were proposed and answered: 
1. What are the Equal Employment Opportunity laws that cover 
public school employees and who is covered? 
2. How are the Equal Employment Opportunity laws enforced? 
3. What is the legal status of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission and how does it function? 
4. What legal principles of equal employment opportunity have 
been established through case law? 
5. What are the current trends in Equal Employment Opportunity 
laws and rulings? 
6. Based on this study, what are the legally acceptable standards 
which are most likely to prevent charges of discrimination in 
public school employment? 
Based on analysis of this study, the following conclusions were 
reached: 
1. School board policies are legally binding on employers and the 
employees. 
2. School board policies that result in charges of unlawful employ­
ment practices may have to be proven by the employers to be 
bona fide occupational qualifications to stand muster in the 
courts. 
3. Practices and patterns of equal employment opportunities must 
not disadvantage protected classes of individuals. 
4. Administrators and boards of education who make employment 
decisions need to act with well reasoned procedures and antici­
pate the potentially adverse impact of their decisions. 
5. Personnel officers in the public schools, aided by legal coun­
sel, must be familiar with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
laws and regulations applicable to public school employees. 
6. Personnel officers must understand and be prepared to re­
spond appropriately to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) by having a working knowledge of Title 
VII and the EEOC Guidelines, questions and answers, and 
Commission opinions. 
7. School attorneys need to regularly advise personnel officers 
regarding the legal remification of employment practices. 
8. Personnel officers need to avail themselves of special training 
to understand equal employment opportunity procedures. 
9. Politics and litigation are constantly in a change mode and the 
impermissable and the permissable rise and fall on political and 
judicial decisions. They usually have predictable trends, but 
have been somewhat irregular in the rulings based on Title 
VII. 
10. Sexual harassment has not been faced realistically by most 
school systems. Few policies exist to handle the issue of 
sexual harassment. 
11. Maternity benefits are still in litigious limbo. 
12. Comparable worth is the newest area of major litigation and is 
likely to be the subject of many law suits in the 1980's. 
13. Salary and benefit conflicts arise when policies are not clear 
and specific. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Overview 
Employment discrimination, an issue in both the public and the 
private sectors, has provided the basis for a myriad of court decisions, 
Presidential Orders, federal and state guidelines, rules, policies, and 
regulations. Beginning with the Civil Rights Act of 1866, employment 
discrimination has been a continuing concern of the American people for 
over one hundred years. Both state and federal legislative bodies and 
the courts at all levels have sought to make it illegal to engage in 
employment discrimination. 
Immediately following the Civil War, the United States Congress 
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866. In addition to providing a 
guarantee to the newly freed slaves that they would have the same legal 
rights as whites, the act also included the right to enter into contracts 
of employment without discrimination. 
The Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870, which are certified in the 
United States Code, were weakened by a series of court decisions in 
1883. These decisions mandated that the Acts were intended to cover 
only acts of discrimination by a state and were never intended to 
cover the private sector. These judicial decisions, commonly called 
"the Civil Rights Cases", struck down the federal protection that gave 
142 U.S.C. Sections 1981 and 1983. 
2 
blacks and other minorities the right to enter into contractual 
agreements with private parties. The passage of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 provided for the reinstatement of the coverage of employment in 
2 the private sector. 
From 1866 and up to the New Deal administration of President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, governmental action provided protection 
primarily for governmental employees. The Civil Service Act of 1883 
sought to establish the principle of "merit employment", and contained 
one of the first regulations issued under legislated law making religious 
3 
discrimination in federal employment illegal. 
President Roosevelt's Executive Order 8587 issued in 1940 
contained a Civil Service rule making racial as well as religious 
discrimination illegal. In 1940, the United States Congress established 
through the passage of the Ramspeck Act, which served to amend the 
Classification Act of 1932, a philosophy of "equal rights for all" in 
4 classified federal employment. 
Equal opportunity in the availability of training, in addition to 
equal employment opportunity, evolved from the political environment of 
the New Deal through Presidential Order and Congressional action. The 
equal opportunity for training is prescribed in those areas where federal 
? 
Kenneth P. Norwick, Your Legal Rights: Making the Law Work 
for You (New York: The John Day Company, 1975), p. 191. 
^The Pendleton Act (Civil Service Act), 22 Stat. 403, (1883). 5 
U.S.C. Ch. 12, (1958); U.S. Civil Service Commission, Rule VIII, 1883. 
4 Bureau of National Affairs, The Equal Employment Opportunity Act 
of 1972, (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1973), 
p. 14. 
3 
funds are expended for employment and training. The requirement 
applies not only to the direct federal employment but also to employment 
by governmental and training contractors as well as training opportuni-
5 ties provided by grant-in-aid programs. 
In the closing years of the New Deal, World War II became the 
top priority of the nation. However, the legislative and executive 
branches of government continued to focus on the problems of discrimi­
nation. Through their own initiative they responded to pressure groups 
that were advocating fair employment practices, not only in the public 
sector, but in the private sector as well. 
This initiative in Congress, supported by the President, Lyndon 
B. Johnson, reached a zenith in the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. Title VII of this act prohibits employers, employment agencies, 
and labor unions from committing certain discriminatory acts. It pro­
tects individuals from discrimination on the basis of color, race, religion, 
sex, or national origin. 
Title VII provided for the establishment of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). This federal agency is given the res­
ponsibility to secure compliance with Title VII. A network of offices 
exist throughout the nation to make the services provided by EEOC 
available to any person who needs its help because of perceived acts of 
discrimination on the basis of color, race, religion, sex, or national 
origin. The EEOC staff investigates such charges and seeks to bring 
resolutions. 
5Ibid., p. 15. 
4 
In recent years both the EEOC and the Supreme Court have recog­
nized that the mandate of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 could not be met 
by prohibiting practices intentionally designed to deny opportunities to 
minorities. Practices that are not racially motivated may, nonetheless, 
operate to disadvantage minority workers unfairly. In the landmark 
g 
case of Griggs v. Duke Power Company , the Supreme Court's appli­
cation of Title VII invalidated the use of general intelligence tests and 
other selection criteria for employment that causes disparate treatment 
for minorities. The only exclusions are those criteria that are shown 
to be bona fide occupational qualifications (BFOQ).^ Thus, the courts 
become the ultimate watchers of discriminatory behavior in the work 
place. 
As government agencies, public school systems in America come 
under the same laws and regulatory requirements as do other private 
and public employers. Therefore, school personnel officers are 
increasingly involved in monitoring employment procedures as the 
administrators responsible for affirmative action in the public school 
systems. In this capacity, the personnel officer is responsible to 
provide leadership to prevent charges of discrimination through 
effective employment discipline and dismissal procedures. 
The personnel officer's role in cases where charges are filed with 
EEOC or in a suit taken to the courts requires an understanding of the 
requirements of federal and state laws, case laws, federal and state 
Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
^United States Commission on Civil Rights, Toward an Understanding 
of Bakke, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 179. 
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requirements of federal and state laws, case laws, federal and state 
regulations and the Uniform Guidelines in Employment Selection 
Procedures (1978).** 
Status of Equal Employment Opportunity in Public Education 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, (42 U.S.C.) was enacted 
by Congress as a comprehensive prohibition on private acts of employ­
ment discrimination. With an amendment known as The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act of 1972, Title VII now covered practically all state and 
local governmental employees to include the previously exempt employees 
of educational institutions and agencies. The law charged the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to process, investigate, and 
conciliate employment discrimination complaints, and if necessary, to 
bring suits against respondents in the federal courts. This was a 
change in the role of EEOC which, as a part of the compromise that led 
to the adoption of the 1964 act, had virtually no enforcement powers. 
The basic responsibilities of employees under the 1972 Act are 
predominantly those that are imposed under Title VII of the 1964 Act. 
Under Section 703(a) of the act, it is an unlawful practice for an employ­
er to do the following: 
A. Fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge, any individual or 
otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ­
ment because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin. This applies to applicants for employment, as well as 
employees. 
B. Limit, segregate, or classify employees in any way that would 
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
^Federal Register, 43 no. 166, 25 August 1978, 38290-38311. 
6 
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee 
because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
Section 706(c) of Title VII requires that an allegedly unlawful 
employment act occurring in a state or political subdivision that has a 706 
agency be filed with the 706 agency before it can be filed with the 
EEOC. 
The North Carolina State Personnel Commission has been designated 
by EEOC as the 706 agency for those charges filed by state employees, 
employees of local service departments, public health dspartments and 
mental health clinics, employees of local civil defense agencies that 
receive federal grant-in-aid funds, and other county employees that the 
county commissioners may from time to time determine. The designation 
does not include charges filed by public school superintendents, princi­
pals, teachers, other public school employees, or employees of the Office 
g 
of the Governor and Lieutenant Governor. Therefore, the EEOC is the 
notice agency for public school employees and such charges must be filed 
within 180 days of the occurrence of an allegedly unlawful employment 
practice. 
Even though the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that charges of 
discrimination be filed within one hundred eighty days of the incident 
that is alleged to be discriminatory, the Supreme Court in Zipes v. 
10 
TransWorld Airlines, Inc. ruled that an employee can sue later even 
if the employee did not go to the EEOC. The court indicated in this 
9 
North Carolina, General Statutes, Chapter 95, Sec. 95-28.1. 
10 
Zipes v. TransWorld Airlines, Inc., (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1982), 28 
EPD, 32,432. 
7 
case that there are some instances where the timely filing requirement 
might be waived. Timing, in addition to other documentations, is an 
important factor in filing charges and an employer must insure that all 
records maintained are appropriately and correctly dated in the event a 
charge should occur. 
A study of the developments in constitutional law in the last two 
decades shows a major reversal on the question of constititional rights 
for public school employees under the protection of the First Amendment. 
Splitt stated, "A more careful historical analysis, however, shows that 
the actual change in legal interpretation took place . . . when the First 
Amendment rights of public workers began to receive serious 
attention. 
Prior to the early 1950's, an employee in a public school position 
had little or no right to object to employment conditions, and job 
applicants were held without regard to having rights. School 
executives and boards of education hired and fired school personnel in 
the 1930s and 1940s at will and without regard to constititional 
limitations. Persons were fired for any reason that displeased the 
employer. 
The first breach in the absolute perceived right of school execu­
tives and members of school boards to hire and fire at will came to light 
in the litigious environment resulting from a requirement of teachers to 
1 2  
sign loyalty oaths. In the landmark case of Wieman v.Undegroff (1952), 
11 
David A. Splitt, "School Law," The Executive Educator, 12 
(July 1983):8. 
^Wieman v. Undegroff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). 
8 
the Supreme held that a state could not require its employees to swear 
oaths of loyalty and deny under oath that they had past affiliation with 
Communists. This ruling extended into a series of law cases dealing 
with loyalty oaths and culminated in the 1961 decision in Cafeteria 
13 Workers v. McElroy. The court held that employment could not be 
based on whether a person previously had membership in a specific 
political party. This case was followed by several other First Amend-
14 merit cases that eventially led to Conniek v. Myers in April, 1983. 
Myers appears to significantly limit the rights of public employees under 
certain working conditions. 
The full meaning of the Myers decision will not be realized in the 
near future, but to conclude that the case makes a new and strong 
basis for terminating employees who prove disruptive is wrong. It 
appears more reasonable to conclude that when a well-documented, 
procedurally correct dismissal is pursued, it is less likely to be 
overturned by a federal judge in cases where lawyers argue that the 
action was unconstitutional and based on statements made by the 
employee. It is an employer's responsibility to document and be 
procedurally correct in the employment of public school personnel for 
the benefit of the applicants, employees, and the school system. 
However carefully policies, regulations, guidelines, contracts and 
letters of appointment are worded, no general rule can possibly 
anticipate every individual case that is likely to arise. When a clear 
13 
Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union 473 AFL-CIO v. Mc­
Elroy, 36 U.S. 886 (1961). 
^Connick v. Myers, 103 SCT, 1684 (1983). 
9 
course is not apparent, the decision makers in a public school system, 
like those in both private and public organizations, must draw on 
society's other laws and traditions for guidance. 
Clarence Thomas, Chairman of EEOC, in an address before the 
District of Columbia Chapter of the Industrial Relations Research 
Association on June 3, 1982, stated that he intended to use his office 
to question old assumptions and to gather data, analyze it, and use 
15 it to check the validity of current employment practices. Thomas' 
comments add emphasis to developing a planned procedure to reduce the 
liability of charges of discrimination in the employment of public school 
personnel. 
This study provides public school administrators with an evalua­
tion of the legal aspects of equal employment opportunities for public 
school employees. The study offers a philosophical and an operational 
basis for public school administrators to avoid litigation resulting from 
charges of discrimination in the employment of public school personnel. 
Should an EEOC charge or lawsuit be filed against a school system, 
understanding of proceedings and role of defendent are outlined in 
the study. 
This study is important in that it provides information to the 
educational decision-makers to understand the complexity of the 
requirements of a personnel procedure that will provide equal 
employment opportunities for all persons. As legal questions arise in 
15 "EEOC's New Chairman Says Commission Will Examine Use of 
Statistic, Other 'Old Assumptions'," Ideas and Trends in Personnel, 
23 July 1982, pp. 141-2. 
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increasing numbers, personnel administrators must be able to justify 
personnel decisions or they may become increasingly involved in charges 
taken to EEOC or suits filed in the courts. 
This study will provide significant data and guidelines to public 
school decision-makers, especially personnel officers, to help them 
assess the employment process that exists in their school systems and 
to provide suggestions for making equal employment opportunity avail­
able to all applicants and employees of the public schools. 
Questions to be Answered 
The purpose of this study is to examine equal employment 
opportunities in the employment of personnel in public schools and to 
develop practical, legal guidelines for decision-makers in the public 
schools to use in making employment decisions. 
Several key questions to be answered in this study are as 
follows: 
1. What are the Equal Employment Opportunity laws that cover 
public school employees and who is covered? 
2. How are the Equal Employment Opportunity laws enforced? 
3. What is the legal status of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission and how does it function? 
4. What legal principles of equal employment opportunity have 
been established through case law? 
5. What are the current trends in Equal Employment Opportunity 
laws and rulings? 
11 
6. Based on this study, what are the legally acceptable 
standards which are most likely to prevent charges of discrimi­
nation in public school employment? 
Coverage and Organization of the Issues Involved 
The remaining four chapters of this study explore and analyze 
the issues raised in Chapter I. 
Chapter II is a review of the literature of equal employment 
opportunity and traces the establishment of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission. This background data will provide information 
on which to analyze more appropriately the legal cases to be discussed 
i n  C h a p t e r  I I I .  
Chapter III is a historical narrative of some of the legal issues 
relating to equal employment opportunity and their influence on the 
employment procedures of the public schools. 
Chapter IV is an analysis of several major judicial cases with 
emphasis on the major legally protected categories of employees and how 
action in the employment process causes adverse impact on these pro­
tected classes. 
Chapter V contains a summary of the findings of this study that 
have been obtained from a review of the literature and the analysis of 
the selected court cases. Recommendations for the foundation of legally 
acceptable policies and regulations concerning equal employment 
opportunities in the public schools are made. 
12 
Definition of Terms 
To facilitate an understanding of this study, the following terms 
are identified: 
Adverse Impact - occurs when employment decisions such as hiring, 
promotion, and termination work to the disadvantage of members of 
protected groups; focuses on the consequences of employment practices, 
and as such, the charging party need only establish that an employment 
practice has the effect of excluding a significant proportion of women or 
members of minority groups. 
Affected Class - any group of employees or former employees who are 
members of a protected group that has suffered or continues to suffer 
the effects of unlawful discrimination. 
Affirmative Action - specific actions taken by the institution or agency 
to eliminate the effects of past discrimination in regard to recruitment, 
hiring, or promoting of employees. 
Bias - any constant error; any systematic influence on measures or on 
statistical results irrelevant to the purpose of measurement. 
Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) - a job requirement which 
permits an employer to discriminate legally on the basis of sex, age, or 
religion; for example, the requirement that a performer playing the part 
13 
of a woman be a woman or that a minister of a particular religion be a 
member of that religion; is interpreted very narrowly by the courts; 
for example, age may be a BFOQ, but race is never a BFOQ. 
Business Necessity - an institution's plea that if institutional practices 
adversely affect members of a protected group, the practices challenged 
are essential to the institution and that no alternative nondiscriminatory 
practice exists. 
Class Action Suit - a civil action brought on behalf of an affected class 
by one or more individuals or by the EEOC to secure a judicial remedy 
to an unlawful pattern of discrimination by the institution. 
Compliance - the degree to which the institution has carried out its 
mandatory affirmative action obligation. 
Conciliation the process by which the EEOC attempts to settle a 
complaint of discrimination through agreement with the respondent after 
a finding of reasonable cause and before bringing a civil action. 
Disparate T reatment - discrimination by which an employer treats 
certain people differently because they are women or members of a 
minority group;may be proven by comparative evidence, statistical 
evidence, and direct evidence of motive. 
Prima-Facie Evidence - evidence that doesn't have to be proven because it is 
sufficient on its face or first appearance. For example, if all of a company's 
14 
stockroom employees were black, all of its clerical workers female, and 
all of its supervisors white male, the EEOC would consider this 
prima-facie evidence of discrimination. 
Probable (or Reasonable) Cause - finding required to conclude that 
discrimination exists in contrast to the "proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt" needed in criminal cases. 
Protected Class - any group (or member of that group) specified in, 
and therefore protected by, the anti-discrimination laws which bar 
discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 
Reasonable Accommodation - usually used in connection with 
discrimination because of religion; for example, if an employee needs to 
be absent for religious reasons, an employer must make reasonable 
accommodation to grant the employee that absence—even though it may 
conflict with, or differ from, the employer's schedules, standards or 
other business conditions; exception: If absence causes employer 
undue hardship. 
Sexual Harassment - an incident in which a person uses his or her 
position to control, influence, or affect the grade, career, salary, or 
job of another employee or prospective employee in exchange for sexual 
favors; includes sexual innuendos made at inappropriate times, perhaps 
in the guise of humor; verbal harassment or abuse; subtle pressure for 
sexual activity; sexist remarks about a woman's clothing, body, or sexual 
15 
activities; unnecessary touching, patting, or pinching; leering at a 
woman's body; constant brushing against a woman's body; demanding 
sexual favors accompanied by implied or overt threats concerning one's 
jobs, grades, letters of recommendation; and physical assault. 
16 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Equal employment opportunity is a principle that Congress made 
into law with the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
Equal employment opportunity as identified in the legislation was not a 
new concept. Like much of social legislation, Title VII had roots 
extending deep into the past. 
The Civil Rights Acts of 1864 and 1870 guaranteed that all persons 
within the jurisdiction of the United States have the same rights enjoyed 
by white citizens in every state and territory to make and enforce 
contracts, to sue, be parties and give evidence, and to enjoy the 
full and equal benefits of all laws and proceedings for the security 
of pensions and property. This protection of the rights of all persons 
had long been in place, but the Civil Rights Act's intent was to define 
these rights better and provide enforcement. 
The coverage of the Civil Rights Acts seemed broad enough to 
prohibit acts of racial discrimination in both private sector and public 
sector, in a number of situations. However, a series of court decisions 
in 1883 rendered the law virtually meaningless by determining that the 
acts were never intended to cover acts of discrimination in the private 
sector. Further, the courts restricted coverage to acts of 
discrimination initiated by the individual states. Because of these 
rulings, minorities were without federal legislation to protect their right 
to contract for employment with private employers until the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 passed. 
17 
After the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the United 
States Supreme Court reversed its 1883 decision and decided in a 1968 
i 
Case, Jones v. Mayer, that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 covered acts 
of discrimination in the private sector. Mr. Jones, the plaintiff, 
claimed a private housing developer refused to sell him a house because 
he was black. The plaintiff argued this action was illegal under the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Supreme Court agreed with him. With 
this ruling, the Court expanded the principle of equal employment 
opportunity to cover private persons as well as persons employed by a 
state. 
Like other minorities, women were without rights prior to the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. They were not considered 
legally responsible persons and therefore were not allowed to enter into 
contracts or to control their own property. 
2 The Civil Service Act of 1883 which sought to establish the 
principle of "merit employment" was one of the first laws making 
religious discrimination in employment illegal. 
A Civil Service rule in 1940 made racial, as well as religious, 
3 
discrimination illegal . This was followed by the Congressional adoption 
of the Ramspeck Act, which extended the coverage of the Civil Service 
Act and amended the Classification Act of 1923. The principle of "equal 
rights for all" in the Ramspect Act read: 
^Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
^The Pendleton Act (Civil Service Act), 22 STAT. 404 (1883). 
^Executive Order 8587, 5 Fed. Reg. 445 (1940). 
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In carrying out the provisions of this title, and the 
provisions of the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, there 
shall be no discrimination against any person, or with respect to ^ 
the position held by any person, on account of race, creed or color. 
The first recognition by the United States Congress of the 
principle of equal job opportunity was found in the Unemployment Relief 
Act of 1933. The Act provided: 
That in employing citizens for the purpose of the Act no ^ 
discrimination shall be made on account of race, color, or creed. 
Many of the laws passed during the New Deal administration of 
President Franklin Roosevelt contained similar provisions to bar 
discrimination. If the laws did not directly bar discrimination, the 
executive branch executed a policy of non discrimination to fill the 
void. Regulations of the National Industrial Recovery Act and the laws 
covering public housing and defense housing forbade discrimination 
based on race, color, or religion.^ 
The Bureau of National Affairs summed up this early effort to 
provide antidiscrimination procedures as follows: 
Although these amounted to unequivocal declarations by the 
legislative and executive branches, they were of limited effect 
in most instances. They amount to little more than expressions 
of policy. There were no standards by which discrimination could 
be determined, and machinery and sanctions for enforcement were 
rare. 
^Ramspeck Act, 545 Stat. 1211, (1940), Title I, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 
631a (1958). 
^Unemployment Relief Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 22 (1933). 
^National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, Title II, 48 Stat. 200 
(1933). 
7Bureau of National Affairs, The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Act of 1972, (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 
1973), p. 15. 
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More effective approaches to the problems of discrimination were 
initiated during World War II. On June 25, 1941, President Roosevelt 
issued Executive Order 8802 which provided for the establishment of a 
five-member Fair Employment Practice Committee (FEPC). The committee 
was an independent agency reporting solely to the President. The 
demand of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) and the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car porters for the 
elimination of employment discrimination in war industries and in federal 
government agencies led to this action by President Roosevelt. The 
executive order states the policy of the government: 
To encourage full participation in the national defense program 
by all citizens of the United States, regardless of race, creed, 
color, or national origin, in the firm belief that the democratic way 
of life within the nation can be defended successfully only with the 
help and support of all groups within its borders. 
Executive Order 8802 was broad in its coverage and applied to all 
defense contracts, persons employed by the federal government, and 
vocational and training programs administered by federal agencies. 
FEPC had the authorization to receive and investigate complaints of 
discrimination and to take appropriate steps to address concerns and 
make the necessary recommendations to federal agencies and to the 
President to fulfill requirements of the Executive Order and protect the 
interest of citizens. 
This committee was short-lived due to many reasons, but primarily 
due to having a staff of only eight members and no direct power to 
9 
enforce its recommendations to abolish discrimination in employment. 
^Federal Register 6 (1941):3109. 
a 
Kenneth P. Norwick, Your Legal Rights (New York: The John 
Day Company, 1975), p. 194. 
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With only eight staff members, FEPC concentrated on drafting 
policies and holding public hearings throughout the country, but lost 
its autonomy when it was transferred to the War Manpower Commission. 
A dispute with the chairman of the War Manpower Commission resulted 
in several resignations from FEPC and and the Committee ceased 
operation in early 1943. 
10 Executive Order 8802 was followed by Excutive Order 9346, 
which re-established the Fair Employment Practice Committee (FEPC), 
and announced that policy of the federal government was to promote to 
the fullest utilization the available work force, and to eliminate 
employment discrimination. 
The new FEPC was broader in its jurisdiction than its 
predecessor. The FEPC now covered all persons employed by 
governmental contractors, not just those in defense work, the 
recruitment and training for war production, and persons employed by 
the Federal Government. For the first time labor unions were covered 
to include, not only discrimination in employment, but in member-ship 
as well. 
When the authority for the FEPC expired in 1946, the staff of 
approximately one hundred twenty serving fifteen field offices had 
processed approximately 8,000 complaints and held thirty public hear­
ings. However, the FEPC had to depend on negotiations, moral persua­
sion, and the pressure of public opinion to gain compliance and eliminate 
employment discrimination. FEPC was not a viable force to do so. 
m 
Federal Register 8 (1943):7183. 
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Several states and some cities using the FEPC as a model 
developed similar agencies through state and local legislation to handle 
individual employment discrimination complaints. These state and city 
initiatives occurred between 1945 and the passage of the Civil Rights 
11 Act of 1964. Although several states had Fair Employment Practice 
Laws, sometimes called State Civil Rights Laws, and the Federal Govern­
ment continued to insert nondiscrimination clauses in some contracts, the 
* 
ending of the FEPC terminated the nationwide efforts to effect a policy 
of equal employment opportunity. 
President Harry S. Truman tried to revise the policy of nondis­
crimination in employment by companies and agencies holding government 
12 contracts. President Truman issued a series of Executive Orders that 
directed specific government agencies to insert clauses in contracts that 
required nondiscrimination in employment. On December 3, 1951, Presi-
13 
dent Truman issued Executive Order 10308, which created the Com­
mittee on Government Contract Compliance. The committee consisted of 
eleven members made up of persons who represented industry, the 
public, and the five principal government contracting agencies. The 
committee was charged to study and evaluate existing programs and 
issue a report to appraise their effectiveness. 
The following conclusions among others, resulted from this 
evaluation: 
11 Norwick, Your Legal Rights, p. 194. 
12 Bureau of National Affairs, The Equal Employment Opportunity Act 
of 1972, p. 16. 
^Federal Register 16 (1951): 12303. 
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(1) The nondiscrimination clause is almost "forgotten, dead, and 
buried" under thousands of standard legal and technical 
words in contracts. 
(2) Government contracting is so far-reaching that nondiscrim­
inatory employment would be practically assured if every 
contractor were made to live up to the letter of the nondiscrim­
ination clauses in his contract. 
(3) There no effective enforcement of the nondiscrimination 
clause. 
Based on these conclusions, the committee developed twenty 
specific recommendations, many of which were targeted to provide 
adequate enforcement procedures to deal with the issue of discrimination 
in employment. 
As a result of this study, President Dwight Eisenhower issued 
15 Executive Order 10479 creating the President's Committee on 
Government Contracts. This fifteen-member committee replaced the 
Truman Committee. Membership on the committee included 
representatives of industry, labor, government, and the public. The 
new committee had these duties: 
(1) To make recommendations to contracting agencies for improving 
nondiscrimination provisions in government contracts. 
(2) To serve as a clearing house for complaints alleging violation 
of the nondiscrimination clauses. 
(3) To encourage and assist with educational progress by 
nongovernmenal groups. 
As was true of its predecessors, the President's Committee on 
Government Contracts had no enforcement power and had to rely on the 
13... . 
Ibid. 
14  
31 Labor Relations Reference Manual 186. 
^Federal Register 18 (1953):4899. 
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(2) To take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are 
employed and employees are treated during their employment 
without regard to race, creed, color or national origin. 
(3) To state in all solicitations or advertisements for employment 
that all qualified applicants will receive consideration without 
regard to race, creed, color or national origin. 
(4) To advise each labor union with which the employer deals 
of their committment under the order. 
(5) To include the obligations under the order in every sub­
contract or purchase order, unless specifically exempt. 
(6) To comply with all provisions of the order and the rules and 
regulations issued to the committee. 
(7) To furnish all information and reports required to the 
committee and to permit access to books, records, and 
accounts for the purpose of investigation to assure 
compliance. 
(7) To file regular compliance reports to describe hiring and 
employment practices. 
Executive Order 10925 established very specific enforcement 
powers. Compliance reports were required, but to assure compliance, 
the Committee was empowered to (1) publish the names of noncomplying 
contractors and unions, (2) recommend suits to the Justice Department, 
(3) recommend criminal actions by the Justice Department for furnishing 
incorrect data, (4) terminate contracts for non-compliance, and (5) 
forbid contracting agencies to enter into new contracts with a contractor 
who discriminates unless the contractor can show his employment policy 
had changed. 
In addition to the five requirements above, the "plan for 
progress" set up by the committee required the contractor to establish 
an effective recruiting program that gave protected classes of individuals 
equal employment opportunities. 
23 
procurement agencies to adjust complaints, although a copy of the 
deposition tion was made to the committee. 
President John F. Kennedy, on March 6, 1961, issued Executive 
16 
Order 10925 which created a new President's Committee on Equal 
Employment Opportunity (EEO) that was charged to effect equal 
employment opportunity in the federal government and in employment on 
government contracts. This new committee had more enforcement power 
than previous committees. 
This Executive Order revamped the EEO program and reaffirmed the 
policies established by the Eisenhower order. It reunited governmental 
and private programs and abolished the President's Committee on Equal 
Employment Opportunity (PCEEO). The new committee was chaired by 
the Vice President, while the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, 
the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the Secretary of 
Defense, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the 
Administrator of General Services, the Chairman of the Civil Service 
Commission, and the head of the National Aeronautics Space Admini­
stration were committee members. The PCEEO was to provide procedures 
and policies to implement the executive order, make reports to the President, 
and act in an advisory capacity. There was an additional requirement that all 
executive departments would initiate studies of employment practices. 
Executive Order 10925 required the following: 
(1) Not to discriminate against any employee or job applicant 
because of race, creed, color or national origin. 
16Federal Register 26 (1961): 1977. 
25 
17 
Executive Order 10925 was extended by Executive Order 11114 
on June 22, 1963, which placed the nondiscrimination requirement for 
federally assisted construction contracts. On February 13, 1964, 
18 
President Lyndon Johnson issued Execuive Order 11141, extending 
the nondiscrimination coverage to forbid employment discrimination on 
the basis of age, except upon the basis of a bona fide occupational 
qualification (BFOQ), retirement plan, or statutory requirement. 
The 1940's, the 1950's and 1960's were eventful years in the 
history of the United States. During World War II with the nation's 
industry operating at a peak to help the war effort, minorities were 
employed through the influence of President Roosevelt's Committee on 
Fair Employment Practices. By 1950, labor demand decreased. Automa­
tion and other technological innovations contributed to the shortage of 
jobs. A sizable number of employers and labor unions continued to avoid 
equal employment opportunities even though discrimination was against the 
law. 
In 1954, the United States Supreme Court decided the landmark 
20 Brown v. Board of Education, holding that segregation of school 
children was unconstitutional. Blacks began to picket, demonstrate, 
and conduct sit-ins to consolidate the gain that came with Brown 
through the Civil Rights movement. Norwick commented: 
^Federal Register 20 (1963):6485. 
18Federal Register 29 (1966):2477. 
19 
Norwick, Your Legal Rights, p. 198. 
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Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 485 (1954). 
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The Civil Rights Movement continued to press for full equality 
throughout the 1950's and the early 1960's, and in 1963-64 a 
substantial victory was finally achieved. The high point for the 
movement was the famous March on Washington in 1963 . . . led 
by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. . . . (to) demand equal opportunity 
for black people and tpj demand passage by Congress of a comprehen­
sive Civil Rights Act. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Between 1866 and 1964 many forces arose to establish equal 
employment opportunities without regard to race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin. 
Rosenbloom related: 
The history of federal efforts to prevent discrimination and 
promote EEO in the federal services is complex yet 
instructive. It is impossible to view the present federal EEO 
Program in its proper political and administrative contexts or 
to understand its policy developmeg| without entering into a 
consideration of past developments. 
Rosenbloom noted that in a sense, the gradual development of 
the current equal employment opportunity program may be traced to 
the enactment of the first Civil Service Act, or perhaps to Article VI 
of the United States Constitution. However, it was well into the 1930's 
and 1940's when a continuing, systematic effort to assure equal employ­
ment in the public services became a major feature of federal personnel 
23 
administration. The Hatch Act of 1939 is the first significant link in 
the chain of laws and excutive orders leading to current programs. 
Section 4 of the Hatch Act provides: 
21 Norwick, Your Legal Rights, p. 198. 
22 David H. Rosenbloom, Federal Equal Employment Opportunity: 
Politics and Public Personnel Administration (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1977), p. 59. 
^"Interpretation of Hatch Political Activities Act," Cong. Rec. 
85, Part 2, Appendix, p. 712. 
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It shall be unlawful for any person to deprive, attempt to deprive, 
or threaten to deprive, by any means, any person of any employ­
ment, position, work, compensation, or other benefit provided 
for or made possible by any act of Congress appropriating funds 
for work relief purposes, on account of race, creed, (or) color. . . 
This provision applies only to a peripheral kind of employee, but 
does establish the principle that public employment or public funds 
should not be denied to protected individuals in the employment process. 
24 The Ramspeck Act of 1940 was an important act to combat dis­
crimination. Section 3 (e) prohibits "discrimination against any person, 
or with respect to the position held by any person, on account of race, 
creed or color." These prohibitions relate to establishing salaries, 
allocations of personnel to positions or grades, transferring of personnel, 
promotions and other personnel actions. This law is important because 
it represents the first major piece of legislation to outlaw discrimination 
in the federal services. It became a catalyst to encourage similar 
actions by the executive branch. 
Rosenbloom added: 
The history of the development of these early regulations 
demonstrates the fact that the government only reluctantly 
formulated a policy of nondiscrimination in the federal serving 
and basically lacked a strong committment to equality. 
Rosenbloom held that the pressures for equal employment oppor­
tunities began to mount in 1941 from the philosophical impact of the New 
Deal and the impending likelihood that the United States would become 
involved in World War II. It was deemed desirable to promote racial 
OA 
Ramspeck Act, 545 Stat. 1211 (1940), Title I, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 
631a (1958). 
25 Rosenbloom, Federal Equal Employment Opportunity, p. 60. 
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harmony and unity as a way to expand war production through the 
utilization of manpower without regard to factors unrelated to output 
and efficiency. One of the most dramatic and visible gestures in 
support of government action in the area of racial equality was A. Philip 
Randolph's threat to lead a mass march on Washington to protest dis­
crimination against blacks. The march was scheduled for June 1941. 
President Roosevelt tried to get Randolph to cancel the march, but he 
failed. In July the various forces came to a head and positive action 
was taken to create a fair employment practice in the federal services 
and the defense industries. Although Vito Marcantonio, an American 
Labor Party representative from New York, introduced the nation's 
first bill to this end, it was the executive branch that led the way with 
26 the issuance of President Roosevelt's Executive Order 8802. 
The equal employment opportunity bill was introduced by Congress­
man Marcantonio in February, 1943. Between 1943 and 1963, other bills 
were introduced in both the Senate and the House of Representatives to 
regulate or attempt to conciliate situations involving alleged discrimination 
for reasons of race, creed, color, religion, sex, age, or national origin. 
The breadth, authority, and power of enforcement were varied. During 
this time only one bill was passed by either house, and two others were 
27 killed by Senate filibuster. Others died in committees. 
A bill introduced on February 22, 1950, by Congressman Samuel 
K. McConnell, Jr., a Republican representing Pennsylvania, dealt with 
^Federal Register 6 (1941):3109. 
27 Bureau of National Affairs, The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Act of 1972, p. 23. 
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"fair employment practices". Representative McConnell introduced this 
bill in an all-night session running over into Washington's Birthday, at 
3:00 a.m. 
The next morning, February 23, the House voted to substitute 
McConnell's bill for a previously introduced bill by Congressman Adam 
C. Powell, a Democrat of New York. The vote was 221 to 178 to substi­
tute and it passed 240 to 177. Powell proposed enforcement of orders 
based on findings of illegal discrimination. The McConnell proposal set 
up a Fair Employment Practices Commission with power to study the 
matter of discrimination on the basis of race, creed, or color and to 
recommend procedures for its elimination. The bill provided employment 
opportunities for minority groups without the use of force. Discrim­
ination on account of sex, physical disability, and political affliation 
were added on the House floor before the substitute was adopted. The 
only real power was that of subpoena to compel the attendance of any 
28 witnesses. 
In 1960, a Presidential election year, the Eisenhower administration 
proposed legislation with respect to Fair Employment Practices for the 
consideration of Congress in 1960. The proposal was to write the 
principle of equal employment opportunity into the Civil Rights Act of 
29 
1960 . This act dealt primarily with voting rights. Congress did not 
act on the proposal, but did enact a Civil Rights Bill. 
When President John F. Kennedy was elected in 1960, action began 
to change the composition of the Rules Committee of the House and Rule 
28lbid., p. 23-34. 
29PL 86-449, 6 May 1960, 62 Stat. 86. 
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XXI of the Senate. The House Rules Committee, controlling legislation 
coming to the House, had been unfriendly to the Fair Employment 
Practices Commission for two decades and on several occasions had 
blocked its consideration on the floor of the House with the addition of 
new members appointed by a speaker friendly to the administration. 
The power balance with respect to legislation now shifted from the iron 
rule of Chairman Howard W. Smith, Democrat from Virginia. 
In the Senate where extended debates were annual happenings 
over the requirements for ending a debate, a new rule was established 
that a two-thirds vote of those present and voting was necessary to 
end debate after one hour of debate per Senator. This replaced the 
two-thirds rule of all Senators. 
President Kennedy did not propose any equal employment oppor­
tunity legislation during the 87th Congress for which he received 
criticism. However, others introduced bills. Congressman Powell, 
then Chairman of the House Labor Committee, introduced a bill and 
declared that Fair Employment Practice legislation was a target for 1962. 
Two events happened during the House Committee's consideration 
of H.R. 10144. The principal argument was whether the courts or 
the administrative body should be the enforcing agency; notwithstanding, 
the name of the legislation was changed to the "Equal Opportunity Act 
30 
of 1962". However, the bill did not survive. 
President Kennedy announced in a television conference on June 
11, 1963, that he would seek Civil Rights legislation from the 88th 
30 
Bureau of National Affairs, The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Act of 1972, p. 25. 
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Congress. His proposed legislation went to Congress on June 19, 
31 
1963. Exactly one year to the day the Senate passed a compromise 
bill acceptable to the House without further changes. The House 
passed the legislation on July 2, 1964, and President Johnson signed it 
into law about 6:55 p.m., EST, the same day. The dispute with respect 
to the method of enforcing the Equal Employment Section was resolved. 
An Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was created that was to 
be partisan in nature without enforcement power. Enforcement would be 
32 
handled by judicial review in a federal district court. 
President Kennedy's assassination advanced his unfulfilled 
legislative program. His successor, President Lyndon Johnson, put 
civil rights legislation in a priority position comparable to the 1964 tax 
33 
cut. Chairman Smith of the House Rules Committee cleared H.R. 7152 
immediately after New Year's Day in 1964, with his own amendment 
adding sex to the list of reasons which might cause discrimination. 
After 543 hours, 1 minute, and 37 seconds of Senate debate, the 
bill's supporters, mainly Senator Everett Dirksen, Republican from 
Illinois, and Senator Hubert Humphrey, Democrat from Minnesota, drafted 
a compromise in consultation with Attorney General Robert Kennedy. 
The Senate passed the bill 76 to 18. This vote was followed on July 2, 
1964, by a House vote of 289 to 126. "After more than 20 years, a 
31 
"Civil Rights Legislation - Message from the President", 109 
Cong. Rec., 11097 (1963). 
32 
Bureau of National Affairs, The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Act of 1972, p. 26. 
3378 Stat. 253; 42 U.S.C.A. (1964). 
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Federal Employment Practice bill, under another name, became law with 
34 
President Johnson's signature." 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 preface reads: 
An Act to enforce the constitutional right to vote, to confer 
jurisdiction upon the district courts of the United States to provide 
injunctive relief against discrimination in public accommodations, to 
authorize the Attorney General to institute suits to protect constitu­
tional rights in public facilities and prevent discrimination in 
federally assisted programs, to establish a Coi^giission on Equal 
Employment Opportunity, and for other purposes. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was amended by the Equal Employ­
ment Opportunity Act of 1972*^. Like the Civil Rights Act, the 1972 
Amendment was a compromise worked out in the conference committee in 
late 1972. The Senate approved it by a vote of 62 to 10 and the House 
approved it by a vote of 303 to 110. President Richard N. Nixon signed 
the measure on March 24, 1972. The amendment greatly extended the 
coverage and authority of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Title VII became operative in July, 1965. Prior to 1965, the only 
major constraints on employee selection had been state and local prac­
tices. Some cities, counties, and states had fair employment statutes 
dating back to 1945. These were found in about half the states by the 
mid-1960's. The effectiveness of the Fair Employment Practice Laws 
varied considerably from one jurisdiction to another with regard to 
enforcement. A small number of cases were activated, but the overall 
34PL 92-261, 24 March 1972, 86 Stat. 103. 
3578 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C.A. (1964). 
36PL 92-261, March 24, 1972, 86 Stat. 103 (1972). 
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impact on personnel practices was almost nil except for the elimination of 
37 certain questions on forms used for employment applications. 
When the federal government becomes involved in regulating an 
employment procedure, or any other procedure, it is not always entirely 
clear what role state and local government play. In some cases Congress 
takes full control, leaving the states powerless to enact and enforce any 
laws that differ from the federal law. Yet in other cases the state and 
local governments are permitted more stringent laws than the federal 
38 
law, so that the federal law becomes a minimal requirement. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a comprehensive 
prohibition on private acts of employment discrimination. As amended 
by the Equal Employment Act of 1972, Title VII now covers virtually all 
state and local government employees and the previously exempt 
employees of educational institutions and agencies. The law authorizes 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to process, 
investigate, and conciliate employment discrimination complaints and, if 
necessary, to bring suits against employers in the federal courts. 
Until 1974, the Attorney General was authorized to bring "pattern and 
practice" employment suits concurrently with EEOC. This was changed 
in 1974, and EEOC assumed the primary governmental authority for 
enforcement of the law. However, the Attorney General remained the 
only government party authorized to sue states or municipalities. Title 
37 
Mary Green Miner and John B. Miner, Employee Selection Within 
the Law, (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 
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VII created a cause of action enforceable in federal courts by aggrieved 
persons or classes on protected persons. The law provided for injunc­
tive and affirmative relief that included back pay and the granting of 
attorney's fees to prevailing party. 
Title VII covers employers who employ more than fifteen employees, 
labor unions, and employment agencies. Persons covered by the 
substantive provisions of Title VII are numerous. It prohibits discrimi­
nation based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in the 
acts of hiring, segregating and classifying protected persons. Also 
actions resulting in compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment are covered. However, some exceptions exist. Title VII 
permits classification or employment referral on the basis of religion, 
sex, or national origin, but not to include race or color, in certain 
limited instances where there are bona fide occupational qualifications. 
Section 703 of Title VII states that an employer may act upon the results 
of "any professionally developed ability test" provided the test is not 
designed or used to discriminate. Further, an employer may apply 
different conditions of employment or rates of pay pursuant to a bona 
39 
fide seniority or merit system. However, the importance of these 
exceptions is very limited, if not nonexistent, after the Court's decision 
in Griggs v. Duke Power Company, and related cases. The Griggs v. 
Duke Power Company established the adverse-impact theory as stated 
in the decision by the United States Supreme Court in its landmark decision 
in 1971: 
3942 U.S.C.A. 2000e (a-j). 
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The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain 
from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of 
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in 
the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over 
other employees. Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests 
neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot 
be maintained if they operate to 'f^eze' the status quo of prior 
discriminatory employment practices. 
The Court insisted in Griggs that Duke Power had no evil 
motives in its employment practices and that qualification requirements 
in question have been administered fairly to blacks and whites. 
However, the consequences of employment practices resulted in an 
adverse impact on blacks. The Court pointed out that if an employment 
practice can be shown to be a "business necessity", it will not be 
prohibited even if the results create an adverse impact on a protected 
group. However, Duke Power failed to demonstrate a relationship be­
tween the tests and successful job performance. 
Section 703 (j) states that: 
Nothing contained in this title shall be interpreted to require 
any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint 
labor-management committee subject to this title to grant pre­
ferential treatment to any individual or to any group because 
of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or such in­
dividual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist 
with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of 
any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by 
any employer referred or classified for employment by any 
employment agency or labor organization, admitted to member­
ship or classified by any labor organization, or admitted to, 
or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, 
in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons 
of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any 
community, State, section or other area, or in the availably 
work force in any community, State, section, or other area. 
^ Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
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However, this has not been interpreted to prohibit an order of 
preferential treatment or quotas against a defendent who has been 
found in violation of Title VII. When a court orders an employer to 
change an employment practice as it affects a protected group, the 
court's order is often characterized as requiring affirmative action 
because the persons who will benefit from the order are not only those 
who are actual victims of previous discriminatory actions, but also all 
those people who might otherwise become victims of biased action or 
42 policies. 
The adverse-impact theory of discrimination has been the basis 
for much Title VII litigation since 1971. When a clear case of adverse 
impact results from employment practices, the employer needs to establish 
that such practices are job-related and are a business necessity. The 
business necessity requirement has been narrowly construed. Miner 
and Miner asked, "if a practice results in cutting off opportunities for 
a certain group, does the practice in fact fulfill a legitimate business 
need?"^ 
One other exception exists. Section 703 (g) makes an exception 
for security classifications, and Section 703 (f) provides that discrimi­
nation is permitted on the grounds that an individual is a member of the 
44 Communist Party. 
Title VII provides a complainant with several procedural advan­
tages. The EEOC will initially investigate and seek relief on the plain-
4? 
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tiff's behalf in federal courts except in the case of governmental employ­
ees which EEOC must refer to the Attorney General for investigation. 
If the EEOC or the Attorney General does not promptly seek judicial 
relief, the statute provides for a private right of action, with a court-
appointed counsel, a waiver of costs and fees, and the payment of a 
reasonable counsel fee as part of the relief if the complainant ultimately 
45 
prevails. 
Title VII has several extremely important technical requirements 
that must be met prior to filing a complaint in federal court. Generally, 
the procedural prerequisites require the filing of a discriminatory 
charge, first, with a state 706 agency and, then, with EEOC. Addition­
ally, there are specific and strick time limitations. 
In the provisions of Title VII, Congress chooses to encourage 
states to become the enforcers. The provisions of Title VII provide a 
federal enforcement mechanism, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, to take over for a state whose enforcement procedures do 
not satisfy the need. Section 708 of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Act of 1972 states: 
Nothing in this title shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any 
person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided 
by any present or future law of any State or political subdivision 
of a State, other than any such law which purports to require or 
permit the doing of any ̂ t which would be an unlawful employment 
practice under this title. 
The only state laws preempted by Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 are those that are inconsistent with the purposes of Title 
45 
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47 VII. State laws barring discrimination in employee benefits plans are 
preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to 
the extent that the state law may prohibit practices relating to ERISA 
48 that cover employee benefits that are lawful under Title VII. 
Under Title VII, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) defers to the authority of state government whenever the state 
has a law prohibiting the allegedly discriminatory practices and has an 
agency to enforce relief for the practice. Time limits are placed on the 
deferral requirement so that EEOC may act when the state fails to do so. 
Section (d) provides, "a reasonable time, but not less than sixty days 
(provided that such sixty-day period shall be extended to one hundred 
and twenty days during the first year after the effective date of such 
49 
state or local law)". 
The term "706 Agency" has been adopted by the EEOC to refer 
to a state or local agency that is deemed by the Commission to satisfy 
the criteria stated in Title V111 s Section 706 (c) for the period of 
exclusive processing. Jurisdictions that have 706 agencies are often 
called "deferral jurisdictions". As cited earlier in this study, the North 
Carolina State Personnel Commission is designated by EEOC as a 706 
agency, but is not the designated agency to handle charges filed by 
public school employes. For these charges, the EEOC is the designated 
notice agency. 
47 
Title VII, Section 1104. 
48 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1964, September 2, 
1974, PL. 94-406, 88 Stat. 829. 
4Q 
Title VII, Sec. 706 (c) and (d). 
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Although the provisions of Title VII preclude the filing of a charge 
with the EEOC prior to filing with a state or local 706 agency, the 
Commission does not reject a charge for that reason. Instead it defers 
its action until the state has handled or has declined to handle the 
charges. When the state or local agency's time has expired without 
relief, the charge filed with EEOC becomes active. 
The EEOC considers the charges received by the state and local j 
706 agencies and those received directly by the Commission as a common 
workload and strives for an integration of the processing.^ 
Title VII is only one among many statutes available to redress 
employment discrimination. These remedies vary considerably in 
coverage, scope, procedure and in their relationship. In certain 
circumstances, they are used as alternative or supplemental remedies 
and causes of action. One outstanding course of action arises under 
42 U.S.C.A. Section 1981 which is a derivative of paragraph #1 of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended in 1870. The Supreme Court ruled 
51 
in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. that 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1981 bars 
racial discrimination by private individuals in the sale or rental of 
housing. Following the Jones principle, the federal courts have 
determined that Section 1981 requires that all persons be given the 
same rights to contracts as white citizens and prohibits private racial 
52 
discrimination in employment by companies and unions. Therefore, 
50 
EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 CFR Part 1601.70. 
^Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (I968). 
^Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970), 
cert, denied 400 U.S. 911 (1970) as an example. 
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employees who have suffered racial discrimination theoretically have a 
choice of using Title VII or 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1981. Section 1981 has 
also been read to prohibit discrimination in employment against aliens 
53 in Guerra v. IVianchester Terminal Corporation and has been read to 
prohibit discrimination against Puerto Ricans and other other Hispanics 
54 
in Miranda v. Clothing Workers Local 208. 
Having Title VII and Section 1981 available presents several 
issues regarding the interrelationship of the causes of action. The 
federal courts have found authority to use Section 1981 whether or not 
Title VII procedures have been used and to grant injunctive and 
monetary relief in Section 1981 action similar to that available under 
Title VII. The same substantive rules of law have been applied 
to the extent of treating EEOC regulations and guidelines as persuasive 
in evaluating the merits of a Section 1981 claim. The remedy afforded 
by Title VII is supplemental to contractual remedies and any other legal 
remedies, and a charging party may seek requested relief without 
55 involving other remedies. 
Section 1981 is available where a Title VII claim would be pre­
cluded. The great advantage of Section 1981 is its longer statute of 
limitations. Unlike Title VII, there is no expressed time period in Sec­
tion 1981. The courts have generally held that the period for bringing 
CO 
Guerra v. IVianchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d. 641 (5th Cir. 1974). 
R4 
Miranda v. Clothing Workers, Local 208, 8 EPD Sec. 9601 (D.C., 
N.J., 1974). 
Rios v. Reynolds Metal Co., (CA-5, 1972), 467 F.2d 54, and Caldwell 
v. National Brewing Co., (CA-5 1971), 443 F.2d 1044, cert, denied (U.S. Sup. 
Ct. 1972), 405 U.S. 916 (1972). 
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action, usually several years, is the appropriate referral by analogy. 
Additionally, Section 1981 covers all private and public employers, while 
Title VII exempts employers of fewer than 15 persons not engaged in 
interstate commerce, private clubs, Indian Tribes, and to some extent, 
the U.S.  Government, the District of Columbia, and companies wholly 
57 
owned by the U.S. Government. Section 1981 may preserve a racial 
discrimination charge that would be dismissed under procedural reasons 
under Title VII due to the charging parties' failure to follow the technical 
prerequisites. 
Section 1981 does not provide for the intervention of the Attorney 
General or the EEOC in the suit, waiver of fees and costs, statutory 
attorney fees, and appointment of counsel. By analogy to Title VII, 
58 attorney fees are awarded in Fowler v. Schwarzwalder. 
Section 1981 reads: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall 
have the same right in every state and territory to make and 
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to 
the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citi­
zens and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties,^ 
taxes licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other. 
Whenever discrimination occurs in a public agency or in a private 
organization whose activities can be classified as "state action," the 
United States Constitution provides an avenue of relief under the Four­
teenth amendment. Claims under this right are filed directly in Federal 
^Page v. Curtis Wright Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1060 (D.N.J. 1971). 
5742 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2000e (g) (b) and e-16. 
^Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498 F.2d 143 (8th Cir., 1974). 
°342 U.S.C.A., Sec. 1983. 
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Court without having to exhaust Title VII's administrative remedies. 
This remedy exists in addition to the opportunity to sue state govern­
ments or agencies under Title VII in the same manner as private em-
61 62 
ployers. Officers of fire departments, police departments and trans­
portation authorities cannot engage in discriminatory employment policies. 
63 64 Public boards of education and public or semi-public hospitals are 
similarly barred. Moreover, since all arbitrary classifications and actions 
are barred by the Fourteenth Amendment, not just race, sex, religion, 
or national origin, the potential extent of a constitutional cause of 
employment discrimination is somewhat greater in scope than a similar 
charge under Title VII. 
The courts, in deciding racial discrimination cases under the Four­
teenth Amendment, have basically used a Title VII analysis to reach a 
decision with regard to determining that the plaintiffs are victims of 
unconstitutional discrimination even before the 1972 amendment to Title 
VII made that law directly applicable to state and governmental employ-
fiO 
Bureau of National Affairs, The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Act of 1972, p. I845 
^Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir., 1971), cert, denied 
406 U.S. 950 (1972). 
®^Penn v. Stumpt, 308 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal., 1970), and 
NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala., 1972). 
^Jackson v. Wheatley School District No. 28, 430 F.2d 1359 (8th 
Cir., 1970); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2nd Cir. 
1972). 
^Mizell v. North Broward Hospital District, 427 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 
1970). 
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65 66 
ees. For example, in Morrow v. Crisler and in NAACP v. Allen 
the courts held that where no black has ever been a member of the 
Mississippi or Alabama highway patrols, a prima facie case is established. 
No business necessity justification could be offered by the respondents. 
The coverage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is broad, 
but the changes made by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 
1972 increased the coverage to many more persons including public 
school employees. 
Section 701 defines who is covered. The 1972 change added the 
inclusion of "governments, governmental agencies and political subdivi­
sions". 'Government' means states and local governments as the federal 
government is covered by section 717, a new section added to the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. 
Section 703 (a)(2) is amended to add the qualifiers "or applicants 
for employment" and Section 703 (c)(2) is amended to add the qualifier 
67 
"or applicants for membership". In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. 
the United States Supreme Court cleared the way for protection for an 
applicant when it ruled that the refusal to hire women with children while 
hiring men with young children was sex discrimination. Employment 
discrimination based on marital status or the number and age of children 
was unlawful under federal law because it disqualified women only. This 
ruling by the Supreme Court in 1971 was an added reason to change 
Morrow v. Crisler, 479 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1973). 
^^Supra note 62. 
^Philips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971). 
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Section 701 to include applicants. This case and its companion cases 
became known as the "sex-plus" cases. 
Sex discrimination and a person's right to make personal decisions 
have been the foundation of the cases taken to court, but the EEOC 
68 compliance manual indicates that other bases for discrimination could 
be involved in rules barring single parents from employment. The EEOC 
notes that racial or ethnic discrimination might be involved because of 
adverse impact of a rule against the employment of a single parent. The 
manual indicates that to the date of the manual there have been no court 
decisions on the question, but indicates that if a disproportionate number 
of a minority group are affected by such a policy against hiring single 
custodial parents, the policy could be shown to be racially or ethnically 
discriminatory. 
Title VII is grounded on the Congressional power derived from 
the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. The key is the 
term "industry affecting commerce". Two definitions are implied; one 
for 'commerce' and one for 'industry affecting commerce'. 
Commerce is defined in 701 (g): 
The term "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce, trans­
portation, transmission, or communication among the several 
States; or between a State and any place outside thereof; or 
within the District of Columbia, or a possession of the United 
States; or between Fg^nts in the same State but through a 
point outside thereof. 
Industry affecting commerce is defined in 701(h): 
The term "industry affecting commerce" means any activity, 
business, or industry in commerce or in which a labor dispute 
CO 
EEOC Sex Discrimination Guidelines, 29 CFR 1604, Appendix. 
69Title VII, Section 701(g). 
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would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free flow of com­
merce and includes any activity or industry "affecting com­
merce" within the meaning of the Labor-Management Reporting 
and Disclosure Act of 1959, and furth^ ncludes any govern­
mental industry, business, or activity. 
Thus, excepting the size of the organization, and the explicit 
exemptions, the coverage of the act is intended to reach as far as the 
power of Congress to regulate commerce. Section 701 (h) includes 
71 everything defined as affecting commerce in the Landrum-Griffin Act, 
which includes the National Labor Relations Act. The definition appears 
to be explanatory rather than limiting. The full definition remains as 
broad as the courts will be willing to invoke before they apply limiting 
decisions. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 covers numerous employ­
ees, but the 1972 amendment gives further extension to the coverage. 
In Section 701 (a) the definition of "person" is enlarged by the 1972 
amendment to include state and local government, governmental agencies, 
and political subdivisions, but not the United States Government, 
corporations wholly owned by the United States Government, or depart­
ments of the District of Columbia that are subject to competitive service 
under 5 U.S.C. Section 2102. 
Under the 1964 Act, coverage is extended to employees on the 
basis of the number of employees, with the number being reduced each 
year. The schedule is as follows: 
(1) From July 2, 1965, to July 1, 1966, the required number is 100. 
70Title VII, Section 701 (h). 
•^National Labor Relations Act, Sec. 11 (e), 29 U.S.C. 161 (e). 
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(2) From July 2, 1966, to July 1, 1967, the required number 
is 50. 
(3) From July 2, 1968, until change is made by 1972 Amendment, 
the number is 25. 
(4) From March 24, 1973, the number is 15. 
To be covered under Title VII, an employer needs to have the 
required number of employees on each working day in each of twenty 
or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. 
Once the requirement is met it is satisfied for two calendar years. 
One of the major changes made by the 1972 Amendment was the 
extension of the definition of "employer" to include state and local 
governments, governmental agencies and political subdivisions. However, 
an exemption was included that involves the following: 
(1) Persons elected to public office in any state or political sub­
division; 
(2) Personal staff of such elected official; 
(3) Appointees of such elected official who are on the policy­
making level; 
(4) Intermediate advisors of such elected official who advise on 
exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office. 
Federal employees were not under the jurisdiction of the EEOC in 
1964, but the 1972 Amendments added a new section that made clear the 
obligation of the Federal Government to make all personnel actions wotj-
out discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion, or national origin. 
The authority to enforce equal employment opportunity in federal agen­
cies was assigned to the Civil Service Commission. If a federal employee 
was dissatisfied wth the action of the Civil Service Commission, appeal 
72 appeal lay in the Federal District Court. 
72Title VII, Section 717 (b). 
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Section 701 (j) was added in 1972 and states: 
the term 'religion' indicates all aspects of religious observances 
and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demon­
strates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an 
employee's or prospective employee's, religious observance or 
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the 
employer's business. 
The purpose of this amendment was to create a statutory basis for 
EEOC to make guidelines on religious-based discrimination and thus 
resolve questions such as those raised in Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co. 
(United States Supreme Court, 1971, 402 U.S. 689, 3 FEP Cases 508).74 
The EEOC's guidelines on religious accommodation state that "religious 
practices include moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong 
if those beliefs are sincerely held with the strength of traditional 
religious views". This definition is one that was developed by the 
75 
United States Supreme Court and adopted by the EEOC. 
Several changes in exemptions are included in the 1972 amendments, 
as follow: 
(1) Under the 1964 Act, there was an exemption for educational 
institutions with respect to individuals whose work involves 
educational activities. This exemption is eliminated. The 
result will be to bring under Title VII an estimated 120,000 
educational institutions, with about 2.8 million teachers and 
professional staff members and another 1.5 million non-profes­
sional staff members. 
(2) Under the original Title VII, there was an exemption for 
religious corporations, associations, or societies with respect 
to individuals whose work involves the religious aspects of 
the employing organization. The 1972 amendments broaden 
73Title VII, Section 701 (g). 
74 George Cooper, Harriet Rabb, and Howard J. Rubin, Fair 
Employment Litigation: Text and Materials for Students and Practioners 
(St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Company, 1975), p. 137. 
7529 CFR, Section 1605.1. 
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the exemption to include all activities of such organizations, 
not merely their religious activities. The provision, however, 
permits the organization to discriminate solely on the basis 
of religion. It may not discriminate on the basis of race, 
color, sex, or national origin. 
(3) The new coverage of state and local governments contains 
an exemption for elected officials, their personal assistants, 
and their immediate advisors. But it was emphasized during 
the congressional debate that this exemption was "to be con­
strued very narrowly and is in no way intended to establish 
an over-all narrowing of the expanded coverage of state and 
local governmental employees." 
One of the exemptions in the 1964 act that was not changed is 
provided by Section 703 (e)(1). Under this section, there was an 
exemption to the prohibitions "where religion, sex, and national origin 
is a bona fide occupational requirement reasonably necessary to the 
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.1,77 
The anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII are extensive. 
Those provisions relating to discrimination in employment were not 
charged to any agencies. This action, in 1972, brought under Title 
VII prohibitions an estimated 120,000 educational institutions and agen­
cies employing about 2.8 million teachers and professional staff members 
and another 1.5 million nonprofessional staff members under Title VII 
78 
coverage. 
The 1972 amendment extends coverage to state and local govern­
ments and their employers, but provides an exemption for elected 
officials, their personal assistants, and their immediate advisors. 
76 
Bureau of National Affairs, The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Act of 1972, pp. 35-36. 
77Title VII, Section 703 (e)(1). 
78 
Cooper, Rabb, and Rubin, Fair Employment Litigation, p. 235. 
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The Equal Pay Act arid Title VII 
Congress, in 1963, adopted the Equal Pay Act as an amendment to 
79 
Section 6, the minimum-wage section, of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
The amendment required equal pay for equal work without regard to 
sex. As a part of Section 6, the Equal Pay Act was subject to all the 
exemptions under Section 6. Persons made exempt were employees who 
are employed in bona fide executive, administrative, or professional 
capacities or as outside salesmen. 
Under Title VII, no such exemption existed for executive, admini­
strative, or professional employees, or outside salesmen. Therefore, 
any discrimination in employment, including salaries, among that class 
of employees was a violation of Title VII, if it is based on sex. 
The Equal Pay Act, as an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards 
Act of 1963 fell under the authority of Congress to regulate interstate 
commerce. The Act included an exemption for state and local govenments 
80 81 
and agencies. However, amendments enacted in 1966 and 1974 
extended the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and thus the 
Equal Pay Act, to include government employees in hospitals, institu­
tions, schools, and most state and local government employees. The 
standards established in the Equal Pay Act for comparing jobs were 
equality of skill, effort, responsibility and similarity of working con-
82 
ditions. 
79Equal Pay Act of 1963, PL 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963). 
80Public Law 89-601, Sec. 102 (b). 80 Stat. 831 (1966). 
Public Law 93-259, Sec. 6, 88 Stat. 55, 58, 60 (1974). 
82 
Equal Pay Act, Section 3. 
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The legislative history of the Equal Pay Act indicated that jobs of 
the same or closely-related descriptions should be compared in applying 
the equal pay for equal work. Jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and 
responsibility within the requirements of the act were not usually the 
same in every detail. Inconsequential differences in job descriptions 
were not valid reasons for a pay differential based on the sex of 
members if both sexes perform equal work on essentially the same jobs 
in the same organization. The policy of the National War Labor Board 
gave rise to the practice that if two jobs were substantially different, 
83 the Equal Pay Act should not be an index to measure the pay. 
According to EEOC, the question is whether a female doing a 
completely different job than a man is beyond the scope of the Equal 
Pay Act. The Act does not apply in organizations where only men are 
employed in one job and only women are employed in a dissimilar job. 
As an example, if only women are employed as clerk-typists and only 
84 
men are employed as administrative secretaries the act does not apply. 
To determine if job differences are substantial enough to make the 
jobs unequal, EEOC will inquire into what significance has been given 
85 
to such differences in setting wage levels for these jobs. 
The amount of time employees spend in the performance of differ­
ent duties is one criterion for determining whether nonidentical jobs are 
substantially equal. The fact that two jobs are in different departments 
OO 
Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., (CA-3 1970), 421 F.2d 259. 
S4I bid. 
851 bid. 
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departments or locations within an establishment would not make other-
86 
wise equal jobs unequal. 
It is a very complicated process to compare jobs and pay under 
the Equal Pay Act. To do so, it is imperative to note that sex discrimi­
nation, not simple unfairness, is the issue. The two groups compared 
are to be differentiated by sex. Once it is determined that women in a 
job are paid less than the men, or vice versa, in the same or another job 
requiring equal skill, effort, responsibility and performed under similar 
"working conditions", the next step is to determine whether any of the 
four exceptions are applicable. 
According to the United States Supreme Court, "working condi­
tions" are defined as the surroundings and hazards. Surroundings are 
the elements such as toxic chemicals or unusual intensity and frequency 
of such conditions. Hazards include anything likely to bring bodily 
harm and the extent of injury that can cause. Time of day is not a 
87 
factor in "working conditions". 
The comparison of jobs under the Equal Pay Act involves determin­
ing the comparability of the skill, effort, and responsibility required to 
perform the jobs. Although there are several cases in which the three 
qualifiers are applied as one, the EEOC and many courts see the standard 
as three separate tests, each of which are to be met if the equal work 
88 
principle is to be applied. "Equal" does not mean "identical". 
07 
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974). 
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The skill test involves indices such as experience, training, 
education, and ability. Each of these is to be measured in terms of 
the performance requirements of the job. Two jobs requiring the same 
skills are equal even if the employee in one job is not required to use 
the skill as frequently as the other. However, possession of a skill 
89 cannot make two employees' jobs unequal. The focus is generally on 
the skill needed to do the job. However, courts have also recognized 
an employer's right to compensate at a higher level an individual with 
90 
greater skill even though a person having less skill could do the job. 
The effort test is a measure of physical or mental capacity needed 
to do a job. Differences only in the kind of effort required do not 
justify wage differences. However, circumstances in which one employee 
has to perform a lifting function and another does not would be a 
91 
differential. 
The responsibility test is a measure of the accountability expected 
in the job performance and particularly with emphasis on the importance 
92 of the job obligation. 
Extra duties are cited most frequently as reasons for different pay 
in two comparable jobs such as those of janitors and maids. The job 
assessment must remain on the skill, effort and responsibility, but the 
extra duties situation brings in new factors where the bulk of the time 
89 
Hein v. Oregon College of Education, (CA-9 1983), 32 EPD Sec. 
33,895; 29 CFR, Sec. 800.125. 
90 EEOC v. New York Times Broadcasting Service, Inc., (CA-6, 
1976), 542 F.2d 356. 
9129 CFR Sec. 800.127 and Sec. 800.128. 
9229 CFR Sec. 800.129 and Sec. 800.130. 
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spent in the two jobs is on the same task. The courts have argued that 
higher pay is not justified by extra duties except when any of the 
following criteria is met: 
(1) Female employees also have extra duties calling for the same 
skill, effort and responsibility as the male employees' extra 
duties; 
(2) The supposed extra duties are not in fact performed; or 
(3) The extra duties consume a minimal amount of time and are of 
peripheral importance. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination 
with respect to compensation on the basis of the individual's race, color, 
94 religion, sex, or national origin. Age is covered in the Age Discrimi­
nation in Employment Act of 1967, which prohibits discrimination because 
95 
of an individual's age. 
Based on the issues of race, color, religion, or national origin, 
there are relatively few court cases that have been decided concerning 
compensation. It may be that the complexity of proving that compen­
sation rates are applied discriminatorily on one of the prohibited bases 
causes plaintiffs to base their suits in other employment practices such 
as placement, transfer, promotion, layoff or recall. 
96 In Roman v. EBS, Inc., the plaintiff's compensation claim was 
unsuccessful because the court failed to accept the plaintiff's efforts to 
93 
Brennan v. South Davis Community Hospital, (CA-10 1976), 538 
F.2d 859. 
94Title VII Sec. 703 (a)(1). 
9^Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Section 4 (a)(1), 
29 U.S.C. 621. 
96Roman v. ESB, Inc., (CA-4, 1976), 550 F.2d 1343. 
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show that wage rates are discriminatory by comparing the average of the 
salaries paid white workers. The court said that such a comparison 
failed to account for differences in skill, education, and training. In 
97 
Calcote v. Texas Education Foundation, Inc., a white plaintiff was 
successful in demonstrating that starting salaries had been discriminatory 
against whites. The beginning salaries for two employees were compared 
in addition to the two men's respective training and experience. 
However, much litigation has occurred in the application of Title 
VII to sex discrimination in compensation despite the availability of relief 
under the Equal Pay Act of 1963. The reason that the Equal Pay Act is 
sometimes not the basis of sex discrimination cases is that the equal pay 
for equal work approach is limited to those situations in which men and 
women do comparable work to meet the exacting standards for equal work 
in the Equal Pay Act. The equal work standard relating to job compara-
98 
bility has been applied in the same manner under Title VII. However, 
the prohibition against discrimination in compensation in Title VII is 
broader than in the Equal Pay Act, and may provide a greater possibility 
of recovery. The United States Supreme Court clearly stated in 
99 
Gunther v. County of Washington that Title VII provides a theory for 
recovery separate from the Equal Pay Act. The argument to the Court 
is centered on the provision in Title VII known as the Bennett Amend­
ment. This amendment states that Title VII does not make unlawful any 
97 Calcote v. Texas Educational Foundation, Inc., (CA-5 1978), 
578 F.2d 95. 
QO 
DiSalvo v. Chamber of Commerce, (CA-8 1978) 568 F.2d 593. 
Gunther v. County of Washington, (CA-9, 1980), 452 U.S. 161 
(1981). 
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employment practice that differentiates on the basis of sex in determining 
the amount of compensation paid to the employees if the differentiation is 
"authorized by the Equal Pay Act" 
For a full understanding of the Supreme Court's decision, two 
interpretations of the effect of the Bennett Amendment are considered. 
The interpretation as applied by some courts and generally accepted is 
that the Equal Pay Act was intended to set the standard for sex discrim­
ination in pay and that whatever was lawful under it was not changed 
101 
by Title VII. A second interpretation adopted by the Supreme Court 
holds that the Bennett Amendment only adopts the Equal Pay Act's four 
excep t i ons  as  c i t ed  above  as  l im i t a t i ons  on  t he  app l i ca t i on  o f  T i t l e  V I I  
to sex discrimination, but it does not adopt the equal work concept of 
the Equal Pay Act. The Bennett Amendment's use of the word "author­
ized" is the basis for this interpretation. It is argued that "authorized" 
must mean more than permitted. Since only the four exceptions in the 
Equal Pay Act actually "authorize" differentials, the advocates of the 
second interpretation contend that only the four exceptions are intended 
102 
to limit the application of Title VII. 
The interpretation of the Bennett Amendment which is important 
to the application of Title VII to sex discrimination in pay, is not sup­
ported by an examination of legislative history. Because the amendment 
was presented for the first time on the Senate floor, and passed with 
lOOTjtie vil, Section 703 (h), last sentence. 
101 
Ammons v. Zia Company (CA-10 1971), 448 F.2d 117 and 
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102 
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little discussion or debate there is little pertinent legislative history. 
What is available is unclear or arguably not relevant because of the 
timing of the remarks. 
The phrase, "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment", has been construed to include a variety of subjects, 
including fringe benefits, bonuses, company housing, employee stock 
purchase plans, group insurance, lunch and rest periods, individual 
merit raises, and employee discounts. Discrimination with respect to 
any such matters would appear to come within the scope of Title 
Vll.^^. Peskins stated: 
The key to understanding Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (which deals with equal employment opportunity) is to grasp 
the premise upon which the act is based: that neither race, creed, 
color, religion, sex, age nor national origin are relevant in deter­
mining whether an individual should be given gainful employment, 
nor should these factors influence treatment during employment to 
which the individual is entitled. The act is interesting because 
employers, employment agencies, unions, and joint management and 
union committees are affected under Title VII by negative prohibi­
tions against becoming involved in such practices as barring employ­
ment, prohibiting or restricting promotions, transfers, or pay, or 
negating any other privilege or condition of employment on the basis 
of race, creed, color, religion, sex, age, or national origin. (The 
act indicates what not to do but is silent about what is to be done.) 
Another interesting feature of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is its 
attempt to ensure state's rights and state self-determination; this is 
demonstrated in section 708 of the act, which affirms that except 
where an unlawful practice under Title VII is permitted by a state 
law, Title VII does not intend to exempt a person from obligation to 
state statutes. Those persons who were originally suspicious of 
the act because they believed it showed disproportionate preferential 
treatment for minorities were unfamiliar with the all-encompassing 
nature and characterof the act. This most popular misconception 
about the law should have been set straight with Section 703 (j) 
of Title VII, which clearly and pointedly assures that the act 
104 
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seeks to avoid preferential treatment in employment even if such 
avoidance does not correct imbalances due to past discriminatory 
practices that were responsible reducing the percentage of 
employed minorities in a given area. 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
The five-member Equal Employment Commission (EEOC) as esta­
blished by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had virtually no enforcement 
powers. It received charges of unlawful employment based on race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin, but was limited to seeking 
voluntary compliance through conference, conciliation, or persuasion. 
When the commission is not successful in its efforts to bring 
voluntary compliance, it notifies the charging party or parties that there 
is reasonable cause to believe a violation has been committed. The 
aggrieved may then file a suit against the charged party or parties in a 
federal district court. If a "pattern or practice" of unlawful employment 
discrimination is found, the Department of Justice is permitted to file an 
action against the employer, the union, the employment agency, or all 
three. 
When an individual files a suit, the EEOC is permitted to intervene 
as amious curiae but is prohibited from initiating action on its own. 
However, in spite of the limitation there has been a substantial volume 
o f  l i t i ga t i on  unde r  t he  1964  Ac t J^  
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Dean B. Peskins, The Building Blocks of EEO (New York: The 
World Publishing Company, 1971), p. 18. 
106 Bureau of National Affairs, The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Act of 1972, p. 55. 
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Section 705 creates the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis­
sion (EEOC) composed of five members. Not more than three of the 
members may be from the same political party. They are appointed by 
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate for a term of 
five years. Persons chosen to fill a vacancy are appointed only for the 
unexpired term of the member whom the appointee succeeds. The mem­
bers continue to serve until their successors are appointed and qualified, 
except no such member shall continue to serve (I) for more than 60 days 
when Congress is in session unless a nominee to fill the vacancy has 
been submitted to the Senate, or (2) after the adjournment sine die of 
the session of the Senate in which such nomination is submitted. 
The President appoints one member to serve as chairman of the 
Commission and one member to serve as vice chairman. The chairman 
is responsible for the admistrative operations of the Commission. With 
the exception of the provisions of subsection (b), the chairman appoints 
such officers, agents, attorneys, hearing examiners, and employees as 
he deems necessary to assist the EEOC in the performance of its func­
tion. These appointments are made in accordance with Title 5, United 
States Code, governing appointments in the competitive services. 
The chairman also sets the compensation of all employees in 
acco rdance  w i t h  t he  p rov i s i ons  o f  Chap te r  51  and  subchap te r  I I I  o f  
Chapter 53 of Title 5, United States Code, relating to classification and 
general schedule pay rates. Additionally, the assignment, removal, and 
compensation of the hearing examiners shall be in accordance with sec­
tions 3105, 3344, 5362, and 7521 of Title 5, United States Code. 
107 
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Subsection (b) cited above requires that a General Counsel of the 
Commission be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, for a term of four years. The General Counsel 
is responsible for the conduct of litigation as provided in sections 706 
and 707 of Title VII. The General Counsel shall have such other duties 
as the Commission may prescribe or as may be provided by law and is 
to concur with the chairman of the Commission on the appointment and 
supervision of regional attorneys. 
Attorneys appointed may, at the direction of the Commission, 
appear for and represent the Commission in any case in court, except 
that the Attorney General shall conduct all litigation to which the 
Commiss ion  i s  a  pa r t y  i n  t he  Sup reme Cour t  pu rsuan t  t o  T i t l e  V I I .  
Three members constitute a quorum. During the latter part of 
1981 and early 1982, the EEOC went more than one hundred days without 
108 a quorum. Three of the Commission's positions were vacant. The 
Commission has an official seal which is to be judicially noticed and it 
files a fiscal year report to Congress and the President reporting action 
it has taken; the names, salaries, and duties of all employees and the 
monies it has disbursed. Additionally, it reports on the causes of and 
means of eliminating discrimination and recommends further legislation. 
The principal office is to be in or near the District of Columbia, 
but it may meet or exercise any or all of its power in any other place. 
The Commission may establish regional or state offices as it deems neces­
sary. In North Carolina, there are offices as of this date in Charlotte, 
108 
"Clarence Thomas: New Choice for Chairman," Idea and Trends 
in Personnel, 26 February 1982, p. 62. 
60 
Greensboro, and Raleigh. Regional offices are located in Philadelphia, 
109 Atlanta, Chicago, Denver, and San Francisco. 
Section 705 (g) establishes the powers of the Commission: 
(1) to cooperate with and, with their consent, utilize regional 
State, local and other agencies, both public and private, 
and individuals; 
(2 )  t o  pay  t o  w i tnesses  whose  depos i t i ons  a re  t aken  o r  who  
are summoned before the Commission or any of its agents 
the same witness and mileage fees as are paid to witness­
es in the courts of the United States; 
(3) to furnish to persons subject to this title such technical 
assistance as they may request to further their compliance 
with this title or an order issued thereunder; 
(4) upon the request of (i) any employer, whose employees 
or some of them, or (ii) any labor organization, whose 
members or some of them, refuse or threaten to refuse to 
cooperate in effectuating the provisions of this title, to 
assist in such effectuation by concilation or such other re­
medial action as is provided by this title; 
(5) to make such technical studies as are appropriate to 
effectuate the purposes and policies of this title and 
to make the results of such studies available to the 
public; 
(6) to intervene in a civil action brought under section 
706 by an aggrieved party against a respondent other 
than a govetjcjgient, governmental agency, or political 
subdivision. 
The major change in enforcement power that was added in 1972 
was the authority in section (6) above to bring civil suits in federal 
district courts for injunctions and other remedies for unlawful employ­
ment practices on the part of employers, unions, employment agencies 
and joint labor-management committees. 
109 
Telephone interview, EEO office, Greensboro, NC, 8 February 
1984. 
110 
Title VII, Section 705 (g). 
61 
Under the 1964 Act, the Justice Department was the sole jurisdic­
tion to prosecute actions involving an alleged "pattern or practice" of 
unlawful employment discrimination. The 1972 amendment gave the EEOC 
concurrent jurisdiction with the Justice Department to bring such actions 
for a period of two years after which the EEOC had exclusive jurisdiction 
to bring "pattern or practice" actions. 
Section 706 (b) of Title VII provides that when a person files a 
charge alleging employment discrimination, the EEOC shall serve a notice 
of the charge to include the date, place and circumstance of the alleged 
unlawful employment practice to the employer, employment agency, labor 
organization or joint labor-management committee (hereinafter referred 
to as the respondent) within ten days and shall make an investigation of 
the charges. Charges are to be written and signed under oath or 
affirmation using such forms as the Commission requires. Charges shall 
not be made public by the Commission. If the Commission determines 
that there is not reasonable cause to believe the charge is true, it shall 
dismiss the charge and promptly notify the charging party and the 
respondent of its action. 
To determine whether reasonable cause exists, the EEOC shall 
accord substantial weight to the findings and orders made by state and 
local authorities in proceedings commenced under state and local law. 
As cited earlier, public school employees in North Carolina do not have 
a 706 agency so charges go directly to EEOC. 
If the Commission determines after appropriate investigation that 
there is reasonable cause to hold the charges as true, the EEOC 
endeavors to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practices by 
62 
informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Nothing 
said or done in these informal endeavors is made public by the EEOC, 
its offices or employees nor is it used as evidence in a subsequent 
proceeding without the written consent of the persons concerned. 
Persons making such information public in violation of sub-section 706(d) 
of Title VII shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not 
more than one year, or both. The Commission is to make its determina-
tion on reasonable cause as promptly as possible, and, in so far as 
practicable, not more than one hundred twenty days from the filing of 
the charge, or the date upon which the Commission is authorized to take 
action with respect to the charge, if it has been filed with a 706 local 
or state agency. 
Subsection 706 (c) of Title VII requires the charges occurring in 
a state, or political subdivision of a state having a state or local law 
prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged, to seek remedy 
through the appropriate agency before the charges can be accepted by 
EEOC. This procedure requires a waiting period of sixty days after 
the proceedings have commenced under the state or local laws, unless 
the proceedings have been terminated in less time. This time is extended 
to one hundred twenty days during the first year after the effective date 
of such a state or local law. Before taking any action on the charge, 
Subsection 706 (d) requires the Commission to notify the appropriate 
state and local officials of any charge filed by a member of the Commis­
sion alleging an unlawful employment practice occurring in a state or 
political sub-division of a state having a law prohibiting the practice 
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alleged. The same time limits are required as provided in Section 706 
(c) unless a shorter period is required. 
Charges are to be filed within one hundred eighty days after the 
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, except when the person 
has initially instituted proceedings with a state or local agency. Then, 
the time is extended to three hundred days after the alleged unlawful 
employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving 
notice the state or local agency has terminated the case. 
If the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent 
a conciliation agreement acceptable to the EEOC within thirty days after 
it has received a charge or within thirty days after the expiration of 
any period of reference under subsection (c) or (d), the EEOC may 
bring civil action against any respondent not a government, governmen­
tal agency, or political subdivision named in the charge. When the 
Commission is unable to secure a conciliation agreement from a respon­
dent which is a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision 
agreeable to EEOC, the Commission is to take no further action and is 
to refer to the case to the Attorney General who may bring a civil action 
against such respondent in the appropriate United States district court. 
The charging party shall have the right to intervene in a civil action 
brought by the Commission or the Attorney General under these 
circumstances. 
Further, under subsection (f)(1) of Title VII, if a charge filed 
under the Commission pursuant to subsection (b) is dismissed by the 
Commission, or if within one hundred eighty days from the filing of the 
charge or any references under subsection (c) or (d), whichever is 
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later, the commission has not filed a civil action or the Attorney General 
has notified a civil action in a case involving a government, govern­
mental agency, or political subdivision, or the EEOC has not entered 
into a conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, 
the Commission, or the Attorney General, shall notify the charging 
party. Within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action 
may be brought against the respondent or if such charge was filed by 
a member of the Commission, by any person whom the charge alleges is 
aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employment practice. Upon application 
by the complaintant and in such circumstances as the court may deem 
just, the court may appoint an attorney for the complaintant and may 
authorize the commencement of the action without the payment of fees, 
costs or security. With timely application, the court may, in its 
discretion, permit the EEOC, or the Attorney General, to intervene in 
such civil action upon certification that the case is for general public 
importance. 
Subsection (f)(2) of Title VII provides: 
Whenever a charge is filed with the Commission and the Commis­
sion concludes on the basis of a preliminary investigation that 
prompt judicial action is necessary to carry out the purposes of 
this Act, the Commission or the Attorney General in a case involving 
a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, may 
bring an action for appropriate temporary or preliminary relief 
pending final disposition of such charge. Any temporary relief shall 
be issued in accordance with rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. It shall be the duty of a court having jurisdiction over 
proceedings under this section to assign cases for hearing at the 
earliest practicable date and to cause such case to be in every way 
expedited. 
Subsection (f)(3) of Title VII establishes that each United States 
district court and each United States court of a place within jurisdiction 
of the United States shall having jurisdiction of actions brought under 
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Title VII. For purposes of sections 1404 and 1406 of Title 28 of the 
United States Code, the judicial district in which the principal office 
of the respondent is located shall in all cases be considered a district 
in which the action might have been brought. 
Subsection (f)(4) of Title VII places the responsibility of designat­
ing a judge to hear and determine the case on the chief judge of the 
district. If no judge is available, the chief judge of the district, or 
the acting chief judge, shall designate a district or circuit judge of the 
circuit to hear and determine the case. The judge designated under this 
section has the duty to assign the case for a hearing at the earliest 
practicable date and to expedite the case. If failure to schedule the 
case for trial within one hundred twenty days after issue has been 
joined, that judge may appoint a master pursuant to rule 53 of the 
111 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
When the court finds that the respondent has intentionally 
engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment prac­
tice as charged, Sub-section (g) of Title VII authorizes the court to 
enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful practice, and 
orders such affirmative action as may be appropriate. The Court order 
may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, 
with or without back pay payable by the employer, employment agency, 
or labor organization responsible for the unlawful employment practice 
or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay 
liability may not accrue from a date more than two years prior to filing 
111Title VII, Section 706 (f)(5). 
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the charge with EEOC. Any earnings or amounts earnable with reason­
able diligence by the charging party will reduce the amount of back 
pay allowable. This subsection further states that: 
No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement 
of an individual as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstate­
ment, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment 
to him of any back pay, if such individual was refused admission, 
suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement 
or was suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimi­
nation on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
or in violation of section 704 (a). 
Subsections (h) through (k) of Title VII provide other requirements for 
court cases: 
( h )  The  p rov i s i ons  o f  t he  Ac t  en t i t l ed  "An  Ac t  t o  amend  t he  
Judicial Code and to define and limit the jurisdiction of courts 
sitting in equity, and for other purposes," approved March 
23, 1932 (29 U.S.C. 101-115), shall not apply with respect 
to civil actions brought under this section. 
( i )  I n  any  case  i n  wh i ch  an  emp loye r ,  emp loymen t  agency ,  o r  l abo r  
organization fails to comply with an order of a court issued in a 
civil action brought under this section, the Commission may 
commence proceedings to compel compliance with such order. 
( j )  Any  c i v i l  ac t i on  b rough t  unde r  t h i s  sec t i on  and  any  p roceed ings  
brought under subsection (i) shall be subject to appeal as 
provided in sections 1291 and 1292, title 28, United States 
Code. 
( k )  I n  any  ac t i on  o r  p roceed ing  unde r  t h i s  t i t l e  t he  cou r t ,  i n  i t s  
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Com­
mission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part 
of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be 
liable for costs the same as a private person. 
Subsection 707 (e) of Title VII establishes that "effective two years 
after the date of enactment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 
1972, the functions of the Attorney General under this section shall be 
transferred to the Commission". Thus, EEOC is granted the right to 
bring a civil action in the appropriate federal district court of the 
United Stated by filing with it a complaint that is (1) signed, (2) sets 
forth the facts pertaining to pattern or practice, and (3) seeks relief 
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to include an application for a permanent or temporary injunction re­
straining order or other order against the person or persons responsi­
b le  f o r  un law fu l  d i sc r im ina t i on  t o  i nsu re  f u l l  r i gh t s  secu red  by  T i t l e  V I I .  
Subsection (e) of Title VII summarizes the changes made in EEOC 
in the 1972 amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964: 
Subsequent of the date of enactment of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act of 1972, the Commission shall have authority to 
investigate and act on a charge of a pattern or practice of discrimi­
nation, whether filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be 
aggrieved or by a member of the Commission. All such actions 
shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in 
section 706 of this Act. 
Section 709 of Title VII covers investigations, inspections, records 
and relationships with state agencies. Subsection (a) requires that at 
all reasonable times the Commission shall have access to, for the purpose 
of examination, and the right to copy any evidence of any person being 
investigated that relates to unlawful employment practices covered by 
Title VII and is relevant to the charge under investigation. 
A recent court action over the right of EEOC to confidential 
information is reported in Legal Notes for Education. A black college 
professor filed an EEOC claim alleging racial discrimination after he was 
denied tenure by the University of Notre Dame. The EEOC's requested 
access to all files of faculty members who were eligible for tenure at the 
time the claimant was eligible was refused by the University unless it 
could first delete any identifying information of professors who had 
participated in the University's peer review process. The EEOC refused 
to sign a nondisclosure agreement for the release of any files and filed 
a suit in the United States District Court in Indiana which held against 
the University. On appeal, the United states Court of Appeals, 7th 
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circuit, held that the need to preserve the integrity of the peer review 
process necessitated the removal of identifying information. This court 
ruled that EEOC was not required to sign a nondisclosure agreement. 
The case was remanded to the district court to issue a protective order 
assuring that privileged materials would not be disclosed to anyone not 
112 directly involved in the EEOC investigation. 
Subsection (b) provides that the Commission may cooperate with 
state and local agencies charged with administering state fair employment 
practices law, and with consent of such agencies, engage in and contri­
bute to the cost of research and other projects of mutual interest and 
utilize the services of such agencies and their employers. 
Subsection (c) requires every employer, employment agency, and 
labor organization subject to Title VII to (1) make and keep records 
relevant to the determiniation of whether unlawful employment practices 
have been or are being committed; (2) preserve such records for such 
periods; and (3) make reports which EEOC shall prescribe by regulation 
or order. EEOC by regulations requires each employer, labor organiza­
tion and joint labor-management committee which has apprenticeships 
and other training programs, to keep records including, but not limited 
to, a list of applicants who wish to participate, including the chronolog­
ical order in which applications are received, and to furnish EEOC on 
request a detailed description of the process for selection of participants 
The 1972 amendment to this section adds the following: 
If any person required to comply with the provisions of this sub­
section fails or refuses to do so, the United States district court 
112 . . "Confidentiality of Faculty Files Disputed in Discrimination 
Suit", Legal Notes for Education, 6 (January 1984): 1. 
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for the district in which such person is found, resides, or transacts 
business, shall, upon application of the Commission, or the Attorney 
General in a case involving a government, governmental agency or 
political subdivision, have jurisdiction to issue to such person an 
order requiring him to comply. 
Subdivision (d) of Title VII provides for the EEOC, upon request 
and without cost, to provide information obtained pursuant to subsection 
(c) from any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint 
labor-management committee to any state or local agency charged with 
the administration of a fair employment practice law. Such information is 
not to be made public by the recipient agency prior to the institution 
of a proceeding under state or local law involving such information. 
A violation by a recipient agency may result in the Commission's declin­
ing to honor subsequent requests pursuant to this subsection. 
Section 710 of Title VII requires the use of section 11 of the 
National Labor Relations Act for the purpose of all hearings and investi-
113 
gations conducted by EEOC or its duly authorized agents or agencies. 
Section 711 of Title VII requires every employer, employment 
agency, and labor organization to post and keep posted conspiciously 
upon its premises where notices to employees, applicants for employment, 
and members are customarily posted. These notices are to be prepared 
or approved by the EEOC. A fine of not more than $100 is assessed 
for each separate offense. 
Section 712 of Title VII states that nothing in Title VII shall be 
construed to repeal or modify any federal, state, territorial, or local 
law creating special righs or preference for veterans. 
11^ 
National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat, 455, 29 U.S.C. 161 
(1935). 
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Section 713 of Title VII provides the authority for EEOC from time 
to time to issue, amend, or rescind suitable procedural regulations to 
carry out the provisions of Title VII. All regulations issued under this 
section are to be in conformity with the standards and limitations of 
the Administrative Procedure Act. 
Section 714 of Title VII covers the act of forcibly resisting the 
EEOC or its representatives. The provisions of sections 111 and 1114 
Title 18, United States Code, shall apply to all EEOC personnel in the 
performance of their official duties. The 1972 amendment added the 
following: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 111 and 1114 of Title 18, 
United States Code, whoever in violation of the provisions of section 
1114 of such title kills a person while engaged in or on account of 
the performance of his official functions under this Act shall be 
punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life. 
The 1972 amendment adds an Equal Employment Opportunity 
Coordinating Council in Section 715. The council is composed of the 
Secretary of Labor, the Chairman of the EEOC, the Attorney General, 
the Chairman of the United States Civil Service Commission, and the 
Chairman of the United States Civil Rights Commission, or their respec­
tive delegates. 
The council is responsible for developing and implementing agree­
ments, policies, and practices designed to maximize effort, promote 
efficiency, and eliminate conflict, competition, duplication, and inconsis­
tency among the operations, functions and jurisdictions of the various 
departments, agencies, and branches of the Federal Government respon­
sible for the implementation and enforcement of equal employment oppor­
tunity legislation, orders and policies. The council reports to the 
71 
President and Congress on or before July 1 annually. The report is 
to contain activities and such recommendations for legislative or admini­
strative changes the council concludes are desireable. 
The 1972 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 strengthen 
the enforcement of the prohibition against discrimination in employment 
based on race, color, sex, religion, or national origin. Following the 
1972 amendment, EEOC has the authority to bring civil suits in federal 
district courts for injunctions and other remedies for unlawful employ­
ment practices. Two years after the 1972 amendments, on April 24, 
1974, the EEOC has exclusive jurisdiction to bring "pattern and practice" 
114 actions to the courts. 
Miner and Miner argue that although the improvement of personnel 
practices is not one of the goals of Title VII, it may well be a result. 
In the area of selection of employees, the EEOC requirements for compli­
ance with the law contribute to more effective hiring and promotion 
decisions. Having employment decisions be related to job performance, 
which is really all EEOC requires, makes the selection process more 
effective. This is not only in the interest of society; it is in the interest 
115 of the organization. 
Uniform Guidelines on Employment Selection Procedures (1978) 
On Friday, August 25, 1978, uniform guidelines for the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, the Civil Service Commission, the 
114 Bureau of National Affairs, The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Act of 1972, p. 58. 
115 
Miner and Miner, Employee Selection Within the Law, p. 369. 
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Department of Justice and the Department of Labor were adopted. This 
document set forth the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Pro-
116 
cedures. The guidelines were adopted by the Department of Treasury 
on September 11, 1978. 
The guidelines are a common effort by the EEOC to enforce Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act as amended by the Equal Employment Oppor­
tunity Act of 1972 by the Department of Labor to enforce Executive 
Order 11246 through the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Program 
(OFCCP), by the Department of Justice to enforce a variety of equal 
employment laws, and by the U.S. Civil Service Commission (renamed the 
Office of Personnel Management under the Civil Service Reform Act of 
1978) for federal employees (which is now the responsibility of EEOC) 
and for state and local governments receiving grant-in-aid funds under 
various federal statutes. The adoption of the guidelines was followed by 
the release of ninety explanatory questions and answers on March 2, 
117 11ft 
1979 followed by three additional questions on May 2, 1983. 
The Ad Hoc Group on Uniform Selection Guidelines of the American 
Society for Personnel Administration indicates: 
The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedure (the 
"Uniform Guidelines" or "Guidelines") represent a significant attempt 
by the federal equal employment opportunity ("EEO") agencies to 
achieve consistency in interpreting the requirements of equal 
employment opportunity laws as such laws impact on employer 
personnel practices. Some provisions are pragmatic and helpful 
and, if properly interpreted, should discourage unwarranted litiga­
tion while encouraging employers to use selection procedures that 
are job-related and consistent with sound equal employment oppor-
^^Federal Register 43, 116, 25 August 1978, 38295. 
117Federal Register 44, 43, 2 March 1979, 29530. 
118Federal Register 45, 87, 2 May 1980, 11996. 
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tunity objectives. The Guidelines leave many questions unanswered, 
however, and some crucial terms are professionally or legally un­
sound, or both. Employers will not only find that attainment of 
EEO objectives will be enhanced by an understanding of what the 
Guidelines require, but also that guidance as to the more doubtful, 
as well as the most positive points in the Guidelines will emUple them 
to deal in a practical way with the realities of compliance. 
The Ad Hoc Group includes leaders of personnel management and 
industrial psychologists from the private sector, the public sector, and 
the legal profession. The group was organized to develop policies to 
implement the best professional thinking as to how equal employment 
opportunity could be implemented without denigrating the concept of 
120 
merit employment. It has been operating since 1974. 
A problem which caused Congress concern at the time the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 was adopted was the effect that written pre-employ­
ment tests had on equal employment opportunity. The use of these tests 
appeared to deny employment to minorities in many cases without evidence 
that the tests were related to success on the job. Congress sought to 
strike a balance which prohibits discrimination, but otherwise allows the 
use of tests in the selection of employees. Thus, in Title VII, Congress 
authorized the use of "any professionally developed test provided that 
in the administration or action upon the results was not designed, 
121 intended or used to discriminate". 
Employers contended that they could use any test developed by a 
professional as long as they did not intend to exclude minorities, even 
119 
Virgil B. Day, Frank Erwin, and Allan M. Koral, eds., A 
Professional and Legal Analysis of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee 
Selection Procedures (Berea, Ohio: The American Society for Personnel 
Administration, 1981), p. 5. 
120lbid., p. 14. 
121Section 703 (h), 42 U.S.C. 2000 e (2) (h). 
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if such exclusion was the result of testing. In 1966, the EEOC added 
guidelines to advise what the intent of the law and good industrial 
122 
psychology practice requires. EEOC's view was that the employer's 
intent was irrelevant, if the testing resulted in adverse impact on 
protected groups. To justify a test which screened out a higher propor­
tion of minorities, the employer needed to demonstrate that it measured 
123 
or predicted performance on the job. Otherwise, it was not consid-
ered to be "professionally developed". 
124 In 1971 in Griggs v. Duke Power Company, the Supreme Court 
insisted that employer practices which have an adverse impact on minori­
ties and are not justified by business necessity constitute illegal discrimi­
nation under Title VII. Congress confirmed this in the 1972 amendments 
to Title VII. The extension of these principles by courts and agencies 
125 continued into the mid-1970's. However, differences between EEOC 
and the Department of Justice, Department of Labor, and the Civil 
Service Commission had produced two different sets of guidelines by the 
end of 1976. 
126 In Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court relaxed the 
standards for demonstrating job-relatedness in a constitutional and 
non-Title VII statutory content, although the court seemed to be using 
Title VII standard to make its determination. 
12235 U.S.L.W. .2137 (1966). 
123 
Federal Register 43, 116, 25 August 1978, 33290. 
124 
Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
1?^ 
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
^2^Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
75 
The Supreme Court's opinion in Washington v. Davis has had its 
greatest impact for its holding that employers not subject to Title VII 
are not subject to the same burden of proof concerning selection 
procedures as employers who are subject to Title VII. The Court applied 
the constitutional standard requiring intentional discrimination and found 
that, by that measure, the test used to make employment decisions was 
proper. The test of verbal ability, vocabulary, reading, and comprehen­
sion was designed to select police officers in the District of Columbia. 
The court also affirmed that the trial court's conclusion that the test 
was directly related to the requirements of the police training program 
and that a positive relationship between the test and training perfor­
mance was sufficient to validate the test. The court applied a less 
restrictive standard for demonstrating job-relatedness in a Section 1981 
case than had been set forth in the 1970 Guidelines. Washington v. 
Davis held, "It appears beyond doubt . . . There is no single method 
for appropriately validating employment tests for their relationship to 
job performance." 
The incoming administration of President Jimmy Carter in 1977 
caused a movement to produce a unified government position with regard 
to employment decision and thus the Uniform Guidelines on Employee 
Selection Procedures (1978) developed. 
The legal importance of the guidelines to employees lies both in 
their scope and the use to which they are put by the EEOC and other 
Equal Employment Opportunity agencies. The guidelines cover virtually 
all employee selecton procedures other than recruitment. They mark 
the likely parameters in enforcement, especially with regard to whether 
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to prosecute "pattern and practice" or systemic discrimination cases. 
They are not "regulations" in the strict sense of the meaning. EEOC 
lacks the authority to issue regulations and the Justice Department does 
not use its rule-making authority to adopt the guidelines. However, 
the guidelines have a very important effect on an employer's ability 
127 to defend against Title VII charges of discrimination. 
The Ad Hoc Group on Uniform Selection Guidelines of the American 
Society for Personnel Administration summarized the guidelines as follows: 
1. If the overall selection rate for any racial, ethnic or sex group 
is is less than 80 percent of that of the most successful group 
(typically whites or males), this will generally be deemed to 
constitute "prima facie" (i.e., initial) evidence of discrimination 
because the selection process has "adverse impact" on that 
group. Each component procedure of the overall selection 
process must then be examined for adverse impact on the 
group in question, using the same 80 percent rule. Compo­
nents need not generally be examined if the overall process 
does not have adverse impact. 
2. The employer then has four choices to forestall liability for 
components having adverse impact: 
a. Demonstrate the job-relatedness of the selection procedure; 
b. Modify the procedure so that the adverse impact is elimi­
nated, or modify the method of use of the selection 
procedure to eliminate adverse impact; 
c. Abandon the procedure and adopt a different procedure 
without adverse impact; 
d. Otherwise justify the procedure in accordance with federal 
law, such as through showing "business necessity". 
3. If the employer chooses to demonstrate the job-relatedness of 
the selection procedure, the Guidelines require: 
a. Validation studies conforming to highly detailed require­
ments or validity evidence from other users that conform 
to the Guidelines' rules governing transportability of 
validity data; 
b. Detailed recordkeeping; 
127 Day, et al., A Professional and Legal Analysis of the Uniform 
Guildlines, p. 5. 
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c. Investigation of alternatiy^ valid selection devices that 
have less adverse impact. 
The importance of the guidelines is best approached by clarifying 
their purpose in the interpretation of federal equal employment opportu­
nity law. Except for certain merit system requirements placed on public 
sector employers, the government does not require employers to justify 
job-relatedness, fairness or reasonableness of most employment decisions. 
Only when employment practices have an apparently discriminatory effect 
on protected groups of employees or applicants do federal EEO laws 
require a statistical demonstration of adverse impact. This principle 
129 
is discussed at length by the Supreme Court in Griggs and it has 
130 
remained the bedrock of Title VII legal analysis to date. 
The guidelines are concerned with defining a certain kind of 
evidence that employment discrimination exists and the appropriate 
defenses to such evidence. If no statistically "adverse impact" exists 
in a protected group, the requirements of the Guidelines do not 
. 131 
apply. 
While the guidelines appear narrow in that they speak only to a 
particular kind of discrimination, in reality they cover all steps in the 
process leading up to employment decisions on hiring, job placement, 
firing, demotion and layoff. Additionally, the guidelines cover selection 
for training, transfer, apprenticeships, or educational assistance when 
1 2 8 . . .  .  c  Ibid., p. 6. 
^^Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
130 
Day et al., A Professional and Legal Analysis of the Uniform 
Guidelines, p. 7. 
l31ibid. 
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when their decisions affect job status or promotion. Decisions based 
on "merit" or experience rather than on strick seniority may be open 
to charges. Thus, every aspect of the employee-employer relation­
ship is potentially covered within the guidelines if its effects are 
132 
statistically maneuverable so that "adverse impact" can be identified. 
133 
The guidelines are not law. Only the courts can produce 
definititve interpretations and the guidelines are merely administrative 
interpretations of what the law requires. However, the guidelines are 
accorded great weight by the courts since they constitute a majority and 
recent statement of agency interpretation. 
The EEOC in addition to its power to issue procedural regulations, 
has the authority to issue and publicize its interpretations of Title VII 
provisions. The United States Supreme Court has held the Commission's 
134 
interpretative guidelines are entitled to "some deference". However, 
most courts have failed to interpret the EEOC's guidelines as legal obli-
135 
gations of employers. 
The main interpretative guidelines, "the EEOC opinion letters", are 
written in response to inquiries from employers or unions regarding the 
applicability of Title VII to a particular situation. The EEOC or its 
General Counsel issues these letters to give the Commission's point-
of-view on the issues raised. 
133 Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission of the State 
of New York, 23 FEP 909 (2nd Cir. 1980). 
^^Trans World Airlines, Inc., v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
135 
Howard J. Anderson, Primer of Equal Employment Opportunity 
(Washington: Bureau of National Affairs, 1982), p. 94. 
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The EEOC has ruled that such letters are germalne to the specific 
concern of the inquirer and have no effect upon other situations. An 
additional interpretative document is entitled "EEOC Decisions". 
The EEOC began in 1969 releasing selected decisions written by 
the Commission for publication. These decisions related to whether 
reasonable cause exists to credit particular charges of Title VII viola­
tions. Names and other identifying data were deleted from such deci­
sions to protect the confidentiality of the Commission. 
The guidelines apply to "adverse impact" issues of discrimination 
under Title VII and Executive Order 11246. Even though they do not 
apply to employment decisions subject to scrutiny under the Age Dis­
crimination in Employment Act of 1967 as amended, The Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973, the Vietnam Era Veterans Act or various state laws, both 
the legal concepts and the technical standards in the Guidelines are 
potentially influential in the administration of all of the statutes. Job-
relatedness for the purpose of one statute cannot be very different from job-
relatedness for the purpose of another statute. Griggs does not impose 
affirmative action upon employers, but supports Title VII's demand that 
employment practices be neutral or otherwise show the job-relatedness of 
employment decisions. The guidelines are an interpretation of Title VII 
and are not binding regulations. 
It is beyond the scope of this study to analyze in detail the 
Uniform Guidelines. The basic requirement of the guidelines is that in 
any selection process where the results are an adverse impact on groups 
protected by Title VII, the selection process is to be validated and shown 
to be job-related. The major controversy revolves around what consti­
80 
tutes acceptable evidence of validity. One federal court has argued, 
"standards for testing validity compromise a new and complicated era 
136 
of the law". Increasingly the courts have been asked to make judg­
ments of professional nature that previously rested in the exclusive 
province of industrial psychologists. This issue and other legal issues 
involving equal employment opportunity will be examined in Chapter III. 
North Carolinar State and Local Equal Employment Opportunity Laws 
In North Carolina public school employees may go directly to EEOC 
with any charges of discrimination and thus by-pass local and state 
agencies. 
North Carolina has the following Equal Employment Laws: 
A. G.S. 126-16 forbids discrimination in state government 
employment on the basis of race, sex, religion, color, creed, 
national origin or physical disability. 
B. G.S. 143B-391, et seq., is basically like Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act. It sets up a Human Relations Council to admini­
ster law, but fails to provide enforcement provisions. 
C. G.S. 128-15.3 prohibits discrimination against handicapped 
persons in the hiring policies of State Personnel System. 
D. Chapter 168 N.C.C.S. prohibits discrimination in both private 
and public employment against handicapped persons. 
E. G.S. 95-28.1 prohibits discrimination by public and private 
employees on account of sickle cell traits. 
Article II: Fair Employment is an ordinance which the City Coun­
cil of the City of Greensboro, North Carolina, passed on September 17, 
1981, to become effective on October 16, 1981. The purpose of the 
article is to "secure for all individuals freedom from discrimination in 
^^U.S. v. Georgia Power Company, 474 F.2d 906 (1973). 
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connection with employment". It is modeled on the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission's Guidelines. 
82 
CHAPTER III 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
Alexis de Toqueville held that, "scarcely any political question 
arises in the United States that is not resolved sooner or later into a 
i 
judicial question". 
In 1979, Philip J. Lombardi, Vice-President, Industrial Relations, 
Hyatt Hotels Corporation, wrote in a foreword to the book, The Equal 
Opportunity Handbook for Hotels, Restaurants, and Institutions: 
In the last decade, the author and others have attempted to 
give concise expression and definition to 200 years of legal shadow-
boxing with a basic tenet of the Constitution and Bill of Rights that 
"all men are created equal". 
It is essentially true that laws are designed Jay attorneys--for 
attorneys—and frequently appear to dare understanding by others. 
It is difficult to distinquish between laws that satisfy a political 
system and laws that attack a social disease. 
The need to understand both the law and human behavior are 
inextricably intertwined in the satisfaction of equal opportunity. 
The laws governing equal opportunity represent a challenge. 
For the bigot, the challenge is circumvention. For the enlightened 
and lawful, the challenge is understanding and compliance. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act is the primary law used by 
individuals in asserting their employment rights. The 1972 amendment 
extends the law's protection to all public and private school personnel. 
In North Carolina, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
-J 
de Toqueville, Alex, Democracy in Education, rev. ed. (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945), p. 280. 
p 
Arch Stokes, The Equal Opportunity Handbook for Hotels 
Restaurants, and Institutions (Boston: CBI Publishing Company, Inc., 
1979), p. ix. 
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is the commission to which charges of discrimination in employment 
may be referred. 
Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, many guidelines 
and regulations have been issued; formal amendments have been added; 
and court cases have added clarification, interpretation, or confusion to 
the basic tenets of the Civil Rights legislation. 
As defined in Chapter II, an unlawful employment practice is any 
activity on the part of an employer which is motivated, premised, or 
3 conditioned upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
Schlei and Grossman identified four general categories or theories 
of discrimination which, according to them, are listed in the order of 
their historical development: 
1. Disparate treatment. Examples include an absolute refusal to 
consider blacks for employment, paying a woman a lower wage 
than that paid a man for the same work, and discharging 
Spanish-surnamed employees for an offense for which Anglos 
are given lessor or no discipline. 
2. Policies or practices which perpetuate in the present the 
effects of past discrimination. A classic example is a 
departmental seniority structure where the employer has 
departments of varying desirability. If, prior to the effective 
date of Title VII, the employer hired minorities only into the 
least desirable departments, ceased this practice, but at all 
times thereafter either flatly barred transfers between the 
departments or required a forfeiture of seniority in order to 
transfer, a minority employee would be effectively locked into 
an undesirable department, into which he had originally been 
placed as a consequence of discrimination. 
3. Policies or practices having disparate impact not justified by 
business necessity. Examples include a general intelligence 
test as a prerequisite for hire which disqualifies substantially 
more blacks than whites and which cannot be shown to be job-
related in the sense that it accurately predicts successful job 
performance; a requirement of a high school diploma as a 
prerequisite for hire where fewer blacks than whits have such 
342 U.S.C. 2000 e, et. seg. 
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a diploma, arid the diploma cannot be shown to be job-related; 
and a policy of discharging all employees whose wages are 
garnished a specific number of times, where substantially 
more black employees than white employee have their wages 
garnished and the anti-garnishment cannot be shown to be 
necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the employer's 
business. 
4. Failure to make reasonable accommodations to an employee's 
religious observances or practices. An example would include 
discharging a Sabbatarian for refusing to work on the Sabbath 
where an accommodation to the employee's religious practices 
would not work an undue hardship on the conduct of the 
employer's business. 
Schlei and Grossman held that Congress passed Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 solely as a prohibition against disparate treatment 
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The most signi­
ficant developments in laws prohibiting employment discrimination during 
the first decade of Title VII however, were court decisions affecting the 
remaining three categories of discrimination. Categories 2 and 3 were 
especially identified as perpetuating in the present the effects of past 
discrimination and disparate impact. These two categories assume a lack 
of intent to discriminate, and that the practices resulting in charges of 
5 
discrimination are neutral on their face. 
The second category had its origins in the first of many seminal 
0 
court decisions under Title VII. Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc. 
originated the category of discrimination known as perpetuation in the 
present of the effects of past discrimination. Quarles concluded that 
4 Barbara Lindemann Schlei and Paul Grossman, Employment Dis-
crimination Law (Washington: The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 
1976), p. 1. 
5lbid., p. 2. 
^Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (EDVA, 1968). 
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"Congress did not intend to freeze an entire generation of Negro employ­
ees into discriminatory patterns that existed before the Act". 
In a ruling handed down on April 5, 1982, the United States 
Supreme Court voting 5 to 4 held that Congress meant for the language 
of Section 703(h) of Title VII, to apply to future seniority systems as 
well as those in existence in 1965 when the law took effect.^ 
Thus, twenty years after the passage of the Civil Rights Act, the 
Supreme Court ruled on a basic question of seniority. The Supreme 
Court made it clear that Section 703 (h) "immunizes" both seniority 
systems adopted before the Civil Rights Act was passed and those 
adopted afterward. 
The third category of illegal employment practice, disparate impact 
not justified by business necessity, is generally traced to Griggs v. 
g 
Duke Power, which is one of the most important court decisions in 
Q 
employment discrimination law. 
The fourth category of discrimination, reasonable accommodation 
to religious practice, originated in EEOC regulations and was confirmed 
by several court decisions. Some of the litigation involved the attempt 
to determine what the term "religious" included. In some cases the 
courts refused to delve into the question because of the resulting 
entanglement with religion. A few of the religious practices and beliefs 
^American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, (U.S. Sup. Ct., 1982, 
vacated and remanded to CA-4, 1980), 634 F.2d 744. 
8 
Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 40I U.S. 424 (1971). 
9 
Schlei and Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law, p. 5. 
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that have been considered in connection with accommodation duties of 
employees are religious objection to unionism, the observance of special 
10 
holidays, patriotic songs, and national holidays. 
In addition to Title VII Civil Rights Act of 1964, there are other 
laws and acts that provide opportunity for suit from employment deci­
sions. These are the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, the Civil Rights Act of 1870, the Civil Rights Act 
of 1871, the National Labor Relations Act, the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 
the Military Selective Service Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967, the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Vietnam-Era 
Veteran's Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, Executive Order 11246, 
and a myriad of state and local laws. It is beyond the scope of this 
chapter to examine the litigation surrounding each of these laws with 
regard to equal employment opportunity in the public schools. There­
fore, court cases involving Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as 
amended will be the focus of the remainder of this chapter. 
Litigation and the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) 
The initial emphasis in Title VII litigation was basically on charges 
of racial discrimination. By the early 1970's, an increasing number of 
unlawful employment charges were based on sex discrimination. Women 
were demanding opportunities to work in often dirty but higher paid 
10 Human Resources Management, Equal Employment Opportunity 
(Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 1981), Sec. 186, p. 339. 
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craft jobs, or to experience the extra stress and rewards of managerial 
11 
responsibility. 
Stoddard held: 
The educational field has been no exception to the on-going 
discrimination against women in the workforce. There is a wide 
disparity in the total number of women employed in education and 
the percentage of these women who have attained higher-level posi­
tions. Many argue that those who deserve to be promoted and 
rewarded are, that those who are not deserving remain at the lower 
levels, that there is no sex discrimination in educational employment 
but only an honest recognition of merit. But employment statistics 
which indicate higher disproportionate respresentation of females 
in high-lejVpl positions constitute strong evidence of discriminatory 
practices. 
It has become apparent that almost any area of personnel adminis­
tration may be affected by the requirements for equal employment 
opportunity. Employment discrimination in seniority lists, compensation, 
benefits, training opportunities, discipline, and other aspects of employee 
relationships in addition to recruitment, interviewing, and selection are 
likely to result in litigation. 
Early in 1979, EEOC established a program designed to identify 
and process charges that are likely to end in litigation. These charges 
that are known as Early Litigation Identification (ELI) have procedures 
for litigation-oriented investigation and conciliation. ELI is designed 
from the beginning so that all persons affected by the discriminatory 
13 
practices are involved in seeking relief. 
11 Mary Green Miner and John B. Miner, Employee Selection Within 
the Law (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1981), p. 68. 
12 Cynthia Stoddard, Sex Discrimination in Educational Employment: 
Legal Alternatives and Strategies (Holmes Beach, FL: Learning Publica­
tions, Inc., 1981), p. 9. 
13 Human Resources Management Sec. 6090, p. 1774. 
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ELI is in most cases an individual's charges rather than a charge 
initiated by the EEOC. The ELI cases are limited investigations. They 
deal with the allegations made by the charging party and to matters like 
or related to those allegations. ELI cases are handled entirely within 
14 
the district offices of the EEOC. 
The district offices maintain two lists in order to identify ELI 
cases: the ELI issues list and the ELI respondent list. According to 
the EEOC Compliance Manual, the ELI issue list should include the 
following, in addition to locally identified issues: 
1. Issues involving discrimination resulting from an acknowledged 
policy, such as the use of pen and pencil tests and high 
school diploma, height and weight requirements that exclude 
women and minorities; 
2. Failure-to-hire issues where EEO-1 data or data supplied by the 
charging party indicates a very low utilization of women or 
minorities; 
3. Issues involving refusal to admit charging party to, or 
removal of charging party from formal training programs; 
4. Issues involving failure to promote into jobs where the partici­
pation rate for women or minorities is very low; 
5. Issues involving placement where departments, classifications, 
or job categories are highly concentrated; 
6. Issues regarding treatment of maternity leave arising from 
practices after October 31, 1978; ^ 
7. Issues regarding pay differences between women and men. 
The ELI respondent list, which is developed by the top manage­
ment committee at each district office, is based on varied information, 
but includes the following: 
1. EEO-1 reports showing low overall representation of women 
and minorities; 
2. EEO-1 multi-year data analysis showing persistent low 
utilization rates; 
3. Information from state and local agencies or from the OFCCP, 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Wage and Hour 
14 
EEOC Compliance Manual, Sec. 12.1. 
^51 bid., Exhibit 12-A. 
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Division, National Labor Relations Board, Federal Communica­
tions Commission, or similar organizations that have an oppor­
tunity to observe utilization; 
4. Information suppling! by organizations representing members of 
protected groups. 
The ELI respondent list is carefully guarded to prevent disclosure. 
According to the EEOC Compliance Manual: 
When a person files a charge, identified through either of the 
ELI lists, special counseling will be given informing the charging 
party of the different handling given ELI cases. The charging party 
is asked whether he or she knows of other situations at the respon­
dent's place of business that might indicate discriminatory practices. 
If the charging parjty responds in the affirmative, further question­
ing is appropriate. An individual's charge will not be designated 
as ELI case solely on the basis of the ELI issues list or ELI respon­
dent list; the charging party must also state that he or she has 
some reason to think that others in the organization are being 
subjected to discriminatory practices. 
The decision to handle a charge as an ELI case is made by the 
district office's top management on the recommendation of the supervisor 
of the continuing investigation and conciliation (CIC) unit. If the charge 
is selected, the ELI handling procedure is instituted. The fundamental 
difference between an ELI case and other charges by individuals is that 
19 the scope of the investigation is expanded to include a possible class. 
The approach to investigations of ELI charges is the same as the 
full investigation approach conducted by the CIC. However, there are 
some special provisions applicable to ELI cases: 
16Ibid., sec. 12.3. 
^Ibid., sec. 12.5 and 12.6. 
1 8 
Ibid., sec. 12.7. 
^Ibid., sec. 128. 
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1. Notification and deferral: As with systemic cases, agreements 
are sought in all ELI cases, from state and local agencies ("706 
agencies") waiving the 60-day period of exclusive jurisdiction 
. . . If a waiver is in effect, the investigation . . . begins 
with a request for information. If no waiver . . ., the investi­
gation must begin with notice to respondent of the charge and 
its deferral to the 706 agency. In a non-deferr,aJ jurisdiction, 
the case is begun with a request for information. 
2. Planning and investigation: A justification memorandum must be 
prepared, demonstrating why the case has been selected as an 
ELI case. The ELI case may include other charges against the 
respondent, but they must be so directly related to the ELI 
charge that a finding of reasonable cause . . . would justify a 
similar funding on the consolidated charge(s). The investigation 
will be conducted as other CIC unit cases, but deadlines must 
be set up for completion of each phase of the investigation . . . 
Periodic reports are submitted by the CIC unit supervisor to the 
top management, committee as each major milestone in the investi­
gation is met. 
3. Conducting the ELI investigation: Because of the possibility of 
litigation if discrimination is found and conciliation is not suc­
cessful, the investigator in an ELI case works closely with a 
designated attorney to ensures that the evidence is gathered in 
the best form possible . . . 
4. Predetermination interview: In ELI cases, the entire case file 
must be reviewed for litigation-worthiness prior to the predeter­
mination interview held with the respondent and charging 
party. Litigation-worthiness is decided by the regional attorney 
. . . The standard for litigation-worthiness cannot be formed 
into precise guidelines, but the Commission does require that 
the legal proofs—the relationship of the applicable law to exist­
ing an evidence—be dealt with precisely and thor-
For any Title VII charge that has been investigated and not dis­
missed for any reason prior to the close of the investigation, a determi-
oughly. 
20 Ibid., sec. 12.9. 
21 Ibid., sec. 12.10. 
22 Ibid., sec. 12.11. 
23 
Ibid., sec. 12.12. 
24 Ibid., sec. 4.5(d). 
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nation must be made as to whether or not there is reasonable cause to 
believe that the charge of discrimination is true. If the EEOC determines 
that there is reasonable cause, and the case has sufficient merit to 
warrant litigation if conciliation is not reached by the Commission or the 
25 
charging party, litigation may occur. If no reasonable cause exists to 
believe that the Title VII charge is true, the case will be dismissed. 
Notice is sent to the charging party and the respondent. 
At any time prior to the issuance of a determination by the EEOC, 
the parties in the case may settle the charge on terms that are mutually 
agreeable. When conciliation appears impossible, both the charging party 
and the respondent will be notified. Notification of unsuccessful concili­
ation is particularly important if the time limit for filing private court 
27 action is drawing close. 
Upon failure of conciliation, the file is forwarded to the EEOC 
Regional Litigation Center. If the case is not deemed appropriate for 
EEOC litigation, the parties are sent notice that the charging party is 
28 
issued the statutory notice of right-to-sue letter. Statutory notice of 
the right to sue may issue at any of four junctures in the EEOC 
process: 
1. Possibly upon a finding of no jurisdiction; 
2. Upon request of a charging party before the completion of the 
administrative process; 
3. After a finding of no reasonable cause; or 
^Ibid., sec. 4.2(c). 
^Ibid., sec. 166.2 and 166.3. 
28Title VII, Section 706 (f)(1) and 29 CFR, Section 1601.25 (a). 
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nation that the case will not be litigated by the EEOC (or Jus­
tice Ja a case involving a government agency) as a part plain­
tiff/9 
Section 706 (f)(1) of Title VII states that a civil action must be 
filed with the federal district court within ninety days of receipt of the 
statutory notice of the right to sue. 
Once the notice of the right-to-sue has been issued, the commis­
sion will automatically cease processing a charge except under the 
following conditions: 
1. The charge was a commissioner charge; 
2. The EEOC is considering filing a civil action against the respon­
dent; 
3. The case is not within the definition of a "current Commission 
Decision Precedent" (CDP) and it is decided that the case should 
be pursued; 
4. A petition to revoke or modify a subpoena in the case is pend-
ing; 3Q 
5. The charge has been consolidated into a systemic case. 
The issuance of a right-to-sue does not preclude the commission 
31 
from offering assistance in pursuing the case. Each EEOC district 
office has a district counsel responsible to assist with private litigation 
of civil actions under section 706. The responsibility is limited to civil 
actions where the plaintiff is not the EEOC or the Attorney General. 
Most EEOC offices have a legal services program to assist those charging 
parties who wish to pursue their case where there has been a cause 
finding, a failure of conciliation with no reasonable offer of settlement, 
32 
and a decision by EEOC not to litigate. 
29 
Schlei and Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law, p. 808-809. 
30 
EEOC Compliance Manual, Section 6.3. 
3129 CFR, Section 1601.28 (b)(4). 
32 
Schlei and Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law, p. 809. 
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Individuals may pursue their case in court even though a right-
to-sue notice has not been received. However, it must be demonstrated 
that the individual is entitled to such a notice. In one case, EEOC had 
refused to issue the notice because a settlement agreement had been 
conciliated between the charger and the respondent. However, the 
employer did not honor the agreement. The requested notice should 
have been issued, the federal appellate court ruled. The employee was 
entitled to notice, the court continued, and could press the claim in 
court. It is not receipt of the notice that is the jurisdictional prerequi-
33 
site to court action, but entitlement to the notice. 
To bring a suit under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 
plaintiff must have a stake in the outcome of the suit. A person must 
have been damaged or threatened with damage by each alleged unlawful 
employment practice of the defendent to challenge the practice under 
Title VII. The 1972 amendment which intended Title VII to cover state 
and local governmental employees was enacted pursuant to the Equal 
34 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and provided a change 
to Title VII which in 1964 was passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause 
35 
of the Constitution. 
The plaintiff's "standing" is based on injury or threat of injury 
that is real and immediate and not conjectural or hypothetical. The 
plaintiff must be at least arguably within the zone of interests intended 
to be protected by Title VII. The type of injury that can be redressed 
33 
Perdue v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., (CA-4, 1982), 690 F.2d 1091. 
34 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 12 FEP 1586 (1976). 
35 
110 Congressional Record, 7202-12, 8453-56, (1964). 
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and, therefore, can be the basis for a plaintiff's standing have been 
expanded by some courts beyond economic injury. Unfair discipline and 
route assignments that created an atmosphere of discrimination which 
resulted in psychological damage to plaintiffs was a sufficient allegation 
36 to support an action in Gray v. Greyhound Lines-East. 
.The injury may be less than immediate when the alleged discrimina-
37 
tion is part of the employer's established policies or regulations. Many 
employment discrimination cases lend themselves to class action treatment 
because the alleged unlawful employment practice affects other employees. 
Rule 23 of the Federal Procedure provides: 
(a)Prerequisite to a class action. One or more of a class may sue 
or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the 
class is so numerous that joiner of all members is impractical, (2) 
there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the 
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the 
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties 
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 
Schlei and Grossman noted: 
The Supreme Court has never ruled on the requirements of Rule 
23 as applied to Title VII class actions. However, many lower 
courts, and particularly the Fifth Circuit, have treated Title VII 
cases more leniently under Rule 23 than other types of cases. Such 
courts have permitted the named plaintiff to act as a kind of "private 
attorney general" to raise "across-the-board" charges of employment 
discrimination throughout an employer's work force, and to represent 
persons who have materially different employment situations from the 
named plaintiff. 
There appear to be at least three rationales upon which courts have 
readily certified class action in Title VII cases: 
I. Where the Court finds that actions involving discrimination are 
"necessary" class actions; 
"^Gray v. Greyhound Lines-East, (CA D.C., 1976), 545 F.2d 169. 
"^Bartmess V. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., (CA-7, 1971), 44 F.2d 1186 
cert, denied (U.S. Sup. Ct., 1971), 404 U.S. 939. 
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2. Where there are allegations of "across-the-board" discrimination; 
3. Where the court focuses on preventing discrimination's to future 
employees and applicants whose identity is unknown. 
When individuals or organizations learn of a suit initiated by 
someone else is of interest to them, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
govern the decision to permit intervention into the suit. Intervention is 
permitted by "right" when a statute gives an unconditional right to 
intervention or when the applicant claims an interest and is so situated 
that the disposition of the suit may impair or jmpede the applicant's 
ability to protect that interest. Intervention is "permissive" and granted 
at discretion by the court when a statute gives a conditional right to 
intervene or when the applicant's claim or defense and the main action 
have a question of law or fact in common. In all cases the application 
39 
for intervention must be timely filed. 
Intervention of right is available by statute under Title VII, but 
only for suits brought under Section 706. The two primary issues that 
arise when a court receives an application for intervention in Title VII 
action have been timeliness and interest in the outcome. 
Intervention has been considered to be untimely when applications 
are filed at the following points in litigation: 
1. After discovery is complete, but before trial; 
2. Just prior to entry to judgment; 
3. Just prior to signing of the consent decree; 
4. After entry of the consent judgment; 
5. Just before order of dismissal. 
38 
Schlei and Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law, p. 1086-1087. 
39 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 24, 28 U.S.C. Appendix. 
^Human Resources Management, Section 6160, p. 1809. 
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Plaintiffs in a class action must fulfill all the requirements for suit 
such as filing a charge with EEOC, but it is not necessary for others 
41 of the class to have done so. 
Some courts appear to presume that Title VII cases are class 
actions. The view that "racial discrimination is by definition class 
discrimination . . . " in Oatis is an example. Oatis is the leading 
decision holding that it is not necessary for members of the class to 
file a charge with EEOC as a prerequisite to joining as plaintiffs in 
litigation, so long as there is one named plaintiff who has filed a valid 
charge with EEOC. The court in Oatis did not abandon the Rule 23 
requirements. It permits class action "within the following limits: 
First, the class action must, as it does here, meet the requirements of 
Rule 23(a) and (b)(2)".42 
Schlei and Grossman concluded: 
In our view, the doctrines that Title VII cases are "necessarily" 
class action and appropriate for "across-the-board" treatment have 
been loosely used and frequently misunderstood. The essence of 
both doctrines is the same: that discrimination manifesting itself in 
a particular manner against a particular individual on the basis, for 
example, of race is merely one indicium of discrimination against an 
entire class, namely those of the same race. This does not mean 
that any particular Title VII lawsuit should, under these doctrines, 
be certified as class action, since the requirements of Rule 23 must 
still be met . . . The common question of fact and law in this 
example is the existence of racial discrimination; the claim of a 
plaintiff who has suffered racial discrimination may be typical of the 
claims of the class since all members are claiming adverse effects 
from racial discrimination, and in such case the employer would have 
acted on grounds generally applicable to the class. The fact that 
41 
Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., (CA-3 1975), 508 F.2d 
239, cert, denied (U.S. Sup. Ct., 1975), 421 U.S. 1010. 
A? 
Oatis v. Crown Zellerback Corp., 398 F.2d 496, (5th Cir., 1968). 
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these doctrines, peculiar to Title VII cases, aid plaintiffs in meeting 
such requirements should .nevertheless not obscure the necessity 
of compliance with Rule 23. 
Equal Employment Opportunity - Court Action 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine more than 
selected representative cases of Title VII litigation. A list of cases 
relating to equal employment opportunity would exceed a thousand based 
on a counting of those listed by Clearing House Publishers in their 
44 series entitled Human Resource Management. Miner and Miner held 
that, "the courts, particularly the United States Supreme Court, have 
made it very clear that equal employment opportunity is the law of the 
land and a matter of high priority". The courts have supported EEOC's 
45 efforts and have made it expensive to be found in violation. 
An important question that arises in a suit under Title VII is, 
who is the fact finder? Is the fact finder a trial judge or a jury? Title 
VII, Section 706(g) reads: 
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged 
in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice 
charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from 
engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such 
affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is 
not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without 
back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor 
organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful 
employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court 
deems appropriate. Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date 
more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commis­
sion. Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence 
by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to 
reduce the back pay otherwise allowable. 
43 Schlei and Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law, p. 1095. 
44 Editorial Staff, Human Resources Management, pp. 101-127. 
45 
Miner and Miner, Employee Selection Within the Law, p. 15. 
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From this language it is clear that Congress intended that the 
trail judge make the necessary findings of fact in a Title VII action. 
However, the right to trial by jury is guaranteed by the U.S. Constitu­
tion. Virtually every court that has considered the question of trial in 
Title VII action has concluded that there is no right to trial by jury. 
The reasoning varies from court to court. 
If a Title VII suit calls for injunctive relief, an "equitable" 
remedy, it is clear this is no jury question. However, Title VII suits 
generally expect both injunction and back pay remedies, raising the 
concern of whether the involvement of money must be heard by a jury. 
The court soundly rejected the theory that the back pay award issues 
were merely ancillary to the equity claim because such a rule would 
46 
emasculate the Seventh Amendment's quarantee, but have generally 
held that back pay award in a Title VII case is not "damages" in the 
traditional sense but are a monetary form of equitable relief. Thus, 
47 there is no right to trial by jury. 
Suits brought under Title VII and one or more other statutes 
complicate the right to trial by jury due to the differences between the 
statutes cited. If any of the statutes cited provide monetary damages 
and provide a right to jury trial such as the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, a jury must consider only those issues related 
48 to the damages. Other issues are still decided by the court. If none 
46 
Ocha v. American Oil Company, (D.C., S.D., TEX, 1972), 338 
F. Supp. 914. 
47 
Grayson v. The Wickes Corporation, (CA-7, 1979), 607 F.2d 1194. 
A O  
Hodgin v. Jefferson, (D.C. Md., 1978), 447 F. Supp. 804. 
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of the statutes give a right to trial by a jury, or if none of the statutes 
49 is applicable to the case, there is no right to tria by jury. 
The burden of advancing a civil action always rests with the 
plaintiff.^ The plaintiff must present what is known as a prima facie 
case so that the defendent is obligated to defend. Without prima facie 
evidence the defendent can have the case dismissed without presenting 
51 evidence. The McDonnell Douglas burden of proof rules require the 
plaintiff in a single-plaintiff Title VII suit alleging illegal employment 
discrimination to present the following facts: 
1. That the plaintiff belongs to a racial minority; 
2. That the plaintiff applied and was qualified for a job for 
which the employer was seeking applicants; 
3. That, despite plaintiff's qualifications, he or she was rejected, 
and; 
4. That, after plaintiff's rejection, the position remained open 
and the defendent employer continued to seek applicants from 
persons of plaintiff's qualifications. 
52 According to Morton the plaintiff must prove the prima facie case 
by a preponderence of the evidence in order to prevail in this phase. 
In Morton the decrease in the percentage of black school teachers did 
not constitute prima facie evidence showing discrimination because the 
percentage of blacks in the general population of the county also 
decreased. 
49 
Torres v. Clayton, (D.C., S.D., CA, 1978), 18 EPD, Sec. 
8936. 
50 
Editorial Staff, Human Resources Management, Section 6242, p. 
1855. 
51 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
52 
Morton v. Charles County Board of Education, 423 U.S. 1034 
(1975). 
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McDonnell Douglas' proof has been applied to all kinds of cases-
discharge, discipline, promotion, transfer, layoff, failure to train and 
retaliation—which arise under the "disparate treatment" theory of 
discrimination. This is the theory on which the majority of individual 
cases proceed. The proof theory has also been held applicable to 
53 
disparate treatment cases which arise under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. 
In the proof or disproof of a disparate treatment case, the ultimate 
proof is whether or not the decision or action in question was racially 
premised. Motivation and intent are the ultimate issues in McDonnell 
Douglas. Direct proof of discriminatory intent is not necessary to 
establish prima facie evidence in an individual disparate treatment 
54 case. Circumstantial evidence such as was presented in McDonnell 
Douglas is adequate. However, the ultimate issue in the disparate 
treatment case is discriminatory motivation or intent. The plaintiff 
has the ultimate burden of making that showing by a preponderance of 
55 
evidence. 
Absolute use of the McDonnell Douglas four-point burden of proof is 
not always possible. In a situation where another person is chosen for 
the position and therefore the position did not remain open, a federal 
trial court erroneously dismissed the case because the plaintiff failed to 
prove the fourth point. The appeals court ruled it was not necessary 
to adopt a new fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test, but that 
53Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500, (6th Cir. 1974). 
54411 U.S. at 805, (1973). 
^Naraine v. Western Electric Corp., Inc., 507 F.2d 590 (8th 
Cir. 1975). 
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something more should be required than a showing that a member of a 
different racial, ethnic, or sex group was hired. The appeals court 
56 left the proper standard to the trial court's discretion. 
Employees discharged for disciplinary reasons can often establish 
a prima facie case of illegal employment practices by showing that they 
were discharged while a person belonging to a protected group was 
57 retained under apparently similar circumstances. 
When the Title VII plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the 
burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscrimina­
tory reason for the plaintiff's rejection. The United States Supreme 
Court holds that the defendant need not convince the court that it is 
actually motivated by pro-offered reasons. If the defendant's evidence 
raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether the defendent discriminated 
against the plaintiff, that is sufficient evidence. The explanation must 
be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant. If the 
defendant is successful, the prima facie case is rebutted, and the 
58 
factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity. 
The plaintiff has an opportunity to show that the defendant's 
reason was not true for the employment decision. The plaintiff must 
persuade the court that a discriminatory reason more than likely moti­
vated the employer or that the defendant's explanation is not credible. 
56 
Hagans v. Andrus, (CA-9, 1981), cert, denied (U.S. Sup. Ct., 
1981), 102 S. Ct. 313. 
^Davin v. Delta Airlines, Inc., (CA-5, 1982), 678 F.2d 567. 
58 Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 U.S. 
1089. 
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An unlawful employment suit will not always conform to the three 
steps—establishment of prima-facie case, defendant's rebuttal, and plain­
tiff response. As the United States Supreme Court noted in Texas 
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine: 
There may be some cases where the plaintiff's initial evidence, 
combined with effective cross-examination of ,-Uie defendant, will 
suffice to discredit the defendant's explanation. 
The burden of proof rule for single-plaintiff Title VII actions is 
not directly applicable to class action. Other factors must be con­
sidered. The class must be certified. Then the class representative 
has the burden of showing by positive proof, not by speculation, that 
all prerequisites for class action are met. The plaintiff at this juncture 
60 
need not establish a prima facie case. 
In class action, there must be a showing that the defendant's 
employment practice was unlawful and resulted in a recognized depre-
vation to the class, and that the class has suffered from unlawful 
employment practices.^ 
When it has been determined that a liability for discrimination 
against the class exist, the focus of the class action centers on the 
individual claimants who seeks redress. Each member of the class must 
show sufficient evidence exists to show his or her claim comes from with­
in the circumstances of the class liability. The court specifies in each 
60 
Western Electric Company, Inc. v. Sterm, (CA-3, 1976), cert, 
denied (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1979), 12 EPD 11,233. 
61 
Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refining Corp., (CA-5, 1974), 459 
F.2d 437, cert, denied (U.S. Sup. Ct., 1974), 419 U.S. 1033. 
103 
case the facts that must be proved. The evidentiary burden on each 
member is lighter than the burden on the class. 
Timeliness 
The 1964 enactment of Title VII was a product of an intense and 
extended legislative struggle as discussed in Chapter II. This legislative 
struggle resulted in an administrative and enforcement scheme that was 
far different and more complicated than the original drafters envisioned. 
In Miller the process of the enactment was characterized as "Title Vll's 
CO 
tarred conception, its turbulent gestation, and its frenzied birth". 
The procedure outlined in Section 706, with various and varying 
time limitations for filing with EEOC and going to court, has been an 
exceedingly fruitful source of procedural litigation. Between 1965 and 
the amendments in 1972, the courts were generally unreceptive to the 
numerous procedural defenses asserted to Title VII actions. The 
prevailing judicial attitude was perhaps most straight forwardly expressed 
'n Culpeper v. Reynolds Metal: 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act provides us with a clear mandate 
from Congress that no longer will the United States tolerate this 
form of discrimination. It is, therefore, the duty of the courts to 
make sure that the act works, and that the intent of Congress is 
not hampered by a combinattcup of a strict construction of the statute 
and a battle with semantics. 
The 1972 amendments increased some of the time periods for 
filing, but left the procedural structure basically as it was in 1.964. 
CO 
Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir., 
1969). 
^Culpeper v. Reynolds Metal, 421 F.2d 888 (5th cir., 1970). 
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The section-by-section analysis of the 1972 amendments states in the 
preamble: 
In any area where a specific contrary intention is not indicated, it 
was assumed that the present case law as developed by the courts 
would, continue to govern the applicability and construction of Title 
VII. 
In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court as a part of its rationale 
in holding that the absence of a EEOC determination of a particular issue 
could not prevent a plaintiff from suit,and stated two jurisdictional 
prerequisites: 
Respondent satisfied the jurisdictional prerequisites to a federal 
action (i) by filing timely charges of employment discrimination with 
the Commission and (ii) by receiving and^acting upon the Commis­
sion's statutory notice of the right to sue. 
The timely filing of charges with EEOC presents different deadlines 
depending on whether the jurisdiction in which the case arises is a de­
ferral jurisdiction. Holding to the deadlines is a prerequisite to a Title 
VII suit. However, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that 
there are times that the timely filing requirements might be waived and 
66 the suit proceed without the time limit being satisfied. 
The courts have been asked to determine when the period for 
filing a charge begins and whether reason exists to forgive late filing. 
Title VII, Section 706(e) states only that a charge must be filed within 
the specified number of days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred. 
In some circumstances, this date is determined by an event such as the 
C A  
118 Congressional Record, 7166 (1972). 
RR 
42 U.S.C. Sections 2000e-5(a) and 2000e-5(e). 
^Zipes v. TransWorld Airlines, Inc., (U.S. Sup. Ct., 1982), 28 
EPD 132,432. 
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date a test was administered or when an employee is notified that a 
promotion has been denied. However, not all situations are so well 
dated. For instance, when does a dismissal occur? Is it the day it is 
announced, the last day on the job, or the last pay date? When does 
discriminatory failure to promote occur if the employer never discusses 
the possibilities for advancement? The theory of continued violation 
has arisen to cover these kinds of problems, but other situations 
involving timeliness must be determined by the courts. 
When the employee is not aware of the alleged violation for a 
period of time after if occurs, there may be a special problem. Some 
courts have held that the statutory period for filing a charge does not 
begin to run until the facts that would support the charge are apparent 
to the charging party or should be apparent with a reasonable prudent 
67 regard for his or her rights. 
The date of the alleged incident must be established before the 
68 
deadline for charges can begin. In Ricks v. Delaware State College, 
the question is raised whether the deadline for filing a charge with 
EEOC begins on the day the tenure decision is announced or on the last 
day of employment. The United States Supreme Court ruled that the 
180-day filing period began on the day the college professor received 
notice that he would be denied tenure. 
If Title VII violations continue up to the time a charge is filed 
with EEOC and even to the time of suit, the EEOC charge would clearly 
67 
Rebb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., (CA-5, 1975), 516 
F.2d 924. 
CO 
Ricks v. Delaware State College, (U.S. Sup. Ct., 1980), 24 
EPD, 31,392. 
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be timely. The claim of continued violation is often heard when the 
timeliness of EEOC is challenged. The United States Supreme Court 
69 ruled in United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans that the emphasis should not 
be placed on continued discrimination, but whether there is any present 
violation. 
The law of continuing violation is both complicated and confusing. 
There are a variety of theories under which the courts have established 
violations. The employment decision does not necessarily determine 
whether a continuing violation will be found, although some generaliza­
tions are possible. Continuing violations are rarely found in discharges, 
but have usually evolved from promotions where a pattern of discrimina­
tion exists.^ 
Section 6196 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Handbook speaks 
to state statutes of limitations: 
It has been argued in some Title VII cases that the plaintiff's 
right to bring an action in court was barred by state statutes of 
limitations. The courts that have heard the argument have generally 
agreed that Title VII does not borrow state statutes of limitations 
and, thus, that the only statute of limitations on Title VII suits is 
the 90-day filing period . . . While the state statute of limitations 
controls the plaintiff's access to state remedies, it connot be per­
mitted to limit federal remedies. 
The EEOC may bring an action in federal court under Title VII 
if, within thirty days after a charge is filed, the agency has been 
unable to secure an acceptable conciliation agreement. This power is 
limited to respondents that are not a government, governmental agency, 
fiQ 
United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 533 (1971). 
^Kohn v. Royal, Koegel and Wells, 59 FRD 515, 5 FEP 725 (SD, 
NY, 1973). 
71 Human Resources Management, pp. 1821-5. 
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or political subdivision. The United States Supreme Court has ruled 
72 that there is no statute of limitations on EEOC suits. 
Court Actions Under Title VII 
In certain cases, the Title VII plaintiff does not have to wait until 
final adjudication to obtain some relief from the alleged unlawful employ­
ment practices of his or her employer. The federal court hearing a Title 
VII case has the power to order preliminary relief pending resolution of 
73 
the case. Section 706(f)(2)'s provision for preliminary relief is 
granted to the Commission to prevent irreparable hardship to a charging 
74 party and interference with the EEOC processes. Each request for a 
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order is individually 
assessed by the trial court so the importance of the ruling in other 
cases is limited. 
To date the courts have approached Title VII enforcement cases 
independently. Thus, it appears that a practice ruled as illegal employ­
ment practice in one organization by one court may not be so ruled in 
another court. The basic questions which the courts have asked are 
these: 
1. Is there proof of discrimination? Whether discrimination is 
defined as an evil intent, unequal treatment, or adverse impact, 
this proof must be shown by the party charging a violation of 
Title VII. 
72 Occidential Life Insurance Company of California v. EEOC, 
432 U.S. 335 (1977). 
73 
Culpeper v. Reynolds Metal Company, Supra. 
^EEOC v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 475 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 
1972), cert, denied 414 U.S. 854 (1973). 
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2. What employment practices are causing the discrimination? If 
the court is convinced that there is in fact discrimination in 
employment, it has to be shown that certain practices are 
causing discrimination. 
3. Can the employment practice in question be justified on the 
grounds of business necessity that is related to job performance? 
The burden of proof at this point is clearly on the employer to 
show a relationship between the practice in question and job 
performance. 
Basically, the courts appear to have two tenets of equal employ­
ment opportunity to satisfy: What is the adverse impact? And, what 
are the standards for job-relatedness or business necessity? 
The scheme for allocating the burden of proof in all adverse 
impact cases has been expressed by the Supreme Court in McDonnell 
76 Douglas. The proof or disproof of a disparate case, the ultimate 
focus of the inquiry, and thus the proof, is whether or not the decision 
or action in question was racially premised. 
In Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,^ the court recognized that 
"direct evidence of discrimination is virtually impossible to produce." 
The use of comparative evidence which is crucial to most disparate treat­
ment cases is based on comparing the person filing the charge with a 
similarly situated person. Thus, if, 
1. persons of one race, sex, or ethnic group receive different 
treatment from persons of another race, sex, or ethnic group 
who are otherwise similarly situated, and 
2. there is no adequate non-racial, explanation for the different 
treatment, 
75 
Miner and Miner, Employee Selection Within the Law, p. 21. 
76 
McDonnel Douglas v. Green, supra. 
^Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 326 F. Supp. 397, (DC 1970), 
affirmed 7 FEP 416 (9th Cir. 1974). 
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then it is reasonable to infer that race was a factor in the disparate 
78 treatment. 
Disparate treatment may be classified into three areas of illegal 
employment practices. The first area is in the obvious areas of race, 
color, national origin, sex, religion, or age. The second rests in the 
policies and/or regulations of an organization which rule against appli­
cants or employees of a protected group. The third area is sexual • 
harassment. 
The responsibility for the violation of Title VII involving sexual 
harassment is placed on the employer. The doctrine of respondent 
superior, which places the responsibility for an agent's actions on the 
employer, permits recovery even when the charge violates the employer's 
79 policies and regulations. 
Disparate impact may occur when an employment practice or policy 
which appears neutral by its standards causes a disproportionately 
adverse impact on a protected group. As used in EEO litigation, adverse 
impact refers to a selection process which causes a higher percentage of 
protected class to be rejected for hiring, promotion, or other employee 
benefits. 
Miner and Miner argued that in most situations employers can use 
the four-fifth's rule with some confidence. If the selection rate for a 
protected group is eighty percent of the rate of the applicant group with 
the highest selection rate, enforcement agencies will not consider that 
78 
EEOC Decision 72-1089, 2 CCH Employment Practices Guide, Sec. 
6382 (1982). 
79 
Mller v. Bank of America, (CA-9, 1979), 600 F.2d 211. 
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adverse impact exists. Their support is based on the standards found 
80 
in the Uniform Guidelines. 
The courts have tended to endorse the use of statistics in adverse 
impact decisions. In the landmark case Griggs v. Duke Power Com-
81 pany, the company's high school education requirement was found to 
have an adverse impact based on the educational statistics for the state 
of North Carolina. Thus, the United States Supreme Court did not 
rely on Duke Power's work force data. Miner and Miner held that there 
is no way to predict what "relevant" geographic area will be used to 
define the appropriate labor market for comparison and that employers 
should use the labor market area with the largest percentage of available 
82 protected personnel. 
Disparate impact cases in most situations require the employer to 
submit statistical proof. The foundation of the theory of disparate 
impact is that a higher percentage of protected groups are adversely 
affected by an employment policy or practice. Such cases require an 
examination of the employer's employment records, applications, test 
records, discipline records, hiring and offer records, advertisements 
and notices of vacancies, to be used as court exhibits. 
Employment selection does not end with hiring. Promotions and 
selection for training are also areas of possible adverse impact. Dis-
80 Miner and Miner, Employee Selection Within the Law, p. 669. 
81 
Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424. 
82 Miner and Miner, Employment Selection Within the Law, p. 71. 
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cipline layoff, termination, or demotion are subject to the rules of dis-
83 parate impact. 
The United States Supreme Court ruled in International Brother-
84 
hood of Teamsters v. U.S. that statistics alone provide the necessary 
initial showing that an employer is guilty of illegal employment practices. 
However, statistical evidence needs to be evaluated in view of the 
surrounding circumstances. 
Discrimination on the basis of sex is frequently a source of 
litigation under the disparate treatment theory. The treatment of males 
and females with regard to compensation and fringe benefits is an area 
of concern. Other areas of litigation have been pensions, retirements, 
insurance, bona fide occupational qualifications, hair, grooming, and 
pregnacy to name a few of the more common ones. 
Sex discrimination in compensation may be remedied under the 
Equal Pay Act of 1963 or under Title VII, and sometimes under both 
statutes. The Equal Pay Act prohibits differential treatment in the 
85 
wages paid to men and women doing substantially the same work. 
Title Vll's prohibitions are less clear. The courts have only recognized 
Title VII discrimination in compensation suits involving comparable jobs 
where there has been a showing of intentional discrimination on the part 
of the employer. 
83 
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (1978), sec. 2.B, 
43 Federal Register 38290, August 25, 1978. 
84 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. U.S., (U.S. Sup. Ct., 1977), 
431 U.S. 324. 
OC 
Equal Pay Act of 1963, Section 3, 71 Stat. 56. 
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Loften wrote in February, 1983: 
Equal pay for jobs of comparable worth is likely to be one of the 
most hotly debated employment issues of the 1980's. But as yet, we 
have little guidance in case law as to what comparable worth means 
in a concrete way. Future litigation will obviously tell the story. 
In theory, there are two types of comparable worth that can be 
argued in a sex-based wage discrimination case. These are "pure" 
comparable worth and "common" comparable worth. In "pure" 
comparable worth, one argues that workers of one sex (or race) in 
one job category (for example, nurses versus tree-trimmers) are 
paid less even though the two groups are performing work that is 
of the same value or worth to the employer. In the "common" type 
of comparable worth, workers of one sex in the same general job 
classification receive less than the other sex where the content of 
the two jobs is different but assertedly of the same worth to the 
employer. (An example would be the case discussed in the next 
paragraph.) 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet decided any case directly 
involving the comparable worth doctrine. However, in County of 
Washington v. Gunther, decided in the summer of 1981, the Court 
seems to have explicitly left the door open for the theory to be used 
in the future. That case involved female jail matrons who argued 
that their Title VII rights were violated because of intentional sex 
discrimination in that they were paid less than the male jail guards. 
The District Court found that the jobs the female matrons performed 
were not substantially equal to those performed by the male guards. 
It ruled that a sex discrimination claim cannot be brought under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act if equal work is not alleged. But 
the Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court both agreed that 
a claim of sex-based wage discrimination can be brought under Title 
VII without an allegation of equal work, although it will be subject 
to the four affirmative defenses contained in the Equal Pay Act. 
Thus, after Gunther, a claim of sex-based wage discrimination may 
be brought under either the Equal Pay Act or Title VII. 
In Gunther, the United States Supreme Court stated: 
Respondent's claim is not based on the controversial concept of 
"comparable worth," under which plaintiff might claim increased 
compensation on the basis of a comparison of the intrinsic worth or 
difficulty of t^ir job with that of other jobs in the same organization 
or community. 
86 
Lofton, Fred B., "Comparable Worth: The New Issue in Employ­
ment Discrimination," Bulletin, American Association of School Personnel 
Administrators, February, 1983, p. 5. 
07 
Gunther v. County of Washington, 452 U.S. 161 (1981). 
113 
On December 19, 1983, a comparable worth decision in the 
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) 
88 
v. State of Washington was made in United States District Court in 
Tacoma, Washington. In this long-awaited comparable worth decision, 
Judge Jack Tanner ordered the State of Washington to make $300 million 
in back pay. The state has also been ordered to implement the ruling 
"right now", immediately, even though the state does not have funds 
and its treasury by law cannot run a deficit. 
This ruling comes as a result of a comparable worth case that has 
been in and out of courts for years. The court found that the state's 
compensation plan is an example of "direct, overt, and institutionalized 
discrimination". It found a wage disparity of approximately twenty 
percent between male and female jobs scoring equally in the state's 
89 own evaluation system. 
The suit was a culmination of a ten-year battle between AFSCME 
and the State of Washington to raise the wages of women employees. 
A 1974 comparable worth study commissioned by the state revealed that 
women employees received less pay than men doing work requiring com­
parable skill, knowledge, mental demands, accountability, and working 
conditions. Subsequent studies in 1976, 1979, and 1980 indicated the 
gap continued. The state failed to make pay scale adjustments to remedy 
the situation. AFSME filed an EEOC charge against the state in 1981, 
88 
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v. 
State of Washington, USDC, W. Wa., No. C. 82-465-T, (December 14, 
1983). 
89 
"Comparable Worth, Now! Court Orders Immediate Remedy in 
Washington State", Personnel Manager's Report, 173 (January, 1984): 7. 
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and filed a Title VII suit in July, 1982. The union sought changes in 
the current pay schedule for state workers and back pay for those 
employees currently occupying traditional, sex-segregated female jobs, 
which include clerical, nursing, and library positions (1982 DLR 146: 
4-6).90 
The suit was filed by AFSCME and nine state employees claiming 
that sex-based differences in pay were violations of Title VII, the state's 
91 equal rights amendment, and the state civil service law. One of the 
nine state employees was Terry Emerson who after fifteen years of 
"women's work" took a new job and took the state to court. She worked 
as a counselor for severely retarded people at Interlake School in 
Medical Lake, Washington, but quit to take a job as a supply clerk, a 
state job traditionally held by men, at about $150 a month increase in 
92 
salary. 
Washington's Governor John Spellman signed into law a comparable 
worth bill for Washington State's 47,000 civilian employees. The bill was 
signed on June 14, 1974. It was the first time a comparable worth law 
had directly resulted from request from, and then a lawsuit filed by, a 
public employee union to remedy decades of pay inequities between male 
and female state government jobs of comparable skill and worth. The 
90 
Bureau of National Affairs, "Trial Begins on AFSCME Title VII 
Charge that Washington Underpays Female Workers", Current Develop­
ments, 30 August 1983, p. A2. 
91 _ 
Op. cit. 
92 
Ken Sands, "Workers Sue State for Comparable-Worth Pay, 
The Spokane [Washington]/Regional, 20 August 1983, p. B1. 
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law stipulated that sex-based wage discrimination be ended over the 
93 next decade. 
Comparable worth started to be an issue in Washington in 1973. 
The union requested by letter that then Governor Daniel Evans take 
a leadership role in dealing with the problem. Governor Evans asked 
the heads of the two personnel systems in the state, the Higher Educa­
tion Personnel Board and the Department of Personnel, to study job 
classifications filled by men and women having comparable levels of skill 
94 requirements and job responsibility. 
A preliminary study completed in December, 1973, covered twelve 
classes of jobs filled predominantly by men and twelve classes of jobs 
filled predominantly by women. This study confirmed the possibility of 
discrimination between males and females. In September, 1974, Norman 
D. Willis and Associates, a Seattle-based consulting firm, was hired to 
conduct a study of 120 job classes. The classifications were divided 
between jobs held predominantly by seventy percent of either sex, 
fifty-nine male-dominated classes involving 4,497 employees, and sixty-
two female-dominated classes involving 9,115 employees. 
The study used a position questionnaire sent to 1,600 state 
employees selected at random in the one hundred twenty-one classes. 
A trained task force interviewed 800 incumbents of the 1,600 employees. 
Four components were used to rate the positions: knowledge and 
skills, mental demands, accountability, and working conditions. The 
93 
"Washington State, Delaware Enact Equal Pay Laws for Public 
Workers", Government Employee Relations Report, Bureau of National 
Affairs, 11 July 1983, p. 1423. 
94lbid., p. 1424. 
116 
study revealed that women received about twenty percent lower pay 
than men in comparable work which amounted to about $175 per month. 
In spite of this documentation, the 1975 legislature did nothing. 
In 1976 at the Washington Federation of State Employees' (WFSE) 
request, an update study documented wage discrimination again. Out­
going Governor Evans made a budget proposal asking for $7 million to 
begin implementing comparable worth. 
In spite of campaign pledges to support comparable worth, incoming 
Governor Dixie Lee Ray ignored the study and her campaign pledges 
and deleted the seven million dollars from the state budget. No funding 
was ever budgeted to implement the comparable worth. In 1977, lan­
guage was added to state law mandating that comparable worth be 
included as a supplemental component of the biennial salary survey. 
Because of the lack of action by the governor and the legislature, WFSE 
filed a complaint with EEOC on September 16, 1981. 
In 1982, after EEOC failed to act, the WFSE filed its lawsuit in a 
United States Federal District Court. Meanwhile, a comparable worth bill 
was introduced in the 1982 legislature by Senator Eleanor Lee (R.-
Burien). Both the House and Senate were Rupublican controlled, and 
the bill failed. 
In 1983, both houses were controlled by Democrats and S.B. 
95 
3248 introduced by the same senator in January cleared both houses 
with relatively little controversy. The ways and means committee held 
a hearing in February, 1983, at which the bill received the endorsement 
95S.S.B. 3248, C 75 L 83E1 (California), 23 August 1983. 
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of WFSE, the Washington State Nurses Association, and the League of 
Women Voters. 
The Senate approved S.B. 3248 thirty-seven to nine on April 15, 
and the House passed it on May 10. During debate, some legislators 
tried to change the language of the bill to say employee's pay could 
be "adjusted" down, but as passed the version sent to the governor on 
May 22 called for increases only. 
The $1.5 million appropriated for the 1983-85 biennium would give 
pay raises of $100 a year to approximately 14,000 state employees in job 
classifications with the greatest disparities between what they earn and 
what comparable worth studies indicate they should earn. Setting 
salaries according to comparable worth could conflict with state law 
requiring personnel boards to adopt salary schedules that reflect pre-
96 
vailing rates in private industry. 
S.B. 3248 requires four actions by personnel agencies of the state: 
1. To adjust salary and compensation plans to reflect similar 
salaries for positions that require or impose similar responsibil­
ities, judgment, knowledge, skills and working conditions. 
2. Salary changes to rectify differences are to be implemented in 
the 1983-85 biennuim. 
3. Adjustments will be made annually to achieve comparable worth. 
4. Comparable worth will be fully achieved not later than June 30, 
1983. 
Even with the comparable worth bill, the AFSCME refused to be 
deterred from pursuing its comparable worth lawsuit. The trial was 
bifurcated. The first phase was to determine if the judge agreed that 
96lbid., pp. 1424-1425. 
97 
Ann Davis, "Comparable Worth Update", Interact (Governor's 
Committee on Status of Women), October 1983, p. 2. 
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Washington State was guilty of violating the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
State Equal Rights Amendment, and the State Civil Service Acts. A 
second phase was to determine a remedy. Judge Jack Tanner ruled on 
September 16 that the state government was guilty of pervasive wage 
discrimination against many of its female workers and set a second trial 
98 
date of November 14 to establish the compensation the state must pay. 
Classified advertisements for male-only and female only-only jobs 
were run in the state's newpapers prior to 1973. These ads were 
introduced by AFSCME as pivotal evidence of deliberate job discrimina­
tion. The statistics, assembled according to Mann, were devastating. 
In comparing jobs of similar classification the monthly wage dropped 
$4.52 for every percentile increase in the number of women working in 
the job category. Evidence showed that half of all job categories were 
exclusively male, and only 3.5 percent of the women employed worked in 
integrated jobs. 
Mann editorialized: 
The Washington case is a model of how systematic wage discrimi­
nation came into being. But more significantly for the future, the 
suit is a model of how ur^ns and women's organizations can use 
existing laws to destroy it. 
The state's main defense was that its pay system was based on a 
survey of about 2,700 private employers in the state. The state main­
tained that its system's legality rested in the legislative's power to decide 
go 
"Ruling Against Washington is a Battle Won for Equal Pay", The 
Herold [Everett, Washington], 26 September 1983, p. 7A. 
99 
Ibid. 
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what system to use.1^ Deputy Attorney General Chris Gregoire said 
101 
that the salaries were set "without regard to sex". 
On September 8, 1983, Judge Tanner narrowed the scope of the 
"comparable worth" lawsuit. He told union attorneys seeking back pay 
and promotions for women who claimed sex discrimination that he is 
dismissing portions of the lawsuit involving alleged violations of the two 
state laws. 
He announced: 
The issue is sex discrimination under Title VII. I just want to 
know if there is sex discrimination, and^p there is, can the state 
explain it? A very simple Title VII case. 
Judge Tanner ruled September 18, 1983, that the state was guilty 
of "direct, overt and institutionalized" wage discrimination against 
thousands of female employees. His ruling was the first in the nation 
regarding sex discrimination by an entire state government, and involv 
103 
ing wages. 
On December 14, 1983, the United States District Court in Tacoma, 
Washington, issued a written opinion explaining why it was ordering the 
State of Washington to revise its pay scales so state employees will be 
given equal pay for doing work of "comparable worth" to the state. The 
court ordered the state to extend the remedy back four years for seve-
^^Don Tewkesbury, "Judge Says Women Will Win Lawsuit If Pay 
Bias Exists", Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 31 August 1983, p. A3. 
101 
"Washington State in Court on Women's Pay", The New York 
Times, 1 September 1983, p. A25. 
102 "Judge Dismisses Part of Pay Suit", Spokesman-Review, Spo­
kane/Regional [Washington], 3 September 1983, p. 1. 
103 "Pay Bias: Legislators Admit Concern over Ruling by Tanner", 
The News Tribune, [Tacoma, Wasington], 17 September 1983, p. B3. 
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ral thousand employees. The projected cost to the State of Washington 
was estimated to be more than $600 million in wage adjustments and 
back pay. 
Strictly speaking, the court nev.er found the State of Washington 
had or violated any legal duty with regard to giving women equal pay 
for doing comparable work.^^ 
The court ruled that the state violated Title VII by establishing 
first that its own pay policies were having a discriminatory effect and 
then failing to take corrective action. Therefore, its continued refusal 
to offer a remedy must have been intentional or it would have ceased. 
The Washington State decision does not mandate that "public sector 
employers must pay equal wages to employees of both sexes for perform­
ing work of comparable value". The decision indicated that Washington 
State determined that its pay policies were underpaying women who 
worked in "women's" jobs, and having decided that its own policies 
amounted to unlawful sex discrimination, the court held, the state's 
105 failure to change its policies is unlawful. 
The court continued throughout its opinion to speak of "disparate 
impact" not comparable worth. The court concluded its opinion by 
writing: 
The court's finding of discrimination based on the theories of 
disparate impact, and disparate treatment, requires formulation of 
a remedy. Defendents' preoccupation with its budget constraints 
104 "Comparable Worth", Ideas and Trends in Personnel, No. 56, 
13 January 1984, p. 1. 
105.. .. « 
Ibid., p. 2 
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pales when compared with the invidousness.xrf the impact ongoing 
discrimination has upon the plaintiffs herein. 
Justice Tanner's decision will cost the state $800 million. The state 
is appealing, but "the Reagan Justice Department is hot to back Tacoma's 
challenge. 
Assuming the decision is sustained, the decision will apply not 
only to Washington's subdivisions, but far beyond the boundaries since 
it was a federal case. 
The case is the kind attorneys are fond of calling "landmark 
cases". It is the first to test a relatively new legal theory called "com­
parable worth". 
The big question remaining is, does this case open up all employ­
ers, private and public, to comparable worth lawsuits? 
Summary 
Even though the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
was established in 1964 with bright hopes that it would be a viable force 
to reduce illegal employment practices under Title VII, it was unable to 
operate in the prescribed method due to improper enforcement powers. 
Thus, as EEOC was unable to gain conciliation and establish remedies 
for violations, persons having alleged discrimination practice charges 
asked for and gained access to the courts. Court decisions between 
106 
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees 
v. Washington, U.S.D.C., W. Wa., No. C82-465T, December 14, 1983, 
33 EPD 33,376. 
107 
llene Barth, "Comparable Worth: Basing Pay on Skill, Not 
Sex", Greensboro [North Carolina] Daily News and Record, 12 February 
1984, p. E7. 
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1964 and 1972 were instrumental in the changes made in the 1972 amend­
ments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its component Title VII. 
Court decisions between 1972 and 1978 were instrumental in the adoption 
of the Uniform Guidelines in 1978. Litigation since 1978 has shaped the 
structure and power of EEOC. 
As an example, the decision in AFSCME v. State of Washington, 
being the first of its kind in interpreting Title V111 s statutory power in 
sex discrimination in wages paid, has certain implications for other 
employers: 
1. Management should not complete a comparable worth study 
unless it is prepared to make the necessary remedies. 
2. When a comparable worth study concludes that some employees 
holding "women's jobs" are paid less, there is sufficient data 
for a finding that the employer's policies discriminate because 
there is a disparate impact on females. 
3. If the employer concludes that its pay policies have a disparate 
impact on women, the court will order that comparable worth 
be used to remedy that impact. 
4. This case does not stand for the principle that employers 
must conduct a comparable worth analysis and pay their 
employees accordingly. 
In commenting on whether the case is a "comparable worth" case 
or not, the court had this to say: 
This is a case of first impression insofar as it concerns the 
implementation of a comparable worth compensation system. 
However, it is more accurately characterized as a straight-for­
ward "failure to pay" case . . . The plaintiffs herein are challenging 
the State of Washington's failure to rectify an acknowledged disparity 
in pay betwee^g predominantly female and predominantly male job 
classifications. 
108 
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees 
v. State of Washington, supra. 
123 
Anne Bridgman said: 
The impact of applying that concept in education could be dramatic. 
In public schools, 90 percent of support-staff employees, including 
clerical and maintenance workers, are women, and approximatley 27.5 
percent of administrative staffs are women, according to figures from 
the American Federation of State and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) 
and the National Center for Education Statistics . . . According to a 
recent survey by Ms. Perlman's organization, the National Committee 
for Pay Equity (NCPE) a total of eighty-five state, local and school-
district surveys of comparable worth in twenty-six states have been 
conducted in the last few years. As part of such studies, the 
employers conducted job evaluations of support and administrative 
personnel in which they assigned points to job responsibilities and 
ranked positions by salary. 
The studies, according to an NCPE report, "uncovered a consis­
tent pattern of undervaluation of 'women's' work in every workplace 
examined." 
School systems' evaluation practices vary, but most periodically 
review job classifications and pay scales, educators say . . . it is 
not clear, those familiar with the comparable-worth concept say, how 
or whether it can be applied to teachers, as opposed to administra­
tive and support-staff employees. 
109 
It is easier to show, said Ms. Stein of the NEA, that salary 
inequities among support personnel are part of the district's pay 
system. But with regard to teachers' salaries, she noted, "in most 
school districts, it's more likely or possible that tt^sex discrimi­
nation is taking place vis a vis the rest of society." 
Chapter IV will specifically address the court rulings involving 
Title VII relating to equal employment opportunities of public school 
employees. 
109 Barbara Stein is a specialist in human and civil rights for the 
National Education Association (NEA). 
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CHAPTER IV 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 
1 In Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, the United States 
Supreme Court held that maintaining separate, but equal, facilities for 
races in the public schools, is inherently unequal. In the period of ten 
years following this decision, some seventeen states had to adjust their 
practices that discriminated against students and teachers. During this 
time period, the idea of racial equity in public schools became sufficiently 
entrenched within the legal processes to enable the United States Con-
2 gress to make this idea "majoritorian" in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
Many Court decisions have emanated from the Fourteenth Amend­
ment which ensures in part that states must provide each person with 
equal protection of the laws. Other decisions have been based on fede­
ral statutes that prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, 
national origin, religion and sex. Litigation involving discriminatory 
practices against persons protected by the statutes has been extensive 
3 
under both the Federal Constitution and statutory provisions. 
Between 1953 and 1969, the United States Supreme Court handled 
thirty-six school cases. These cases were about equally divided between 
^Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
p 
Chester M. Nolte, Nolte's School Law Desk Book (West Nyack: 
New York, Parker Publishing Company, 1980), p. 24. 
3 
Martha M. McCarthy, and Nelda H. Cambron, Public School Law: 
Teacher and Student Rights (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1981), 
p. 75. 
125 
church-state, loyalty and desegregation issues. The litigation that 
began with Brown continues into the 1980's and will greatly change the 
4 way that Americans manage their schools for years to come. 
Nolte held there are practical limits to which the courts can go 
in solving school problems by means of litigation. To support his 
reasoning, he cited the limitation stated by Judge Coleman in U.S. v. 
Jefferson County Board of Education, 380 F.2d 385, 419, 1967: 
The decree is not as I would have written it if I had been 
charged with sole responsibility for the effort. No offense is 
intended where I doubt that it is perfect . . . The school official 
cannot win. In one breath, he is told to act; in the next, he is 
immobilized. 
. . . Judges, like other human beings, do not always write iig 
granite; they often find that they have only marked in the sand. 
This chapter will review some judicial decisions regarding equal 
employment opportunity in public education, applicable to the areas of 
racial discrimination, sex discrimination, age discrimination, and discrimi­
nation based on handicaps. 
Litigation Based on Race 
Schlei and Grossman indicated that the greatest number of employ-
6 
ment discrimination cases arise in the area of racial discrimination. 
The courts continue to interpret the protection afforded to minorities. 
These decisions have implications for public school personnel in the areas 
of employment, promotion, training, discipline, and discharge. 
4 
Notle, Nolte's School Law Desk Book, p. 24. 
^ I bid., p. 25. 
Barbara Lindemann Schlei, and Paul Grossman, Employment Dis-
crimination Law (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1976), 
p. 235. 
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The protection of minority rights in employment decisions has 
resulted in court-ordered remedies to restore individuals to their rightful 
status had they not been victims of past discrimination. Some of these 
remedies have caused charges of "reverse" discrimination when they have 
affected the status of majority applicants or employees. 
Three of the bases of discrimination prohibited by Title VII are 
race, color, and national origin. Whether discrimination is on the basis 
of race or color, or both, is a potentially difficult question, but is rarely 
an issue in a discrimination case. When an individual is identified as a 
minority, there is no need for fine anthropological distinctions. 
National origin discrimination may involve a person with roots in 
any country. However, in EEOC's definitions for reporting purposes, 
it is Hispanic. 
The EEOC issued an administrative guideline providing that 
discrimination on the basis of citizenship is unlawful under Title VII if 
it has the effect of discriminating on the basis of national origin.^ The 
United States Supreme Court in Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing 
g 
Company holds that an individual's status as an alien is not a status 
protected from discrimination under Title VII. The refusal to employ a 
Mexican citizen is discrimination on the basis of alienage, but is not 
illegal as national origin discrimination. 
EEOC's racial/ethnic classifications are: 
1. White (not of Hispanic origin) - all persons having origins in 
any of the original peoples of Europe, North Africa or Middle 
East. 
^Preamble to EEOC order 45 F.R. 85632, December 29, 1980. 
g 
Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Company, Inc., 414 U.S. 811 
(1973). 
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2. Black (not of Hispanic origin) - all persons having origins in 
any of the Black racial groups in Africa. 
3. Hispanic - all persons of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central 
or South American, or other Spanish culture or origin, regard­
less of race. 
4. Asian or Pacific Islander - all persons having origins in any of 
the original peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, the Indian 
Subcontinent, or the Pacific Islands. These include, for 
example, China, Japan, Korea, the Phillipine Islands, and 
Samoa. 
5. American' Indian or Alaska Native - all persons having origins 
in any of the original peoples of North America and who 
maintain cultural identification through tribal affiliation or 
community recognition. 
The protection provided under Title VII extends beyond the 
immediate characteristics identified above. The EEOC contends such 
protection includes individual characteristics generally associated with 
the protected class through religion, membership, ethnic stereotypes, 
and food irrespective of that individual's ethnic origin. The EEOC 
guidelines include the following examples: 
a. Marriage to or association with persons of a national origin 
group; 
b. Membership in, or association with an organization identified 
with or seeking to promote the interests of national origin 
groups; 
c. Attendance or participation in schools, churches, temples, or 
mosques, generally used by persons of a national origin 
group; and 
d. Because an individual's natj^ or spouse's name is associated 
with a national origin group. 
However, it is unclear after Baker v. California Land Title 
11 Company whether national origin protection extends to mutable 
g 
EEO-1 Report, Instruction Booklet, Appendix, Section 4. 
1029 CFR Section 1606.1 (1975). 
^Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974), 
cert, denied 422 U.S. 1046 (1975). 
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(language, dress, religion, etc.) as well as the "immutable" (physical 
traits) characteristics of one's national origin. 
Application, interview, and hiring practices have been challenged 
as racially discriminatory because of the selection criteria upon which 
the employment decision are made. The major issue has been, can an 
employer have a criterion for employee selection that disqualifies a dis­
proportionately number of protected applicants? Griggs v. Duke 
12 
Power addressed this issue and became a landmark case. However, the 
question of constitutional infringement was not addressd in Griggs. The 
decision was based solely on Title VII. The court did not prescribe the 
use of selection criteria, but ruled that the selection criteria must be 
r e l a t e d  t o  j o b  p e r f o r m a n c e  t o  s a t i s f y  T i t l e  V I I .  
The 1975 decision by the Supreme Court in Albemarle Paper 
13 
Company v. Moody clarified some of the job-related requirement 
advanced in Griggs and established the principle that once discrimination 
is proven, the trial judge in a Title VII case ordinarily does not have 
the discretion to deny back pay. In neither Griggs nor Albermarle did 
the employer have a validated job-relatedness of its testing program. 
The court decisions therefore focused on what is permissable rather what 
is necessary to demonstrate job-relatedness successfully. 
Through the mid-1970's, the rulings in Griggs and Albermarle 
constituted the legal framework for analyzing alleged discriminatory 
practices under Title VII. The primary focus rested on the adverse 
impact theory of the practice. 
12Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
13 
Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
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14 The 1976 decision in Washington v. Davis reduced the Griggs 
test for constitutional analysis by holding that discriminatory impact 
alone was insufficient to abridge the Federal Constitution. Washington 
involved a test referred to as "Test 21" developed by the United States 
Civil Service Commission and used widely throughout the federal 
government. "Test 21" was designed to test verbal skills, vocabulary, 
reading and comprehension. The Supreme Court held that employers 
not subject to Title VII were not subject to the same burden of proof 
concerning selection procedures as were employers who were subject to 
Title VII. The Court applied the Constitutional standard requiring 
intentional discrimination and found the test was proper. The Court 
also affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the test was related to 
the requirements of police training and that a positive relationship 
between the test and training course performance was sufficient to 
validate the test. 
Thus the Supreme Court has said it is only "substantially dispro­
portionate" impact that warrants further judicial scrutiny, but it failed 
to rule on just what thresholds mathematical showing suffices as substan­
tially disproportionate. The federal appeals courts have had to deal 
with this question, though not directly ruling on the validity of the 
EEOC's four-fifths rule of adverse impact. 
The basic rational in Washington v. Davis was adopted by a 
federal district court in upholding the use of the National Teachers' 
^Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
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Examination for state certification and salary purpose in South Caro-
15 
lina. The required test score disqualified 83 percent of the black 
applicants for certification, as opposed to only 17.5 percent of the white 
applicants. Under the revised standards for this test, it was predicted 
that 96 percent of the new teachers certified in South Carolina would 
be white. The district court ruled that the plaintiffs did not prove a 
racially discriminatory purpose and that the state justified its use of 
the test. Washington v. Davis was used to hold that test validity could 
be established by showing a relationship with success in job training, 
which was knowledge of course content of teacher education training 
programs. In spite of the adverse impact and admonishment by the 
test's authors that it was not designed for the purpose for which it 
16 
was used, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. 
When EEOC determines that conciliation will not be achieved in 
resolving a charge of employment discrimination under Title VII against 
a government, a governmental agency, or a political sub-division, the 
EEOC may not itself bring a civil action to compel the resolution of the 
case. It may refer such cases against public employees to the United 
States Attorney General who may bring civil action in the appropriate 
federal district court. The charging party has the right to intervene 
15 
United States v. South Carolina, National Education Association 
v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094 (D.S.C. 1977), affirmed 434 U.S. 
1026 (1978). 
1 fi 
McCarthy and Cambron, Public School Law, p. 77. 
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17 in the suit. Reorganization Plan Number 1 in 1978 was responsible for 
18 
this reservation of Title VII authority to the Attorney General. 
As provided in the Reorganization Plan, the Attorney General has 
the authority to bring pattern or practice suits against school districts 
and other public employees, subject to the procedural requirements in 
19 
Title VII, without an EEOC referral. Other courts have held to 
20 the contrary. 
21 The 1983 Deskbook Encyclopedia of American School Law cites 
six court cases involving the use of the National Teachers' Examination. 
In Virginia a number of black teachers challenged their dismissal. The 
United States District Court enjoined the school district from discriminat­
ing on the basis of race and from making use of the National Teacher's 
Examination (NTE) scores as a sole basis for employment, reemployment 
or termination of services of teachers or other personnel. The court 
upheld the termination of two teachers on grounds their discharge was 
not racially motivated. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, 
Fourth Circuit, affirmed the dismissal of one teacher as not based on 
racial factors, but reversed the lower court's decision with respect to 
17Title VII, Section 706 (f)(1). 
1843 F.R. 19807 (February 23, 1978). 
19 
U.S. v. North Carolina, (CA-4 1978). 587 F.2d 656, cert, denied 
442 U.S. 909 (1979). 
20 
U.S. v. Board of Education of the Garfield Heights Cith School 
District (VA-6 1978), 581 F.2d 791, and U.S. v. State of South Carolina, 
supra. 
21 The 1983 Deskbook Encyclopedia of American School Law (Rose-
mont, MN: Informational Research Systems, 1983), pp. 63-65. 
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the other teacher. The Court of Appeals held that the lower court's 
injunction regarding use of the NTE as the sole basis for employment 
and discharge of teachers did not comport with the Court of Appeals' 
prior decision which required that in order for these test results 
to be used at all, they must be properly validated. The case was 
remanded to the district court in order to modify its injunction (566 
F.2d 1201).22 
In Alabama, black teachers in a school district sued seeking 
reinstatement and back pay alleging discrimination against them in 
instituting a qualification and selection plan that resulted in substantial 
reductions in black teachers. The controversy arose over the require­
ment that new teachers obtain a minimum score of 500 of the NTE and 
placed the same requirement on teachers about to be transferred, 
regardless of years of experience. The U.S. Court of Appeals held 
that the evidence failed to show that NTE test scores bore any demon­
strable relationship to successful job performance and that the school 
23 
district's practices were discriminatory (492 F.2d 919). 
In Georgia, the Georgia Association of Educators brought suit 
against the state superintendent of schools and members of the Georgia 
State Board of Education. The teacher certification procedure in 
Georgia required that in order to obtain a six-year certificate an edu­
cator must obtain a composite score of 1225 on the NTE or be uncondi­
tionally admitted to a doctoral degree program. The lawsuit challenged 
the score of 1225. The U.S. District Court of Georgia held that the 
22lbid., p. 63. 
2^lbid., p. 64. 
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use of the 1225 score was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Constitution. The court held that using the test was arbitrary and 
not rationally related to its purpose. The NTE was designed to test 
general knowledge of undergraduate course work and not graduate work 
and there was no evidence that the test was in any way related to 
performance. The court prohibited the Georgia State Board from 
-Cjuiring Georgia educators to attain a minimum score on the NTE 
(407 F. Supp. 1102).24 
In North Carolina, the United States brought a lawsuit aganst the 
State of North Carolina charging the state, the State Board of Education 
and its members with invidious discrimination against blacks, Indians, 
and Orientals in violation of their equal protection rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The legislated requirement of a score of 950 on 
NTE for certification was the focus of the litigation. The facts demon­
strated that 31.08 percent of the black candidates for certification 
fell below 950 while only 1.36 percent of the whites fell below 950. 
The U.S. District Court held that while a state has the right to establish 
standards of competence, the defect was that the State of North Carolina 
had failed to validate 950 as a legitimate cut-off score. Since the score 
was not validated as revealing teacher competency, and since the test 
has a disparate impact on blacks, the court concluded that the test was 
not reasonably related to any proper government objective and was 
therefore, a denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment 
(400 F. Supp. 343). 
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In another North Carolina case involving NTE scores, the United 
States Court of Appeals was asked to reverse a decision of a U.S. 
District Court which held that grades achieved on the NTE to determine 
salary increase were illegal under the United States Constitution and 
Title VII. The plaintiffs charged that 38.6 percent of the district's 
black teachers were denied raises while only two percent of the district's 
white teachers were denied raises. The Court of Appeals held in favor 
of the school district stating that the district's purpose in using a pay 
scale based on proficiency achieved in objective testing bore a rational 
relationship to a legitimate state—that of giving teachers an incentive to 
improve their skills—which, in turn, would tend to improve the quality 
PFI 
of education in the district's schools (651 F.2d 222). 
In a case upholding the validity of NTE test scores, a United 
States district court held that while the evidence was undisputed that 
blacks score less well than whites, there must be intent by the state to 
create and use a racial classification in order for there to be a violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The use of the test did provide a ratio­
nal relationship with the legitimate objectives of the state. The objection 
that graduation from a state-approved school should suffice for employ­
ment was dismissed by the court which pointed out the vast disparities 
between the various teacher-training institutions in the state. The 
validity of the test was also established through a large scale study 
27 
which proved the test to be a trustworthy one (445 F. Supp. 1094). 
26 
Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
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The six examples of court cases dealing with a specific test, the 
National Teachers' Examination, illustrate how the courts have varied in 
their interpretation of the use of the test in various situations. Hence, 
in order to establish a constitutional or regulatory violation, the burden 
of proof is placed on the plaintiff to show that an adverse impact is the 
result of purposeful discrimination by the employer. In the case of the 
NTE, the validity of the test was established through a large-scale study 
which proved the test to be a trustworthy one as established by 
Washington v. Davis. 
Most minority employees alleging illegal employment practices in 
selecton and hiring have relied on Title VII. Under Title VII, the 
charges must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The 
28 Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas established the requirements for 
a prima facie case. Establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell 
Douglas does not mean that discrimination under Title VII will be esta­
blished. It only raises an inference of discriminatory hiring practices 
which, if unexplained by the employer, may be used to substantiate 
illegal employment practices. To rebut such a claim, the court holds 
that the employer must show that the decision is based on a legitimate 
29 business reason. The plaintiff is then provided with an opportunity 
30 to refute the employee's evidence. Relying on McDonnell Douglas, 
in 1978 the United States Supreme Court concluded that: 
^McDonnell Douglas Corp., v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
PQ 
Furnco Construction Corp., v. Waters, 438 U.S. 802 (1973). 
30 
McCarthy and Cambron, Public School Law, p. 78. 
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it is apparent that the burden which shifts to the employer is merely 
that of proving that he based his employment decision a legitimate 
consideration, and not an illegitimate one such as race. 
Further classification of the respondent's burden in showing a 
nondiscriminatory reason was provided in Board of Trustees of Keene 
32 State College v. Sweeney. Sweeney met the McDonnell Douglas 
requirements and because the employer did not demonstrate sufficiently 
a legitimate purpose for its action, the appellate court ruled in favor 
of Sweeney. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court ruled the 
employer was not required to "prove" a nondiscriminatory reason, but 
to "articulate" such a reason. Noting that the words "prove", "arti­
culate", and "show" are similar in meaning, the Court established 
"articulate" as requiring a lesser burden than was required by the 
appellate court. On remand, the appellate court again found evidence 
of discrimination, but stated that the employer's burden is "merely a 
burden of production", and the burden of persuasion remains at 
all times with the plaintiff. Thus, the ultimate burden to prove discrim­
ination rests with the plaintiff. 
To determine illegal employment practices or patterns, statistical 
anaylsis of racial ratios have been useful to both plaintiff and defen-
dents. Title VII makes no requirement for a workforce analysis of the 
racial make-up of the local population, but a substantial discrepancy may 
indicate racial discrimination. The United States Supreme Court acknow­
ledged the importance of statistics in establishing either a pattern or 
31 Furnca Construction Corp., v. Waters, supra, at 577. 
32 
Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 604 F.2d 
106 (1st. Cir. 1979), 444 U.S. 1045 (1980). 
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practice of discrimination or a prima facie case, but noted that the use-
33 fulness of such statistics depends on the circumstances of each case. 
The adage that statistics can be used to prove almost any point 
has been demonstrated in cases where plaintiffs and defendants by 
comparing different population groups and time periods used the same 
data to support both discriminatory and nondiscriminatory practices. 
Through numerous federal court decisions, common points of comparison 
have evolved such as comparison of the workforce to the composition of 
the surrounding labor market. As an example, in identifying a pattern 
and practice of discriminatory hiring practices in Hazelwood, Missouri, 
school district, the Supreme Court held that the proper comparison 
should be between the racial composition of the school district's teaching 
34 staff and the area's teaching pool. 
Hazelwood involved a school district that had not employed a black 
teacher prior to 1969, but employed twenty-two black teachers by 1973. 
The lower court had compared the percentage of black teachers employed 
by the district with the percentage of black teachers in the relevant 
labor market. For 1972-73, the figures for the district were 1.4 percent 
and 5.7 percent, respectively. The lower court ruled that this statistical 
analysis was evidence of discrimination. The Supreme Court held that 
the lower court was wrong to use these figures solely to establish a 
pattern of employment discrimination. The school district should have 
been provided an opportunity to demonstrate, by post-1972 hiring data, 
33 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 
U.S. 324 (1977). 
•34 
Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). 
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pattern of employment discrimination. The school district should have 
been provided an opportunity to demonstrate, by post-1972 hiring data, 
that the alleged discriminatory pattern was a product of pre-act hiring 
rather than unlawful post-act discrimination. The court stated that a 
public employer that made all its employment decisions in a nondiscrimi­
natory way after March 24, 1972, the date Title VII became effective, 
would not violate Title VII even if it had formerly maintained an all-white 
workforce by purposefully excluding blacks. 
The case, although limited in its applicability to the question of 
adverse impact, clarified two principles that are helpful in selection 
procedure evaluation. First, the effects of pre-Title VII effective date 
practices should be separated from post-act practices for statistical 
analysis. Second, hiring statistics can only be understood with 
reference to some other statistics which will often not be the applicant 
flow or the general population. 
The Supreme Court held that a comparison between the black 
teaching force and black pupils in a school district was irrelevant. 
Depending on the geographic area of comparison, black teachers 
composed 5.7 percent or 15.4 percent of the labor market, whereas 
35 
only 2 percent of the student population was black. 
The current problem of staff reduction in public schools due to 
a declining student population, school closings, district consolidations 
and court-ordered desegregation has become litigious. Criteria to use 
in the identification of teachers for dismissal were articulated by the 
35 
Ibid. 
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Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1969. In Singleton v. Jackson Munici-
36 
pal Separate School District, the Appellate Court held that professional 
staff members subject to dismissal "must be selected on the basis of 
objective and reasonably nondiscriminatory standards from among all the 
staff of the school district". 
To prevent black teachers from bearing a disproportionate burden, 
Singleton provided that: 
1. Race wilt not be a factor in hiring, assignment, promotion, 
demotion, salary, or dismissal; 
2. A reduction in professional staff must be made on the basis of 
"objective and reasonable nondiscriminatory standards"; and, 
3. Nonracial objective criteria nuist be developed by the school 
board prior to any reductions. 
The court specifically defined demotion as a reassignment involving 
less pay, responsibility, or skill than the previous position, or a trans­
fer to a teaching position for which one is not certified or does not 
have substantial experience. 
To use the Singleton criteria, courts consistently have held that 
dismissals must be related to reductions occurring as a result of court-
ordered desegregation where an actual arithmatical reduction in positions 
is caused by a desegregation plan. If the number of professional posi-
38 tions remain the same or increase, Singleton is inapplicable. It is also 
inapplicable if a district has entered into a voluntary desegregation 
36 
Singleton v. Jackson Muncipal Separate School District, 419 F.2d 
1211 (5th Cir. 1970). 
371 bid. at 1218. 
38 
Barnes v. Jones County School District, 544 F.2d 804 (5th Cir 1977). 
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39 effort or after a district has operated as a unitary system for several 
40 
years. 
According to Singleton, teachers released because of the implemen­
tation of a reduction-in-force policy must be given preference in 
reappointment. This principle has been strictly construed as entitling 
41 
qualified "riffed" teachers preferential treatment when vacancies occur. 
As long as "riffed" teachers possess minimum qualifications, they must 
not be rejected on the basis that other applicants hold better creden-
.. . 42 
tials. 
When unitary school systems were established, a number of 
districts sought to hold the racial ratio existing at the date of desegrega­
tion. Thus, as vacancies occurred, whites replaced whites and blacks 
replaced blacks. Such employment procedures have been held unvali-
dated. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Carter v. West 
Feliciana Parish School Board: 
Once a unitary system has been established the system-wide 
racial ratio may thereafter change from time to time as a result of 
nondiscriminatory application of objective m^git standards in the 
selection and composition of faculty and staff. 
The objective of Singleton and similar rulings was not to freeze 
the existing minority/majority ratio. Thus, a decrease in minority 
40 Barnes v. Jones County School District, supra. 
^ Kelly v. West Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 517 F.2d 
194 (5th Cir. 1975). 
42 United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 380 
F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1970). 
^Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Baord, 432 F.2d 875 
(5th Cir. 1970). 
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teachers does not substantiate discriminatory practices when equal 
employment opportunity practices are employed in the selection of 
44 
staff. 
For whatever reasons, changes from one position to another have 
resulted in litigation based on demotion. Singleton established factors 
to guage demotions as level of responsibility, skill, salary, and certifi­
cation. The level of responsibility has been a key index in establishing 
45 
demotion. In Lee v. Macon County Board of Education the court held 
that Lee was demoted. Lee, a black, was transferred from j principal-
ship to a classroom teaching position. However, when a black high 
school counselor was reassigned as an elementary school counselor with 
the same title and salary, the court held the transfer was not a de-
46 motion. The court indicated there was no compelling reason for 
complete congruency of responsibilities between two positions. 
Singleton addressed reduction-in-force related to court-ordered 
desegregation. However, the reduction-in-force necessitated by declining 
enrollments and financial exigency have become more pressing issues in 
the late 1970's and 1980's; Minorities often have fewer years of exper­
ience due to past employment practices, especially pre-Title VII employ­
ment. When simple seniority has provided a last hired, first riffed 
system; a system basically neutral on its face may act to maintain 
44Lee v. Walker, 594 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1979). 
45 Lee v. Macon County Board of Education (Muscle Schoals), 
453 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1971). 
46 
Lee v. Russell County Board of Education, 563 F.2d 1159 
(5th Cir. 1977). 
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earlier discrimination. To protect seniority rights and avoid reverse 
adverse impact, Congress specifically exempted bona fide seniority 
systems from operation of Title VII: 
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer 
to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide 
seniority or merit system . . . provided that such differences ace 
not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race. 
Based on this provisi'on in Title VII, the courts must determine 
what is a bona fide seniority system and to what extent a school system 
must go to remedy any results of past practice and pattern of illegal 
employment decisions. 
With a high level of attention on the South, the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals was active in addressing cases seeking remedies to 
provide minority employees equal employment opportunities in a seniority 
system. In a case involving seniority rights and promotions in a paper 
mill, employees were given seniority based on jobs rather than time 
48 
employed. Positions were organized hierarchically in functional produc­
tion lines which were segregated by race. Black employees were 
restricted to certain low-paying jobs prior to the implementation of Title 
VII and were not allowed to compete for vacancies in the white lines 
because of lack of job seniority. Applying the "rightful place" doctrine, 
the court of appeals held that the future awarding of vacant positions 
should not lock in past discrimination. The court did not advocate 
4742 U.S.C. Section 2000 e-2(h), (1976). 
48 
Local 189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. U.S., 
416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969). 
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granting fictional seniority or bumping white employees, but stated 
that seniority must be based on total years in the company, not in a 
particular job line. 
The "rightful place" principle has been applied by other courts 
and has been extended by the United States Supreme Court to award 
49 
retroactive seniority. The Court held that black employees who had 
been victims of unlawful discrimination could be granted constructive 
seniority to put them in their rightful place where they would have 
been had they not suffered discrimination. Those who had sought 
position in other departments or jobs from which they had been excluded 
were permitted to transfer with seniority retroactive to the date of the 
original unlawful discrimination 
A second Supreme Court decision pertinent to reduction-in-force 
that would adversely affect recently hired women and minorities held 
that a seniorty system is not in "bad faith" merely because it had the 
effect of perpetuating past discrimination. If the system was established 
with no intent to discriminate, it was protected by the exception in 
50 
Title VII. 
Thus, it appears from these decisions that employers who give 
constructive seniority to actual victims of discrimination can proceed with 
a reduction-in-force that respects constructive, or retroactive, seniority 
of the recently hired protected classes of employees. 
In a school desegregation case, the Federal Court of Appeals 
upheld an order barring a school board from making layoffs of teachers 
49 
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). 
5G 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324 
(1977). 
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arid administrators strictly on the basis of seniority. Although the court 
ruled that the school district had discriminated against the professional 
staff, the real victims were found to be the black children who had 
unconstitutionally been denied the teaching faculty necessary to bring 
them fully into the school community. According to the court of appeals, 
the layoff order was designed, insofar as possible, "to make the school 
51 children whole". 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held a "rightful place" 
seniority system for the layoff of supervisory personnel in a New York 
school district. A disproportionate impact on minority supervisors did 
not invalidate the seniority system. The court acknowledged that certain 
minority supervisors might be entitled to "constructive or fictional" 
seniority because they had been denied their "rightful place" on the 
52 seniority list by a discriminatory examination. 
Without a demonstrated case of past discrimination, an employer 
cannot circumvent an established seniority system by using a reduction-
in-force to alleviate racial inbalance in the school's staff. As an 
example, a Pennsylvania school district's riffing of white teachers with 
greater seniority than black teachers was held to constitute racial 
discrimination and was impermissable because there had been no past 
53 discrimination in employment practices. 
^Morgan v. O'Bryant, (CA-1 1982), 28 EPD 32,544 cert, denied 
U.S. Sup. Ct., 1982. 
52 
Chance v. Board of Examiners and Board of Education of the 
City of New York, 534 F.2d 996 (2nd Cir. 1976). 
53 
Bacica v. Board of Education of the School District of the City 
of Erie, PA, 451 F. Supp. 882 (WD Pa., 1978). 
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With public school systems facing declining enrollments, district 
reorganizations and financial problems, reduction-in-force will intensify 
as a area of concern. A bona fide seniority system is a- legitimate 
mechanism for staff layoffs, but prior discriminatory employment practices 
may require modification for certain protected employees who are not in 
their "rightful place". This does not abrogate the seniority system 
itself. "Make whole" remedies, including retroactive seniority for 
54 
protected classes, do not diminish the rights of other employees". 
The rights of other employees have surfaced in recent years in 
charges of "reverse discrimination". "Reverse discrimination" is not a 
new class of employment discrimination, but the term is used to identify 
majority discrimination resulting from attempts to remedy minority 
discrimination. According to Title VII, illegal employment opportunities 
are impermissable without regard to majority or minority. 
The United States Supreme Court held unconditionally that the 
provisions of Title VII "are not limited to discrimination against members 
55 of any particular race". The doctrine of reverse discrimination was 
the central focus of the landmark case, Regents of the University of 
56 
California v. Bakke. As in Brown, the questions in Bakke were seen 
on the legal horizon long before they came to the Supreme Court. 
Bakke entered a new area of case law. It was the first Supreme 
Court decision addressing when voluntary measures intended to remedy 
54 
McCarthy and Cambron, Public School Law, p. 83. 
55 
McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 
(1976). 
56 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265 (1978). 
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the present efforts of past discrimination may themselves take race into 
account. Its lack of unanimity was its most important and confusing 
aspect. Six separate opinions were published, two of which were 
supported by four other justices apiece. The swing vote was cast by 
Justice Powell. 
This split in the Court produced one 5 to 4 majority that ordered 
Allen Bakke admitted to the Medical School of the University of California 
at Davis and found its affirmative action program illegal. However, by 
another 5 to 4 majority, the Court held that at least some form of race-
conscious admissions procedures are constitutional. Consequently, it is 
very difficult, if not impossible, to predict how the court will respond 
when dealing with a different set of facts in another affirmative action 
57 
case. 
With regard to equal employment opportunities in the public 
schools, the case provides more questions than answers. Doubts are 
raised about the legal status of affirmative action plans in the absence of 
58 
prior discriminatory practices. In Weber in June, 1979, the United 
States Supreme Court did not address what Title VII requires or what 
a court might order, but 
whether Title VII forbids private employers and unions from 
voluntarily agreeing upon bona fide affirmative action plans that 
accord racial preference. 
In Weber, the court did not attempt to delineate permissable and imper-
missable affirmative action programs. It merely found the Kaiser plan per­
missable. Although Weber involved a private employer and a voluntary 
^United States Commission on Civil Rights, Toward an Under­
standing of Bakke, Clearinghouse Publication 58 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979, p. 1. 
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affirmative action plan favoring blacks, the principles set forth in the 
decision have been specifically found applicable to programs implemented 
by public employers and to voluntary affirmative action programs which 
59 discriminate on the basis of sex. 
The litigation surrounding reverse discrimination are complex and 
many questions remain unresolved by the courts. Some general prin­
ciples have evolved to guide public school systems in planning for 
affirmative action. All employees are protected from illegal employment 
decisions. If a district without a history of past discrimination is faced 
with a reduction-in-force, white teachers with greater seniority cannot 
be suspended while minority teachers with less seniority are re-employed 
to achieve a better racial balance. In recruitment, selection, promotion, 
and training, it is unlawful to use rigid quotas. The more defensible 
approach is to establish a flexible plan with desirable ranges and to 
include race as a factor in screening, but not as the determinate of 
selection. An acceptable plan might include one that is temporary which 
60 avoids specific quotas or the maintenance of a specified racial balance. 
Litigation Based on Sex 
Initially, the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex was 
referred to as a "sleeper" in Title VII. Although most of the Congres­
sional debate centered on racial discrimination and the provision about 
sex was introduced by opponents in an attempt to defeat the bill, 
59 
Beatton v. City of Detroit, (CA-6 1983), 31 EDP, 33,497. 
60 
McCarthy and Cambron, Public School Law, p. 86. 
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alleged discrimination based on sex now constitutes a high percentage 
of the cases filed with EEOC and litigation in the courts. 
Along with the equal rights gains of minorities, recognition has 
been given to equality in employment for women. In litigation sex-based 
classifications that impose unequal employment burdens on female employ­
ees have been challenged. However, sex has not been designated as a 
"suspect class" as has race. This distinction is vital in judicial review. 
If sex were elevated to a "suspect class", a compelling justification would 
be necessary for any governmental classification based on gender. 
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions have determined that 
classifications based on sex must bear a "close and substantial relation-
62 ship to important governmental objectives" and require "an exceed-
63 ingly persuasive justification to withstand a constitutional challenge". 
Therefore, most litigation has occurred under Title VII. 
In light of the problems of sex discrimination in the 1970's and 
1980's it is interesting to note the up-to-date statement of Thorndike in 
a 1915 book: 
The individual differences within one sex so enormously outweigh 
the differences between the sexes in these intellectual and semi-
intellectual traits that for practical purposes the sex differences 
may be disregarded. So far as ability goes, there could hardly be 
a stupider way to get two groups, than to take the two sexes. 
As is well known, the experiments of the past generation in 
educating women have shown their equal competence in schoolwork 
of elementary, secondary, and collegiate grade. The present genera-
61 
Wendell L. French, The Personnel Management Process: Human 
Resources Administration and Development (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1978), p. 207. 
^Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1977). 
63 Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Fenney, 442 U.S. 
256 (1979). 
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tion's experience is showing the same fact for professional education 
and business service. The psychologist's measurements lead to the 
conclusion that this equality of achievement comes from an equality 
of natura^gifts, not from an overstraining of the lesser talents 
of women. 
It is important to note that Title VII is violated on a sex-plus 
basis when one sex is required to meet additional criteria such as not 
having children. If only women have to meet this employment require-
65 
ment, while men do not, there is a Title VII violation. 
With more and more women in the labor force, the question of how 
employers treat pregnancy and related conditions has received much 
attention. Pregnancy-related disabilities are often excluded from 
employee disability programs. One argument in support of the exclu-
66 sion is related to the so-called voluntariness of the condition. Another 
legal argument rests on the principle that pregnancy-related conditions 
are not sex discrimination because pregnancy is significantly dfferent 
from the typical disease covered by disability plans. Exclusion of some 
67 
risks from such plans does not create a sex-based discriminatory effect. 
The arguments were eventually ended when Congress passed the 
68 Preganancy Discrimination Act of 1978, which amended Title VII to 
specify that pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions must 
FI 4 
E. L. Thorndike, Educational Psychology (New York: Briefer 
Course, Teacher's College, 1915), cited in Professional Psychology, 
5 (August, 1974):263. 
CC 
Cynthia Stoddard, Sex Discrimination in Educational Employment, 
(Holmes Beach, Fla.: Learning Publications, Inc., 1981), p. 37. 
^Gilbert v. General Electric Company, (CA-4 1975), 519 F.2d 661, 
reversed 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
^General Electric Company v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
®^Title VII, Section 701 (k). 
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treated the same as other medical conditions for purposes of employment 
benefits. In school systems the greatest effect is on sick leave. If 
the district permits sick leave for other disabilities, it must accord the 
69 
same for pregnancy-related absences. As of April 29, 1979, all 
employers were to be in compliance with the amendment. 
Like maternity benefits, school systems' mandatory leave policies 
have been litigated. The Supreme Court in Cleveland Board of Education 
v. LaFleur^ ruled that a compulsory maternity leave violated due process 
rights. Women were required to leave their teaching jobs at the end of 
their fifth month of pregnancy, regardless of their health or the school 
schedule. The court held that arbitrary cut-off dates did not serve the 
school's stated purposes which were to assure the continuity of classroom 
instruction and to preclude the presence in classroom of physically inca­
pacitated teachers. Thus, while the court "recognizes that freedom of 
personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the 
liberties protected by the due process clause", this decision does not 
state that pregnancy leave was a "sex-plus" case of sex discrimination. 
LaFleur does not prohibit boards of education from establishing 
maternity leave policies. A reasonable leave policy was upheld in the 
71 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The San Diego school board's policy 
required all teachers to take maternity at the ninth month of pregnancy. 
It was adequately demonstrated that this was a business necessity based 
Education U.S.A., vol. 21, no. 9, October 30, 1978, p. 20. 
^Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). 
^deLaurier v. San Diego United School District, 588 F.2d 674 
(9th Cir. 1978). 
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on obtaining a replacement teacher given the unpredictability of child­
birth. By contrast, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated a 
school board's policy of nonrenewal of teacher contracts where a foresee­
able period of absence could be anticipated for the next school year. 
As female teachers were required to give notice to the school admini­
strators of their pregnancy and expected delivery date, this policy was 
72 determined to place a disproportionate burden on female teachers. 
Board of education employment policies which place a substantial 
burden on women and not on men have been litigated in the courts. 
When the policies cannot be established as a business necessity, they 
have been found to constitute unlawful employment practice under Title 
VII. Leaves taken because of pregnancy, like other leave, do not affect 
73 
the accumulated seniority upon return from maternity leaves. 
The general principle that "sex-plus" cases are grounded on a 
showing that an employment policy is applied differently to one sex than 
to the other is particularly troublesome in cases involving unwed 
mothers. This is true, even in those cases where the policy is stated 
as opposing hiring or retaining persons who are unwed parents. The 
application of the rule against men is so much more difficult than against 
women. It has been held that the plaintiff failed to prove that a man 
74 would have been treated differently. The dissenting opinion in Gray­
son v. Wicks Corp. stated that to ask the plaintiff to prove that male 
72 Mitchell v. Board of Trustees of Pickens County School District, 
599 F.2d. 182 (4th Cir. 1979). 
^Nashville Gas Company v. Salty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977). 
74Grayson v. Wicks Corp., (CA-7 1979), 607 F.2d 1194. 
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employees who engaged in premarital sexual relationships and produced 
offspring would be treated differently was to ask the impossible. The 
equating of pregnancy with the condition of expectant parenthood in a 
man was sophistry because pregnancy is a condition unique to females, 
and men and women cannot be considered to be similarly situated in 
this regard.^ 
Neither case cited above was decided with reference to Title VII 
which seems to lay this question to rest. The amendment states that 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is considered to be sex discrim­
ination. However, the argument supporting policies against unwed 
parents is based on morality and, especially in the case of school 
personnel, example to others. Even with the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act, the argument might be made that these policies do not discriminate 
on the basis of pregnancy or marital status, but that they merely 
apply the employer's moral code to the employees' conduct. 
In a case involving teachers, the question of morality was directly 
addressed by the court in Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School 
76 
District. The case was heard under the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clause of the United States Constitution. The court held that it 
was a violation of both to institute an irrebuttable presumption that a 
person who has had a child out of wedlock is thereby proved to be 
immoral. The court stated that constitutional principles require that 
other considerations be recognized, such as subsequent marriage, length 
^Jacobs v. Martin Sweet Co., (CA-6 1977), 550 F.2d 364, cert, 
denied (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1977), 431 U.S. 917. 
76 
Andrews v. Dres Municipal Separate School District (CA-5 
1975), 507 F.2d 611 cert, denied (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1976), 426 U.S. 559. 
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of time elasped since the birth, reputation for good character, possibility 
of force or deception, or the effects of drugs or alcohol. The court 
also pointed out that, although the obvious aim of the rule was to 
discourage premarital sexual relations, one result would be to encourage 
abortion, considered by many to be morally objectionable. Finally, the 
court noted that a rule against unwed parents ignores the occurrence of 
extramarital sexual relations which is thought by many to be of a more 
serious moral concern than premarital activity. The court asked that a 
hearing opportunity be provided so that teachers suspected of immorality 
would be heard. That would satisfy the constitutional requirement of 
-4 77 due process. 
Illegal employment patterns and practices related to sex-based 
actions in recruitment, salary, promotion, training, compensation, and 
working conditions have all been adjudicated under Title VII using the 
same procedure as in racial discrimination suits. 
Although several courts have held that Title VII and the Equal 
Pay Act are extensive, the Third and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals 
78 
concluded that Title VII is broader in scope than the Equal Pay Act. 
The Equal Pay Act was ruled determinative only when equal salary was 
an issue. An individual was not prevented from challenging other sex-
related compensation differences under Title VII. The Ninth Circuit 
Appellate Court advised, 
7 7 , . . .  Ibid. 
78 International Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers v. 
Westinghouse Electrical Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3rd Cir. 1980) and Gun-
ther v. County of Washington, 452 U.S. 161 (1981). 
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if we were to limit Title Vll's protection against sexually discrimina­
tory compensation practices to those covered by the Equal Pay Act, 
we would in effect Ululate other equally harmful discriminatory 
practices from review. 
These court rulings could advance challenges to some traditional 
salary differences among educational personnel in areas such as male 
and female coaches and maids and custodians. 
Splitt wrote: 
School systems are natural targets for legal action to adjust 
discriminatory pay differences between male and female employees. 
One Pennsylvania school system already has been charged by 
AFSCME under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. That action 
was brought before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
on behalf of several dozen school system workers who claim that 
women holding non-teaching jobs in clerical and food service areas 
are paid substantially less for the same level of work that men 
perform in custodial and maintenance positions. 
School executives who want to get the jump on possible litigation 
should examine the wage scales of all employees carefully—especially 
those for nonprofessional personnel, such as office and library 
workers, nonspecialist maintenance workers, and custodians. If 
there are substantial—or unexplained—gaps between the pay levels 
for jobs held mostly by men and those in which female workers 
predominate, you might want to recommend changes before you must 
defend yourself in a sex-bias lawsuit. 
The Washington and Pennsylvania actions are direct fallout from 
a U.S. Supreme Court decision handed down in 1981. In County of 
Washington v. Gunther, the high court ruled that sex discrimination 
in employment is necessarily limited to equal pay for equal work in 
the same job. As long as the qualifications and necessary skills are 
similar, and as long as the jobs require essentially the same amount 
of effort and responsibility, the fact that the types of work per­
formed are different does ng^ justify lower salaries for positions 
held predominately by women. 
79 Gunther v. County of Washington, Supra. 
80 
David A. Splitt, "School Law", The Executive Educator 12 
(December, 1983): 11. 
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Litigation Based on Age 
In public school employment one of the greatest problems with 
respect to age discrimination has been mandatory retirement ages. 
Compulsory retirements systems have been challenged as violations of the 
equal protection and due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment. With few exceptions these systems have been upheld as constitu-
, 81 
tional. 
Persons between the ages of forty and sixty-five years are in a 
protected class as provided in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
82 of 1967. When age is used as a factor in making employment decisions, 
an employer must consider many of the same situations that are involved 
in analyzing cases of racial or sex discrimination. However, the Uniform 
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures do not apply to age 
83 
discrimination. In 1978, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967 was amended to include persons between sixty-five and seventy 
years of age. 
A 1974 amendment included most employees of state and local 
8" 
governments under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. ~t The 
rule for public employees not covered by the act is a constitutional 
standard; the mandatory retirement rule must have a rational relation­
ship to a legitimate governmental purpose. 
81 
McCarthy and Cambron, Public School Law, pp. 94-95. 
82 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Section 4(d), 29 
U.S.C. Section 621-634. 
83 Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (1978), 43 
FR 38297, August 25, 1978. 
84 
Public Law 93-259, effective May 1, 1974, 88 Stat. 74. 
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The constitutional standard has been applied to teachers' cases. 
85 In Palmer v. Ticcione, a seventy year old kindergarden teacher alleged 
that compulsory retirement violated her civil rights and created an irre­
buttable presumption of incompetence. The court found the state statute 
to be rationally related to fulfilling a legitimate state objective and 
therefore, not subject to due process proceedings. Stressing that the 
rational basis must not be too narrowly defined, the court concluded 
that legitimate reasons for a mandatory system might include providing 
employment opportunities for young people and minorities, creating 
openings for new ideas and techniques, and assuring predictability in 
the managemant of retirement systems. The court also held that a 
rational system should not be invalidated because it may include a 
presumption of employee incompetency at a predetermined age. 
86 
In contrast to Palmer, in Garret v. Garrison, the appellate 
court upheld a teacher's right to a trial on an age discrimination charge 
involving mandatory retirement. The court reasoned that fitness to teach 
should be determined on an individual basis and that mandatory retire­
ment per se violated an individual's rights, whether the cut-off age was 
sixty or eighty. No evidence was introduced in Garret to demonstrate 
a rational relationship between age and fitness to teach. The appellate 
court ruled that in the absence of a valid justification, the mandatory 
retirement age deprived the affected teachers of their due process 
rights to an individual determination of teaching competency. Other 
^Palmer v. Ticcione, (CA-2 1978), 576 F.2d 459, cert, denied 
(U.S. Sup. Ct., 1979), 440 U.S. 945. 
^Garret v. Garrison, (CA-7 1977), 569 F.2d 993, cert, denied 
(U.S. Sup. Ct., 1979), 440 U.S. 945. 
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courts have not viewed mandatory retirement as narrowly as the Seventh 
87 Circuit Court of Appeals. 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act's coverage prohibits 
any form of employment discrimination based on age. Decisions related 
to such matters as promotions, transfers, and discharges cannot be 
premised on age. An Alabama federal district court ruled in Polstorff 
88 
v. Fletcher, that to establish an age discrimination case, a discharged 
employee does not have to be replaced by an individual outside the 
"protected group" who is below forty years of age. That is, if age is 
the only factor in discharge, a sixty year old employee is entitled to 
reinstatement, if displaced by a younger individual—whether forty-five 
or thirty years old. 
89 
The EEOC issued age discrimination guidelines on September 28, 
1981. These guidelines do not make substantial changes in the law, but 
refine long-established rules and definitions. The coverage remains age 
forty to seventy years and the prohibition extend to hiring, promotions, 
and retirement. The EEOC takes the position that employers cannot 
favor the younger of two individuals, both of whom are within the 
protected age group. 
The guidelines particularly take aim at want ads which use phrases 
to attract either the young or old. Although the guidelines state that 
these terms are not always illegal, they make it clear that those using 
87 
McCarthy and Cambron, Public School Law, p. 95. 
OO 
Polstorff v. Fletcher, 452 F. Supp. 17 (N.D. Ala., 1978). 
89 
EEOC/Age Discrimination; 46 Fed. Reg. 188, p. 47724, September 
28, 1981. 
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them do so at their own risk. If an employer can prove that only indi­
viduals of a given age are capable of performing the duties required of 
the job, then age may be specified as a bona fide qualification. To use 
this exception, the employer must prove that (1) the age limit is reason­
ably necessary to the essence of the business; and either (2) that all 
or substantially all individuals excluded from the job involved are in fact 
disqualified, or (3) that some of the individuals so excluded possess a 
disqualifying trait that cannot be ascertained by reference to age. 
The guidelines provide that the extra cost of employing older 
workers is not a valid justification for discrimination either in hiring 
or compensation. 
Seniority systems are exempt from the Age Discrimination Act 
unless they are a "subterfuge to evade the purposes" of the act. To 
qualify as bona fide, a seniority system must provide for the equitable 
allocation of available employment opportunities and prerogatives among 
older and younger workers. Such factors as merit, capacity, or ability 
may be incorporated into the seniority systems so long as they are not 
primary factors. 
The act does not make it illegal to have employees elect early 
retirement at their own option; nor is it unlawful to require early 
retirement for reasons other than age. The problem is that someone may 
become too zealous about encouraging early retirement. If an employer 
90 
goes too far, the EEOC could charge him with age discrimination. 
The February 24, 1984, issue of Ideas and Trends reported: 
90 
"EEOC Issues Age Discrimination Guidelines," Personnel Mana­
gers Legal Reporter, 147, November, 1981, p. 3. 
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In addition, the EEOC says, an employee under 70 who accepted 
incentives to retire early also must be considered if he or she asks 
to return to work; and a policy-maker required to retire before 70 
must be consideg^d if he or she asks to return in a non-policy-
making function. 
Employers have no obligation to take affirmative action to hire, 
promote, or protect in a reduction-in-force workers protected by the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) according to a ruling 
from the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals. In the court 
case the plaintiffs charged that the criteria used to make layoffs was 
discriminatory, that they were willing and qualified to perform the 
work, and that the employer was under an affirmative obligation to 
92 
transfer them to those jobs available. 
The court rejected both claims. The judges ruled that there is 
no affirmative obligation to find alternative work under ADEA. In other 
words, older workers do not have to be treated specially; they need only 
to be treated equally. Two principles evolved regarding age discrimi­
nation: (1) that the employer consciously refused to consider other 
alternatives because of age; or (2) that age was considered a negative 
factor in the employment decision. Public school systems faced with 
reductions in force should examine their criteria in light of these two 
principles. 
91 
"Retirees Still under 70 Must be Considered for Rehire," Ideas 
and Trends: Human Resources Management, no. 59 (24 February 1984): 
25. 
92 
Williams v. General Motors Corporation, U.S.C.A., 5th; nos. 
79-2857 and 80-7192; September 14, 1981. 
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Litigation Based on Handicaps 
A handicapped person is protected to some degree by the Reha-
93 bilitaton Act of 1973. The protection is not as extensive as that given 
minorities, women, and members of religious sects by Title VII. 
According to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, a "handicapped indi­
vidual" is any person who has a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more of the person's major life activities, or 
who has a record of such an impairment, or who is regarded as having 
such an impairment. Specifically excluded are alcoholics and drug 
abusers. 
The key legislation is Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
94 
1973. It provides in part that "no otherwise qualified handicapped 
individual" shall be excluded from participation in a program receiving 
federal financial assistance "solely by reason of his handicap". 
Discriminatory practices occurring prior to the implementation of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 were litigated on Constitutional grounds. 
A blind teacher challenged the Philadelphia School District's refusal to 
permit her to take the Philadelphia Teacher's Examination as a violation 
of her due process rights.^ The court concluded that the school 
district violated the teacher's due process rights by refusing to give 
her an opportunity to demonstrate her competence. It awarded her 
^Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 93-112, 87 stat. 355, 29 U.S.C. 
Section 701 and following. 
9429 U.S.C. Section 794 (1976). 
^Gurmankin v. Constanzo, 556 F.2d 184 (3rd. Cir. 1977). 
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retroactive seniority dating from 1970 and in a subsequent appeal the 
96 
appellate court alsc awarded back pay for the same period. However, 
the court refused to grant tenure reasoning that tenure must be based 
on the system's evaluation procedures. 
In employment decisions, courts have reiterated that Section 504 
regulations require "reasonable accommodation only for handicapped 
persons who are otherwise qualified". In a California case, a blind 
teacher challenged school officials for failure to appoint him to an 
97 
administrative position because of his blindness. To be eligible for 
administrative positions, candidates were required to complete a written 
examination and have an oral interview. During this process, an admini­
strative team determined that the teacher was not qualified for an admin­
istrative position and further expressed reservations about the teacher's 
ability to cope with his blindness. The federal court concluded that 
aside from the teacher's disability, he was not qualified for the position. 
The court also noted that it was permissable for the committee to inquire 
as to how the teacher would cope with his blindness in meeting the 
job requirements. 
A handicapped person cannot be eliminated from employment 
consideration solely on the basis of a disability. In the employment 
process an employer is not required to ignore the handicap or make 
substantial accommodations for the special needs of the individual. 
Under current legislation and judicial interpretation, an "otherwise 
qualified individual" must be accorded an equal opportunity for employ-
96 
Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 626 F.2d 1118 (3rd. Cir. 1980). 
97 
Upshur v. Lone, 474 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Cal. 1979). 
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ment. There is much confusion surrounding the rights of handicapped 
workers. 
Sections 503 and 504 apply to different kinds of employers. 
Employers receiving direct financial assistance from the United States 
Government are covered by section 504. Employers who are government 
contractors are covered under 503. 
The only employers who are legally required to offer equal employ-y 
ment opportunity to the mentally or physically handicapped are the 
following: 
1. employers in the public sector 
2. companies holding federal contract worth over $50,000, 
3. employers covered by state laws that specifically protect the 
handicapped 
Summary 
98 
In Connecticut v. Teal the United States Supreme Court held 
on a 5 to 4 vote that having acceptable employment figures overall is 
not a defense to a charge of discrimination against one or more indivi­
duals. 
A Connecticut agency ruled that several black employees were not 
eligible for promotion to supervisor because they failed a written 
examination which was failed by more blacks than whites. 
The state defended its position by demonstrating that 22.9 percent 
of the black candidates were promoted among those eligible while only 
13.5 percent of the eligible white employees were promoted. 
QO 
State of Connecticut v. Teal, (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1982), aff'g and rem'g 
(CA-2), 457 U.S. 440. 645 F.2d 133. 
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As the "bottom line" result was favorable to the blacks, the state 
argued, it could not be said that the state had discriminated against 
the individuals who failed the written test. 
The Supreme Court, however, noted that the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 guarantees equal employment opportunity to individuals. Therefore, 
an individual cannot be told, ruled the court, that he or she has not 
been wronged because others have achieved what the individual seeks. 
In other words, there is no claim that a selection procedure is made 
lawful by "getting the numbers up". 
The argument in favor of the bottom line approach is that the 
intent of the laws requiring equal employment opportunity in the public 
sector is to give members of all minority groups, men and women equal 
access to jobs and to eliminate the practices that excluded protected 
persons from employment. 
Accordingly, to suggest that the "bottom line" is a defense to a 
claim of discrimination against an individual employee confuses unlawful 
discrimination with discriminatory intent. Furthermore, to measure 
adverse impact only at the bottom line ignores the fact that Title VII 
guarantees protected individuals the opportunity to compete equally with 
others on the basis of job-related criteria. 
Personnel officers in the public schools must work with their 
superintendents and boards of education to ensure that equal employment 
opportunities are available to all individuals who apply or are hired by 
a public school system. To do any less is to perform in an unlawful 
manner and risk making employment decisions made on inappropriate 
data. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary 
This study has reviewed the legal aspects of equal employment 
opportunity for public school employees. In the process, a study was 
made of the federal laws, state laws, case law, decisions of regulatory 
agencies, executive orders, and the guidelines of regulatory agencies. 
Each was analyzed in relation to applicability to employment in the public 
school setting. Chapter IV specifically addressed some of the major 
issues in equal employment opportunities in the public schools. 
From the date of the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, 
which includes Title VII, and the 1972 amendments, the Equal Employ­
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the courts, and Congress have 
increased their influence on the employment decisions of public school 
administrators and boards of education. EEOC guidelines now cover all 
areas of pre-employment procedures as well as post employment activities. 
Legislative mandates and executive orders have intruded into the 
employment process as safeguards of individual rights in the public 
schools. 
Answers to Questions 
Several key questions were answered in this study: 
I. What are the Equal Employment Opportunity laws that cover 
public school employees and who is covered? 
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended in 1972 is the 
basic law covering employment in public schools. With the 1972 amend­
ments, all employees in the public schools have the protection of Title 
VII. Public school employees, like other citizens, decide where they 
will take their charges of discrimination that arise in the work place. 
Litigation may also occur under other laws: the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments to the Constitution; the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1970, 
and 1971; the Equal Pay Act; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act; 
the Vocational Rehabilitation Act, and certain other federal, state, and 
local laws that may apply. 
2. How are the Equal Employment Opportunity laws enforced? 
Employees of the public schools in North Carolina are required to 
take their charges of illegal employment practices or patterns to the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC proce­
dures as outlined in the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection 
Procedures (1978) are to be followed. Once the procedures of EEOC 
have been satisfied, but reconciliation has not occurred, the aggrieved 
may sue in a federal court. Employees not choosing to use EEOC may 
go directly to court to seek remedies if the charges are on some basis 
other than Title VII. Therefore, enforcement of Equal Employment 
Opportunity laws rests with EEOC and the federal courts. 
3. What is the legal status of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission and how does it function? 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 gives legal status to the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The EEOC operates under 
the laws it has been designated to enforce and through its own guide­
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lines, opinions, and answers to questions. All activities of the EEOC 
are subject to review by Congress. 
4. What legal principles of equal employment opportunities have 
been established through case law? 
The following legal principles of equal employment opportunities 
have been established by law: (1) equal employment opportunity has 
been supported in the courts as the right of all persons and especially 
those in the protected classes; (2) employers must provide equal employ­
ment opportunities to all applicants and employees; (3) when litigation is 
involved the plaintiff must establish a prima facie proof of discrimi­
nation as outlined in McDonald Douglas; and (4) employers are respon­
sible for ensuring that equal opportunities in employment are not denied 
to anyone. 
5. What are the current trends in Equal Employment Opportunity 
laws and rulings? 
Recently, laws and rulings affecting equal employment opportun­
ities have been more focused on age discrimination, sexual harassment, 
maternity benefits and comparable worth than on racial/ethnic issues. 
However, there is no less need for appropriate employment practices 
involving all employees and especially those in protected classes. There 
appears to be a continued escalation of court cases and EEOC charges. 
6. Based on this study, what are the legally acceptable standards 
which are most likely to prevent charges of discrimination in 
public school employment? 
Personnel officers, employment decision-makers, and boards of 
education must be aware of the legal requirements of equal employment 
opportunity for all employers. These decision-makers should make 
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their decisions based on job-related criteria and use acceptable 
recruiting, interviewing, and selection procedures as outlined in the 
case laws, guidelines, and rulings of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission. Seminars, college and university courses and publications 
abound to assist employers with appropriate procedures. 
Conclusions 
This study has resulted in the following conclusions: 
1. Local boards of education hold only those discretionary powers 
conferred by state law, but school board policies are legally 
binding on the employers and the employees. 
2. School board policies that might result in unlawful employment 
discrimination may have to be proven by the employers to 
be bona fide occupational qualifications to stand muster in 
the courts. 
3. Practices and patterns of equal employment opportunities must 
not disadvantage protected classes of individuals. 
4. Administrators and boards of education who make employment, 
promotion, benefit and compensation decisions need to act 
with well reasoned procedures and anticipate the potential 
adverse impact of their decisions. 
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5. Personnel officers in public school systems, aided by legal 
counsel, must be familiar with the Equal Employment Oppor­
tunity Laws and regulations applicable to public school employ­
ees. 
6. Personnel officers must understand and be prepared to 
respond appropriately to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
4 
Commission (EEOC) by having a working knowledge of Title 
VII and the EEOC Guidelines, questions and answers and 
commission opinions. 
7. School attorneys need to advise personnel officers regularly 
regarding the legal ramifications of employment practices. 
8. Personnel officers in the public schools need to avail them­
selves of special training to understand equal employment 
opportunity procedures as a preventive measure against 
litigation. 
9. Politics and litigation are constantly in a change mode and the 
impermissable and permissable rise and fall on political and 
judicial decisions. These usually have predictable trends, but 
have been somewhat irregular in the rulings based on Title 
VII. 
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10. Sexual harassment has not been faced realistically by most 
school systems. Few policies exist to handle the issue of 
sexual harassment. 
11. Maternity benefits are still in litigious limbo. The United 
States Appellate Courts have handed down conflicting 
decisions on the employer's responsibility. Complaints taken 
to court are subject to individual decisions. 
12. Comparable worth is the newest area of major litigation and is 
likely to be the subject of many lawsuits in the 1980's. 
These cases will be built on strong "equity arguments" and 
our cultural values of "fairness." 
13. Salary and benefits conflicts arise when policies are not clear 
and specific. 
Recommendations 
As a result of this study the following recommendations are made 
to school board members, personnel officers and other administrators: 
1. All employment practices in the public schools must be based 
on the principle of equal employment opportunity for all. 
2. Legal counsel should be an on-going process to the employment 
decision-makers. 
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3. Employment decisions should be based on legitimate job respons 
bilities. 
4. Job descriptions must be developed for all jobs in the school 
district. 
5. Recruitment, and especially advertising, must state that all 
qualified applicants will receive consideration for employment 
without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 
A file of all recruitment and advertising materials should be 
maintained. 
6. Personnel who interview and make employment decisions must 
be skilled in procedures that ensure equal employment oppor­
tunities to all applicants and employees. This in-service will 
focus on the legal ramifications of Title VII and other state 
and federal laws, executive orders and regulatory guidelines. 
7. Wage and salary range for each job title should be a part of 
the job description and identified on the school district's 
salary schedule. There must be objective standards for 
setting compensation that can be applied equally. 
8. Detailed records should be maintained of all employment activi­
ties. 
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9. The top level decision-makers should establish a geographical 
labor market for developing comparative data to assess possible 
adverse impact. The Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(SMSA) is often acceptable. 
10. Employee benefits must be applied equally to all employees and 
needs relating to pregnancy are to be treated like any other 
medical condition. Clearly defined policies on benefit admini­
stration are essential. 
11. All promotional opportunities are to be posted or advertised. 
12. Develop an internal communication system advancing the 
obligation to provide equal employment opportunity without 
regard to religious or ethnic group. 
13. Develop and implement a formal employee evaluation system 
that is an assessment of job functions, not personal traits. 
14. Establish grievance procedures for all employees. 
15. Keep employees informed of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) and of laws and regulations affecting them. 
This includes the posting of appropriate informational posters 
from EEOC. 
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16. Issue strong policy statements opposing sexual harassment in 
the work place and post the statement in prominent locations. 
17. Investigate thoroughly all employee complaints and take appro­
priate action to remedy any discriminatory conduct. 
Recommendations for Future Study 
The determination of discriminatory effects on all persons, but 
especially on protected groups, is a complex and unending task. 
Although Title VII requires employers to be neutral with respect to 
color, religion, and sex, fulfillment of the requirements of Title VII 
is determined by interpretation of the courts and EEOC. 
The writer believes that a continuing study of equal employment 
opportunity in public schools is needed because the escalation of litigation 
is producing new case law with high frequency. 
The following are major areas of possible future litigation under 
Title VII: 
1. Maternity benefits including those available to wives of male 
employees, unwed parents, and child care benefits. 
2. The theory of equal pay under the rubric of sex discrimi­
nation will be a continuing source of misunderstanding 
between employer and employee. The courts may be asked to 
adjudicate a procedure to determine the relative worth of all 
gainful work in society. 
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3. Title VII is not all-inclusive in its coverage as it exists today. 
As court cases between 1964 and 1972 directly affected the 
1972 amendments, the courts may make new rulings that result 
in the need for additional changes in Title VII. 
4. The changes in national politics as advanced by President 
Ronald Reagan will have adverse impact on employee rights 
and there will be additional arguments on the employment at 
will concept. 
Future study is needed on the evolution of Title VII with careful 
attention being given to the interpretation of Title VII issues by the new 
Supreme Court justices appointed by President Reagan. 
Concluding Statement 
One purpose of this study was to present in one volume a review 
of all facets of the legal aspects of equal employment opportunity relating 
to employment practices in the public school setting. A study such as 
this one is only current until new legislation, guidelines, or court cases 
have provided new laws, rules, and case laws. It is a litigious area 
and changes occur often. The study will need constant up-dating for 
future effectiveness. 
A second purpose was to provide help to public school personnel 
officers and other decision-makers in understanding that courts will not 
sustain unlawful employment practices or patterns; however, when 
employers have adequately documented efforts at fairness, the courts 
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have generally supported the public school employers. Courts and legis­
lative bodies have usually not forced any decisions or laws upon school 
administrators and boards of education that fair-minded educators and 
boards of education would not impose on themselves, if they understood 
all the ramifications of equal employment opportunities. 
Courts have ruled against school systems that have made arbitrary 
and capricious decisions that have violated the rights of individuals. 
* 
These decisions have been ruled in favor of protected and nonprotected 
individuals and groups. 
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